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Abstract
This thesis presents an investigation on the institutionalisation of four Brazilian Internet- 
mediated communities that provide debate and organize political mobilization related to 
the education on environmental issues. Drawing on new institutionalism, this research 
claims that institutional factors influence how these collectivities structure their 
governance and decision-making processes. More specifically, this study adopts W. 
Richard Scott’s (2001) framework on institutional carriers to analyse the phenomenon of 
the diffusion of a segregated decision-making process, which Simon (1997 [1945]) 
claims is an instance of centralization present in hierarchical organizations, in 
communities that declare to be attempting to create network-like organizational 
structures. The comparative case study, based on qualitative methodology (in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews), reveals that laws, power and authority systems, cognitive 
schema, jobs, roles, scripts and Internet tools, among other institutional carriers, influence 
the communities in reproducing centralized governance structures. Furthermore, this 
research highlights how social actors interpret and reproduce such social structures in 
their environment. This research balances the role of both social structures and agency to 
understand how institutional forms diffuse through the studied virtual communities. 
Empirical evidence suggests social actors embed institutionalised social structures in their 
practices through adapting them to the situation, which includes the cultivation of 
mechanisms of legitimation and sanctions of patterned behaviour.
Key words: virtual communities, Internet-mediated communities, governance structures, 
new institutionalism, institutional carriers
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1. Introduction: Research groundings
This thesis focuses on researching the new collectivities -  virtual communities -  which 
emerge from the Internet interactions. A review of current literature1, discloses a gap in 
the academic research on this domain, specifically on how institutions influence virtual 
communities, which this research will address. In more precise terms, this research is 
concerned with the influence of institutions on the governance structures of virtual 
communities, particularly on their decision-making processes, issues that have not 
received enough scholarly attention.
These claims are further elaborated in the next sections of this introduction. The first 
section, below, explains important transformations in the contemporary societies that are 
related to the intensification of interactions in economic, political, social and cultural 
levels, which are enabled by the development in transport systems and information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). It also explores that through computer-mediated 
interactions people have voluntarily created a large variety of virtual communities, which 
affect how they experience their social life through relations which are not necessarily 
geographically bounded.
The second section develops the reason why this thesis is concerned with the governance 
structures of virtual communities. Although some authors relate the Internet interactions 
to the emergence of network-like forms of organizing, this link is questioned by others, 
who emphasise the resilience of institutionalised hierarchical social structures in online 
environments. I have undertaken a pilot study with a group of Internet-mediated 
communities, to gain a preliminary idea of how these collectivities accommodate an 
eventual conflict between network and hierarchical forms of organizing. The pilot 
revealed that these communities defend the network model of organizing as being the 
most adequate for them. Questioned about their practices, nonetheless, community
1 This theme is discussed in chapter 2.
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members expose that they adopt more hierarchical governance structures, displaying a 
gap between their actual behaviour and their ideal models. This dissociation is especially 
clear in their decision-making processes, as these communities keep segregated social 
structures -  which excludes the majority of members from making decisions -  an 
instance of centralization which is characteristic of hierarchical organizations.
The third section in this Introduction argues that, interpreting the pilot study through the 
theoretical lens of new institutionalism, the governance structures of these communities 
are influenced by institutionalised hierarchical models. Thus I propose to study the 
processes of institutionalisation of virtual communities through analysing the governance 
structures related to their decision-making processes. This section explains also the 
reasons for choosing new institutionalism as a theoretical framework of this research. In 
particular, I argue that the focus on institutional carriers is a helpful means of 
understanding in detail the process of institutionalisation in virtual communities.
Next, the fourth section spells out the research domain and empirical object (a group of 
four Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated communities), the research 
approach and the research question of this thesis. This section also summarizes the initial 
contribution this research aims and the inherent limits of a theory-driven research, as 
proposed here.
Finally, in the last section, this Introduction outlines the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis.
1.1. The emergence of virtual communities
The last decades have witnessed significant transformations, in economic, political, social 
and cultural levels. At a broad macro level, there is a continuous debate on what has been 
called “the globalization” of contemporary societies (Croucher, 2004; Giddens, 1990; 
Webster, 2002). Although the term globalization has been used to discuss a large range of 
phenomena (Croucher, 2004: 9), the concept has often been related to ideas of global
11
interconnections and interdependences, across time and space, from the production of 
goods and services, to the flow of information, capital and people (Giddens, 1990: 64; 
Webster, 2002: 68; Tomlinson, 1999: 2-3; Walsham, 2000: 291; McGrew, 2000: 347; 
Croucher, 2004: 13-14). This process of interconnecting distant localities and times is 
underpinned by the development of material infrastructures, such as the transport systems 
and information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Urry, 2003: 4-5; Croucher, 
2004: 15; Slevin, 2000: 200; Garcia, 2002: 41; Castells, 1996: 1; McGrew, 2000: 348; 
Webster, 2002: 73).
Other authors discuss the transformations in contemporary societies from the standpoint 
of the relevance of information and knowledge. For these authors, contemporary societies 
in developed countries have entered a new stage, often referred to as the information 
society , in which information and knowledge acquire increasing significance in the 
processes of production and innovation, in economic and cultural areas, at levels that 
have not been observed before (Burnett and Marshall, 2003: 32; Webster, 2002: 2, 26; 
Castells, 2000 [1996]: 17; Feather, 2003: 3-14).
The idea of an information society derives from Daniel Bell’s (1973) concept of post­
industrial society (Lyon, 1988: 3; Webster, 2002: 2, 26; May, 2002: 7). Bell (1973: 13- 
17) claims that industrial societies have developed towards societies of services, with the 
majority of people working in industries such as finance, transport, education and 
government, rather than the production of physical goods. In addition, Bell (ibid: 20) 
argues that theoretical knowledge becomes a central source of innovation in this society, 
as theory gains primacy over empiricism, and knowledge is increasingly codified in 
abstract systems.
2 The concept of information society has been disputed. The main criticisms are against arguments that 
information and communication technologies are responsible for a discontinuity Of processes, or that 
information is more relevant in contemporary societies. For more details see May (2002: 1-2, 17), Black 
(2003: 18-30), Muddiman (2003: 44-50) and Lyon (1995: 59).
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From a second angle, Beniger (1986: 6-13, 21-25) argues that the information society 
emerges from the control revolution. Developing a historical framework, Beniger submits 
that many technologies, processes and structures (such as computers and bureaucracy) 
have been developed to permit a better control of the increasing volume of information, 
which are the outcome of the globalization of markets, initiated in the 1840s by the 
expansion of railroads, steam ships and telegraph. Gradually, the information sector 
becomes more relevant than other industries, argues Beniger (ibid: 21), drawing upon 
Fritz Machlup’s (1962) work3. For Beniger (ibid: 25, 435-436), the information society 
emerged in the early 1970s from this historical process of controlling information, and 
through the greater development of information technology which afforded the expansion 
of the information economy.
The increasing ubiquity of ICTs, notably the Internet, is a fundamental element of the 
transformations towards an information society, owing to their role in connecting people, 
and permitting flows and controls of data and information (Webster, 2002: 73; Croucher, 
2004: 15; Burnett and Marshall, 2003: 18; Day and Schuler, 2004: 9). Castells (2000 
[1996]: 1) strongly pictures this new scenario: “A technological revolution, centred 
around information technologies, is reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of 
society. Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, 
introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state and society, in a system 
of variable geometry”.
Many scholars have researched the consequences of ICTs in society. Specifically in 
relation to the Internet impact, many are concerned with the development of those social 
collectivities4 that emerge from voluntary computer-mediated interaction, which
3 See also Webster (2002: 12) and May (2002: 3-5) on the relevance of Machlup’s work, and how Marc 
Porat (1977) has refined this idea. Machlup is also one main reference in Bell’s work (1973), in the 
development of the concept of post-industrial society.
4 Following Scott (1998: 183), this thesis understands a collectivity as an identifiable portion of the social 
order which has boundaries and distinguishes it from other instances of social organization. Collectivities 
(such as informal groups, communities, organizations, and even societies) thus should have a bounded
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genetically have been called virtual communities (Rheingold, 2000 [1993], Castells 1996, 
2001; Steinmueller, 2002; Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000). In a very broad definition, 
any group that interacts through computer-mediated communication could be called a 
virtual community (which are also called online communities, virtual or online social 
networks, and virtual or online community networks). Indeed, the term has been used to 
describe very different groups with distinct forms of interaction, and it is under dispute 
(Graham, 1999: 131; Preece, 2001: 347; DiMaggio et al. 2001: 317; Komito, 1998: 97; 
Kling and Courtright, 2003: 221) (see discussion in section 2.1). More precisely, Graham 
(1999: 132, 142) restricts the term to those collectivities which have voluntary 
membership of people who have common interests and adhere to a set of rules. This 
thesis specifically adopts Graham’s concept (see more details in section 2.1).5
Graham (1999: 24, 37-38) and Delanty (2003: 165, 168) have emphasised the extent to 
which the Internet has affected social interactions, permitting people to assume more 
active roles and to form social groups not restricted to face-to-face, geographically 
bounded interactions. Many authors, when discussing virtual communities, highlight how 
the Internet empowers people, opening channels to give and receive social, emotional and 
intellectual support (Butler, 2001: 350; Preece, 2001; Rheingold, 2000 [1993]; Wellman 
et al., 1996: 220; Nip, 2004; Komito, 1998: 98).
Scholars, nonetheless, are divided about the consequences of the Internet. As summarized 
by DiMaggio et a l (2001: 310-322), different authors emphasise either utopian or 
dystopian viewpoints, on how this network affects: social inequality (see van Dijk, 1999: 
2; and Castells, 2001: 247); the formation of social capital (see Hampton and Wellman, 
2002; Nip, 2004: 410-411; and Falk, 1997: 289); public debate (see Femback, 1997: 37-
network of social relations, and a normative order that is applicable to those who participate in this 
network.
5 In this thesis, two main terms will be used to refer to these new collectivities. When the issue in 
discussion is generically any kind of collectivity that emerges from voluntary online interactions, this thesis 
uses virtual community. When the discussion is about the chosen empirical object of this research, this 
investigation uses Internet-mediated communities, drawing upon Bellini and Vargas (2003) and Graham 
(1999). The conceptualization of virtual communities is further discussed in chapter 2.
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38; van Dijk, 1999: 2-3; Wellman, 2001: 39; Norris, 2004: 33; and Baym, 1998: 36); and 
civil society movements (see McConnell, 2000: 2; Gomez, 1998: 224; Diani, 2000; 
Stoecker, 2002: 150-153; and Kahn and Kellner, 2004: 87).
1.2. Contrasting features between ideal and actual decision-making processes
This research studies the phenomenon of virtual communities, focusing on their decision­
making processes. This interest is based on two pillars, the academic work on the 
governance of computer-mediated collectivities, such as virtual communities, and the 
empirical data, obtained in a pilot study, on how six Brazilian environmental-education 
Internet-mediated communities (Rebea, Repea, Reasul, Remtea, REA/PB and RAEA6) 
take decisions. This section discussed these pillars.
Some authors have invoked the metaphor of networks to account for the new social 
collectivities and organizational forms that emerge from computer-mediated interactions 
(Castells, 2000 [1996]: 500; 2001; 2000: 15; Rifkin, 2000: 4, 17, 23; Walsham, 2000: 
291; Slevin, 2000: 22-23). For many authors, the Internet is the precursor of non- 
hierarchical forms of organizing (Fukuyama, 1997: 64): network organizational structures 
which distribute the decision making among their nodes, even within formal 
organizations, in such a way that at least hierarchies become flatter and less centralized 
(van Dijk, 1999: 93; Wellman and Hampton, 1999: 648; Day and Schuler, 2004: 3).
6 Rebea -  Rede Brasileira de Educagao Ambiental (Brazilian Environmental-Education Network); site: 
http://www.rebea.org.br. Repea -  Rede Paulista de Educagao Ambiental (Sao Paulo Environmental- 
Education Network); site: http://www.repea.org.br. REASul -  Rede Sul Brasileira de Educagao Ambiental 
(Brazilian South-Region Environmental-Education Network); site: http://www.reasul.org.br/mambo. 
Remtea -  Rede Mato-Grossense de Educagao Ambiental (Mato Grosso Environmental-Education 
Network); site: http://cgi.ufmt.br/remtea/. REA/PB -  Rede de Educagao Ambiental da Paraiba (Paraiba 
Environmental-Education Network); site: http://www.prac.ufpb.br/reapb/. RAEA -  Rede Acreana de 
Educagao Ambiental (Acre Environmental-Education Network); site: http://www.raea.ufac.br/. Sites last 
accessed in June 2006.
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Similarly, Castells (1996: 29, 153, 172, 469; 2000: 5-9, 19; 2000 [1996]: 1) contends that 
the ICT revolution since the 1980s is so profound that it reshapes the material basis of 
societies, providing an environment for the emergence of a new social structures, which 
the author relates to the network society. Castells (ibid) argues that, although there were 
network organizations before this period, the new ICTs provide the material basis for the 
expansion of the network forms of organizing throughout all social spheres. Delanty 
(2003: 182) also states that virtual communities are more democratic, establishing 
horizontal forms of organizing. In sum, these authors point out that the network logic of 
organizing challenges one of the core pillars of hierarchies: the centralization of decision­
making processes, as proposed by the classical work of Weber (1922) (cited in van Dijk, 
1999: 93).
Nonetheless, this image of linking Internet social collectivities to network forms of 
organizing is not unanimous. For instance, Kallinikos (2003b: 2-3) argues that the 
academic literature is not clear about what constitutes a network form of organizing as 
the same term has been used unspecifically to refer to: informal groups; virtual 
communities; flat organizations; and temporary electronically-sustained alliances, as 
counter-examples to the hierarchical organization. The general idea that networks are 
decentralized and permit access for all its nodes does not help us understand the dynamic 
processes of decision making within such organizations, and whether networks really 
challenge the hierarchies and markets as an alternative form of organizing (ibid: 3, 5). 
Slevin (2000: 52) also criticizes the indiscriminate notion of network as organizational 
forms as being too simplistic to explicate situated social practices and Fukuyama (1997: 
64-66) says it lacks precision. Along a similar track, Courpasson and Reed (2004: 11) 
question the very existence of the network form of organizing, and argue that it is 
necessary to be more realistic about the durability of hierarchical organizations in 
contemporary societies.
Other authors question whether this network logic applies straightforwardly to virtual 
communities, especially when coordination of action is necessary. For Jones (1995: 23, 
29-30), for instance, it is not adequate to imply that any electronic space is democratic
16
and egalitarian, and breaks hierarchical structures. Steinmueller (2002) and Graham 
(1999) challenge these ideals of egalitarianism, highlighting that these collectivities have 
their own, distinct, models of authority. Steinmueller (2002: 24) affirms that the 
coordination of individual actions in virtual communities demands the presence of a 
procedural authority that makes decisions. The author emphasises, nonetheless, that this 
procedural authority may mimic different organizational forms, from hierarchies to 
participatory democracy. Graham (1999: 134, 142) comments that, independently of 
having a person who assumes this role, having norms and rules is enough to characterize 
this authority. In sum, Steinmueller and Graham do not take for granted either a 
hierarchical, centralized model of decision making in virtual communities or a 
participatory one.
Indeed, research shows that virtual communities may have both hierarchical and 
participatory governance models. For instance, open-source communities have 
coordinators (leadership members) who decide which changes are released, thus averting 
conflicts and community fragmentation through a hierarchical form of organizing, i.e. 
segregated decision making (Steinmueller, 2002: 52; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003: 1246; 
Sharma, Sugumaran and Rajagopaian, 2002: 10; Ljungberg, 2000: 214; Demil and 
Lecocq, 2006: 1454-1460). Juris (2005: 197) relates, in a counter-example, how anti­
corporate globalization social movements use Internet tools for coordinating their 
activities through decentralized decision-making processes, permitting the nodes to keep 
their autonomy, even while they need to converge as a group in relation to specific issues 
(see also Pickard, 2006, on how Indymedia organizes its decision-making processes).
1.2.1. Pilot study
In sum, the referred literature points out that the governance structures of virtual 
communities may assume diverse organizational forms, from the more hierarchical to the 
more decentralized. Thus, the question I wish to investigate is in which circumstances 
these structures emerge. It was with this question in mind that I conducted a pilot study, 
with a group of six Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated communities, in
17
order to understand the roots of their governance models, and thus to propose and design 
my substantive investigation.
These communities consider themselves civil society networks (informal social 
organizations, without legal status, based on voluntary, non-anonymous membership) 
formed by individuals who generally work in universities, educational entities, non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) and government offices. Students, who share a 
common interest in relation to environmental education, may also be members. 
Communities depend mainly on voluntary work. Some of their projects, nonetheless, 
have received government funding to pay for the work of some members, and private and 
public organizations (such as universities and NGOs) have also supported these 
communities with material and financial resources.
The pilot was based on 13 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, undertaken in 20047 and 
2005, with representatives of these communities, and of an NGO, called Rits , which 
provides technical and logistical support to some of these communities. The community 
members were interviewed twice (once in 2004 and once in 2005), and the Rits member 
once giving a total of 13 in-depth telephone interviews.
Although the pilot investigation was very open, permitting interviewees to talk about 
many issues related to governance structures, interviewees emphasised that the processes 
of making decisions were the cornerstone of their governance model, which became the 
focus of this present work.
7 This first set of seven interviews had been done with the objective of elaborating a dissertation to the MSc 
New Media, Information and Society at London School of Economics and Political Science, which was 
concluded in 2004. The second set of six interviews, in 2005, complemented the first set and provided the 
necessary data to ground the current research.
8 Rits -  Rede de Informafoes para o Terceiro Setor (Information Network for the Third Sector); site: 
http://www.rits.org.br/. Site last accessed in June 2006.
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The data collected in this pilot clearly shows a level of incompatibility between how 
community members described their decision-making processes (called here their ideal 
model of decision making) and how they, in practice, decided community issues (called 
here their actual model of decision making). To summarize, members of these 
communities, when talking abstractly about their ideal model of organizing, stated that 
they organize themselves in networks, understood as egalitarian spaces of decision 
making, in which all members have equal say and weight in the definition of a final 
resolution made in name of the community. They clearly opposed what they call 
hierarchical model of decision making: having segregated decision-making processes, in 
which some people have power to decide on behalf of the whole community. These same 
members, nonetheless, when describing the actual decision-making processes, relate 
procedures in which decision making is concentrated in the hands of some members.
In describing their ideal model, the interviewees emphasised that the communities intend 
to follow network forms of organizing. The communities explicitly inform members of 
this intention (through their websites for instance), and interviewees often referenced 
Martinho’s book (2003) to describe how their communities are organized in a network 
model. This book, sponsored by WWF Brazil, and written with the direct collaboration of 
representatives of two of these communities9, states that one of the most important 
features of a network organization is its capacity to operate in non-hierarchical models: 
adopting horizontal patterns of coordination, opposing what appeared to be the natural 
(vertical) model of organizing human relationships (Martinho: 2003: 16-17).
The interviewees also argued that the goal of creating network organizations stems from 
the political assumptions which underlie social movements: the ideals of participatory 
democracy, in which individuals have voice directly, and not only through their 
representatives (in opposition to the representative democracy). Indeed, scholars point out 
that most social movements, which have emerged since the 1960s, such as feminism, gay 
and lesbian rights and environmentalism, favour decentralized forms of organizing, 
preferring egalitarian structures in which all members participate in decision making,
9 Rebea (Rede Brasileira de Educagao Ambiental) and Repea (Rede Paulista de Educafao Ambiental).
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instead of having a segregated group that takes decisions in name of others (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2003: 165-166; see also Pickard, 2006: 319; and Epstein, 1996: 128-129). For 
instance, Pickard (2006: 316) and Polletta (2002: vii-ix) describe how the Indymedia 
global network and the movements against the globalization adopt this model of 
participatory democracy -  consensus decision making, following values of egalitarianism 
among members. As both authors explain, in this model members deliberate directly, not 
delegating this function to decision-making elites (or elected leaders), thus all members 
are included in decentralized decision-making processes, which should respect diversity 
of thinking, and be open and transparent to permit accountability (ibid).
Contrasting with the ideal of following a participative model, in practice the decision­
making processes in these six Brazilian Intemet-;mediated communities are segregated -  
some members organize themselves on closed discussion lists which are not accessible to 
other members, forming a group responsible for decisions10. This procedure thus denies 
in practice the idea of participatory democracy. Indeed, their practice is not even related 
to the idea of representative democracy, as the studied communities do not choose their 
leaders by voting, do not have rules of power alternation, and do not clarify how the 
leaders are supposed to represent the interests of the communities (Pickard, 2006; 
Urbinati, 2006). Thus, in spite of using the concept of participatory democracy to explain 
the principles of their organizational structures, in practice these organization do not 
follow any criterion which could proximate their models with the democratic schemas.
These segregated groups take decisions on different issues such as: how the communities 
should relate to political debates; where to invest resources; who may represent the 
community to outsiders (spokespersons), including deciding who negotiates funding with 
government offices; who moderates the lists; who publishes on the websites; and who can 
be a member (although any person can join these communities, membership should be
10 In this thesis, the members who are organized through segregated discussion lists, with the objective of 
making decisions, are called management or leadership members (or groups). The members who have 
access exclusively to the general lists are called ordinary members.
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approved by the leadership groups, which also may decide to moderate or exclude 
members from the discussion lists).
Indeed, this segregated model (centralized decision making) resembles more a 
hierarchical organization. Analysing organizations in general, Simon (1997 [1945]: 7) 
concludes that organizations substitute individual decisional autonomy for organizational 
decision-making processes in order to improve the coordination of collective tasks. Thus 
organizations determine who has authority to make decisions on behalf of others, 
defining who is superior and who is subordinate, such that, in case of disagreement, the 
superior has the last word, independent of the strength of arguments (ibid: 7, 179, 182). 
Administrative organizations delegate tasks, generally following a hierarchical division 
of labour. Supervisory personnel become specialized in decision making, characterizing 
the presence of centralized decision-making processes (ibid: 7, 15). For Simon, this 
model of coordinating activities through hierarchical decision-making processes can be 
applied to voluntary, religious and governmental organizations as well as business ones 
(ibid: 15).
By this stage, it was clear that in spite of having idealised models of constructing 
decision-making processes which would resemble network-like forms, reflecting ideals of 
participatory democracy and equalitarianism, these communities were following an 
institutionalised, hierarchical model, in the sense of having a segregated group 
responsible for resolutions. Moreover, the pilot data revealed other aspects that could 
help to understand how this centralized model has been created, in spite of their declared 
intentions of constructing network-like forms of organizing. For instance:
• Four interviewees (Rits, RAEA, Reasul and REA/PB) accepted that formal 
organizations influence the power relations within the communities. This 
influence derives from these communities, although informal and voluntary, 
having strong links with formal organizations, such as government offices, federal 
universities and NGOs. These formal organizations give material (such as offices
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and computers) and financial support to the communities, empowering members 
employed by them relatively to other members.
• One interviewee (RAEA) alleged that some members are cautious in expressing 
their opinions in these communities, avoiding opposing the interests of 
organizations to which they are affiliated.
• Four interviewees (RAEA, Rebea, Repea and Reasul) justified the presence of 
segregated decision-making processes in projects that are funded by the 
government, because the legislation demands a level of accountability that would 
not be possible without some level of centralization in decisions.
• Two interviewees (Repea and Reasul) argued that society demands formal 
representation from their communities, thus justifying the presence of formalized 
roles, such as executive secretary, as a way of facilitating and legitimating the 
dialogue with non-members, although the communities theoretically defend the 
equal status of all members.
• Three interviewees (Rebea, Repea and Remtea) took for granted the effectiveness 
* and rationality of segregated decision-making processes to avoid inconsistent
behaviour, conflicting information and delays in dispute resolution, in spite of 
these arrangements conflicting with their proclaimed model of promoting a 
network form of organizing. Interviewees faced difficulties in spelling out 
alternatives to their segregated decision-making processes.
• Five interviewees (Rebea, Repea, Reasul, Remtea and RAEA) stated that 
members followed traditional hierarchical patterns of interaction, wanting 
community leaders to take initiatives, although it could be otherwise as any 
member could, in theory, try to take initiatives.
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• Five interviewees (Rebea, Repea, Remtea, RAEA and Reasul) highlighted that 
Internet tools, which support their communication, influence the kind of 
governance structure communities adopt. For instance, groupware discussion lists 
(such as Yahoo!) automatically give special status to the person who creates the 
list, such as the right of: (i) extinguishing the list without consultation to 
members; (ii) defining who can be owner or moderator and with what rights; and 
(iii) moderating the messages of members. Furthermore, the architecture of their 
sites permits restricting the right of publishing to a few community members, 
through limiting the distribution of passwords.
Building on the academic debate and the pilot study, this research proposes to investigate 
how hierarchical institutions influence decision-making processes in Intemed-mediated 
communities.
To summarise, this section has firstly depicted the academic debate on the governance of 
collectivities that emerge from computer-mediated interactions. On the one hand, 
Castells, (2000 [1996]), Rifkin, (2000) and other authors point to the emergence of 
network organizational forms. On the other hand, scholars, including Fukuyama (1997) 
and Kallinikos (2003b), demand more details if we are to accept that such a network 
model exists and represents a challenge to other organizational constructs, such as 
hierarchies and markets. This debate also concerns the governance of virtual 
communities. Empirical research demonstrates these communities may either develop 
participatory-democratic models, or cultivate hierarchical structures (Jones, 1995; 
Steinmueller, 2002; Graham, 1999; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Sharma, Sugumaran and 
Rajagopaian, 2002; Ljungberg, 2000; Juris, 2005; Pickard, 2006).
Secondly, I have presented a pilot study on how a group of Brazilian environmental- 
education Internet-mediated communities organizes its decision-making processes. The 
empirical findings indicate that community members state their intention to construct 
network (horizontal) forms of organizing: social structures in which all members have a
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say in resolutions that affect the collective. The pilot suggests, with a closer scrutiny of 
how decisions are effectively made, that these communities adopt segregated decision­
making processes, an instance of centralization, clearly resembling Simon’s (1997 
[1945]) description of hierarchical structures.
This topic is developed in the next section.
1.3. The relevance of studying the institutional influence in virtual communities
This research thus proposes to study four Brazilian environmental-education Internet- 
mediated communities in order to gain a better understanding of how hierarchical 
institutions influence virtual communities in their establishment of decision-making 
processes. The research will apply the literature on institutions11, in particular the authors 
that follow the sociological branch of new institutionalism. The research will show that 
the presented phenomenon clearly resembles a process of institutionalisation of 
governance structures (isomorphism), as institutionalised social structures12 influence 
emergent ones.
11 The concepts of institutions and institutionalisation are discussed extensively in chapter 3. Following 
Scott’s (2001: 48) definition: “Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree o f 
resilience [...] [which] are composed o f culture-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements, that, 
together with associate activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. ’’ This research 
also considers that there is a process of institutionalisation when patterns of action are repeated, acquiring a 
collective taken-for-granted meaning for actors, and are diffused through settings across time and space, 
drawing upon Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]), Scott (1998), DiMaggio and Powell (1991a), and 
Avgerou (2000).
12 The concept of social structure is discussed in chapter 3. In brief, this research follows Giddens’s 
structuration theory (1979, 1984), in understanding social structures as rules and resources which structure 
behaviour, being memory traces (knowledge) about how action should be performed (Giddens, 1979: 64; 
1984: 17, 25; Porpora, 1998 [1989]: 345). In this approach, nonetheless, social structures influence rather 
than define behaviour, as social actors may change old structures (ibid). This concept is compatible with the 
adopted theoretical lens on new institutionalism and institutional carriers, as suggested by W.R. Scott 
(2001: 67, 75) and J. Scott (1995: 214).
24
The pilot study reinforces the idea that institutions may influence action and structure 
through coercion (such as the direct pressure of organizations that support communities) 
and imitation (such as the reproduction of hierarchical structures, contradicting the 
espoused horizontal ones). DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]) call this process 
institutional isomorphism: organizational structures and processes become increasingly 
similar through time, under certain circumstances (see also Scott and Meyer, 1994: 2- 
4). In addition, the pilot study suggests that taken-for-granted models may sustain 
institutional hierarchical structures, as they make alternatives unimaginable, as proposed 
by new institutionalism (Avgerou, 2000: 236-237; Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 
71-75, 82; Scott, 1998: 135; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 21). These institutional 
influences occur despite agents having the freedom to do otherwise (Scott, 2005: 471; 
March, 1994: 73-76; Jepperson, 1991: 159).
More precisely, this research applies Scott’s (2001) framework on institutional carriers to 
understand how hierarchical institutions influence communities in their decision-making 
processes. As will be discussed in chapter 3, scholars relate the concept of an institutional 
carrier to social strata, actors, organizations, rules, norms, cognitive schemas and 
artefacts (among other social constructs) that carry institutionalised patterns of behaviour 
from setting to setting in time and space (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Weber, 
2002 [1930]; 1978 [1956]; Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973; Jepperson, 1991; Meyer, 
1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b [1983]; and Scott, 2001). In this direction, Scott 
(2001: 77) provides a very detailed framework on 12 categories of institutional carriers, 
which have regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive features, and act through 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and artefacts; this framework will be used 
to illuminate the researched phenomenon.
As noted earlier, the preliminary data obtained in the pilot study indicate that at least 
some institutional carriers are present in the institutionalisation of decision-making 
processes in these Internet-mediated communities, influencing their social structures. For 
instance, Brazilian legislation demands that these informal collectivities have a formal 
representative (such as an NGO or a university) in order to be eligible for government
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funding, thus forging differences among members. The roles and authority that members 
have in society, derived from their organizational affiliations or from their prestige in 
society, affect their power in these communities. The ideas that hierarchical models are 
more efficient and rational, and that community leaders are responsible for taking the 
initiatives (<cognitive schemas) limit the possibilities of envisaging other organizational 
models. Finally, Internet tools embed some rules (such as the possibility of moderating 
members in discussion lists and delimiting authority to publish contents on websites), 
which encourage a leadership group to appropriate these technologies in ways which 
favour centralized structures of decision making.
This research also draws upon the literature on virtual communities to conclude that in 
spite the recognition of the relevance of studying institutional influences in virtual 
communities (DiMaggio et al., 2001; Venkatesh, 2003), few studies have adopted this 
approach (with valuable exceptions such as Matzat, 2004, and Souza et al., 2004) (this 
literature gap is explored in section 2.4). Moreover, none of these academic studies either 
reviews how institutions affect decision-making processes in virtual communities, or 
adopts new institutionalism as a theoretical framework. Thus there is a lacuna in the 
academic work to which this research will contribute.
Furthermore, this research draws upon Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000: 699), arguing 
that it is fruitful to analyse the process of institutionalisation by paying attention to 
durable social artefacts, rather than trying to understand such a complex phenomenon 
only through abstract concepts. Indeed, the framework on institutional carriers matches 
this entreaty to objectify institutions in specific social constructs, such as laws, values 
systems, authority systems, roles, standard procedures and objects (such as Internet 
tools), following a micro-level approach, in Berger’s and Luckmann’s (1967 [1966]) 
mode, in contrast with the more abstract macro-level approach (Czamiawska-Joerges, 
1992: 56). These claims are clarified in chapter 3, when this research’s theoretical 
framework is presented.
The next section will detail the main features of the current research.
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1.4. Research design
This section discusses this research design in more details. The first two subsections 
present the research domain and the empirical object of study (a group of four Brazilian 
environmental-education Internet-mediated communities). The third and fourth 
subsections describe the research approach and the research question. The final 
subsection clarifies the initial contribution of this research and the inherent limits of a 
theory-driven thesis.
1.4.1. Research domain
This research is concerned with the domain of virtual communities, broadly understood 
here as any kind of social collectivity that emerges from voluntary computer-mediated 
interactions (drawing upon Rheingold, 2000 [1993], Steinmueller, 2002, and Mansell and 
Steinmueller, 2000). As indicated above, authors use the concept of virtual community, 
and other similar ones, to refer to very different social groups that emerge from Internet 
interactions. Thus this research adopts this term for its broad domain, in order to locate its 
contribution in the scholarly literature.
This thesis, nonetheless, agrees with DiMaggio et al. (2001: 317) that researchers should 
define clearly the type of virtual community they study, avoiding mixing different 
collectivities in the same category. In accordance with this guidance, this work seeks to 
define more precisely the nature of the virtual community that is being studied here.
The next subsection will outline two aspects of the domain. First, this research draws 
upon Graham (1999) to argue that the computer-mediated collectivities studied here may 
be defined as communities. Second, this research agrees with Bellini and Vargas (2003) 
that _ the term Internet-mediated is preferable to virtual or online, when discussing the 
referred collectivities, as it is more precise in defining the effective communication 
channel of these communities.
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1.4.2. Research empirical objects
The empirical objects (units of analysis, using the terms of Patton, 2002: 229; and Yin, 
2003: 26) of this research are four Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated 
communities. It is thus necessary to explain why the concept of Internet-mediated 
communities applies for the studied collectivities.
First, these social collectivities are communities following Graham’s (1999) 
conceptualization that any community should have defined boundaries in accordance 
with three criteria: (i) members should be bound together voluntarily; (ii) they should 
have common interests; and (iii) they should accept to adhere to rules, such as procedures 
of admission and exclusion (see section 2.2 for a fuller discussion of the 
conceptualization of communities as bounded social collectivities).
Indeed, the chosen communities exhibit these three elements. Membership is voluntary, 
and any person who is interested in environmental education can ask for admission. The 
communities have a common interest: the theme of environmental education, and issues 
related to professionals of this field in Brazil, such as legislation, best practices, courses 
and job offers. The communities also have rules. For instance, in order to register, the 
person should supply personal data, as discussion lists are not anonymous. In addition, 
members are supposed to cultivate an adequate level of politeness in online interactions 
(netiquette), and to keep discussions restricted to the group interest. Furthermore, 
communities also have rules for excluding or punishing verbally members who do not 
comply with current norms.
Second, following Bellini and Vargas (2003), the chosen communities are called Internet- 
mediated, rather than virtual, because the majority of their interactions are through the 
Internet. These groups, nonetheless, occasionally have face-to-face meetings, and their 
members can communicate through other channels, such as the telephone. The most 
common adjective to refer to these communities in the literature are virtual and online, 
but these terms do not clarify whether the channel is the Internet.
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The studied communities are informal organizations, self-described as networks and not 
having any kind of legal existence. They have received, nonetheless, financial and 
material support from formal organizations, such as government offices, universities and 
NGOs. These communities also have members who work on these formal organizations, 
and indeed they have stemmed from inter-actions between government offices, 
universities and NGOs. In spite of these characteristics, interviewees still understand 
these communities as independent social movements (networks), since they are formally 
independent of these other organizations, and members participate voluntarily 
(participation is not linked to their professional duties).
Specifically, this research focuses on four communities13:
a) Rebea (Rede Brasileira de Educa^ao Ambiental) {Brazilian
Environmental-Education Network): in existence since 1992, active at a 
national level. The community had around 380 members on the general
list and around 600 members on Orkut -  the Google’s online social
network14. Rebea management group had around 100 members. Site: 
http://www.rebea.org.br.
b) Repea (Rede Paulista de Educa^ao Ambiental) {Sao Paulo
Environmental-Education Network): in existence since 1992, but active 
more regularly since 1999, in the State of Sao Paulo. The community had 
around 560 members on the general list and 90 members in the 
management group. Site: http://www.repea.org.br/.
c) Reasul (Rede Sul Brasileira de Educa^ao Ambiental) {Brazilian South- 
Region Environmental-Education Network): in existence since 2002, 
active in three states of the Brazilian south (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa 
Catarina and Parana). The community had around 2,000 members on the
13 The cited membership numbers are related to April/June 2006.
14 Some members are in both lists.
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general list and around 100 members in the management group. Site: 
http://www.reasul.org.br/mambo/.
d) Remtea (Rede Mato-Grossense de Educa^ao Ambiental) (Mato Grosso 
Environmental-Education Network)', in existence since 1996, active in the 
State of Mato Grosso. The community had around 200 members on the 
general list and around 25 members in the management group. Site: 
http://cgi.ufmt.br/remtea/index.htm.
For the sake of simplicity, this investigation refers to its empirical object as Internet- 
mediated communities, thus avoiding repeating that they are Brazilian environmental- 
education networks. When cited individually, this research uses their acronyms (Rebea, 
Repea, Remtea and Reasul). The reasoning behind the choice of these four communities 
to do a multiple case-study is given in subsection 4.2.1.
Furthermore, these communities are organisationally independent of each other. Repea, 
Reasul and Remtea are associated to Rebea, but one can be member of Repea, Reasul and 
Remtea without being member of Rebea, as membership is individual and voluntary (not 
defined by any kind of affiliation). Rebea is constituted as a network of networks, 
inviting all similar Brazilian Internet-mediated communities to associate to this national 
network. Local, regional and state communities, nonetheless, take individual decisions on 
affiliation and one community does not have formal power to define the activities of 
other communities. Thus although Rebea acts at a national level this does not mean that it 
has special rights to define how the other communities work in their respective areas.
It is also relevant to note that the studied communities have gained inspiration from the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro 
(Brazil) in 1992 (http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html). Alongside this conference, 
there were parallel forums to discuss related issues, such as the Global Forum of NGOs 
that developed the Treaty on Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and 
Global Responsibility (http ://csdngo. i gc.org/alttreaties/AT05 .htm). This Treaty suggests 
fostering the emergence of social movements to spread its proposals, such as creating
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networks of environmental educators, and grounding these movements in their grassroots. 
Another document emerged from the Global Forum, the Communication, Information, 
Media and Networking Treaty (http://csdngo.igc.org/alttreaties/AT06.htrn). has prompted 
the NGOs to improve their communication channels, including computer-mediated 
interaction, and promoted network forms of organizing and sharing information as a way 
of amplifying their voice in decision-making processes in local and global levels (Hassan, 
2004: 108).
Social and civil society movements have become increasingly important in contemporary 
societies, which have been widely recognized by international organizations such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank (Castells, 2001: 138, 142-143; Stoecker, 2002: ISO- 
153; and Kahn and Kellner, 2004: 87)15. Scholars also emphasise the role of the Internet 
in supporting social movements (McConnell, 2000: 2; Gomez, 1998: 224; Horton, 2004: 
735-737, 740-744; Back and Stark, 2005: 37-39,41; Garrett, 2006: 202-206).
These aspects help to define the context in which the studied Internet-mediated 
communities have emerged, based on the appropriation of computer-mediated 
communication channels, as well as indicate the origins of their goal of creating network 
forms of organizing, through supporting and amplifying the political demands of these 
networks of environmental educators, since the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, in 1992.
In practice these communities organize themselves to diffuse pieces of information and 
knowledge, to debate relevant technical and political issues in the field of environmental 
education and to mobilize themselves politically as social movements in order to 
influence the government and other institutions to consider their demands. Community
15 Social movements, including NGOs, are increasingly more relevant in the contemporary political life, 
crossing national borders, and challenging relations of power, as for example the Greenpeace 
(environmentalist international NGO), the Zapatista movement (social movement in the region of Chiapas, 
Mexico), and Falun Gong (Chinese religious and social movement) (see more about this issue on Croucher, 
2004: 12, 18; Dahlgren, 1991; 2000: 315; and Castells, 2001: 138-139,144, 164).
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members daily send and receive messages about the theme of environmental education, 
from news about techniques and events to further debates on pedagogical issues related to 
the field. Many of these messages focus on how the government is tackling the related 
issues: projects, funding opportunities, federal policies, international agreements, annual 
budget etc. Occasionally the communities mobilize themselves to oppose or support the 
government in local and federal levels. Using the Internet as their main communication 
channel, members inform their political position to governmental offices. Some times this 
communication is individual: each member send her or his own email to the specific 
office, thus the collective movement is obtained by the sum of the individual 
manifestations. Other times the community leadership sends emails or formal letters in 
the name of the community as a whole.
The studied communities related, for instance, two important cases in which their 
collective mobilization had political impact. In one occasion, the communities have 
opposed the distribution of pedagogical material which has been funded by resources of a 
corporation which produces transgenic food. They have understood that the content of 
such a publication has been distorted to favour transgenic food, which is opposed by the 
studied communities. In other occasion, even more drastic, the federal government has 
decided to extinguish the office responsible for environmental education. The collective 
mobilization of many environmental-education Internet-mediated communities have 
convinced the federal government to review the cited extinction. The communities also 
may support the government, and indeed it happens, as the main discussion in this thesis 
will explore.
The identity of the studied communities is intrinsically ambiguous, as they are informal 
social movements and have members from NGOs, universities, educational institutions 
and other private organizations, as well as from the government. Thus the collective 
political manifestations not necessarily represent the individual members’ interests. 
Specially in situations of opposition or support of the government, members assume 
diverse positions, that not necessarily are represented in the so called collective decision.
32
1.4.3. Research approach
This research follows an interpretive orientation (to be presented in chapter 4), and new 
institutionalism, at a theoretical level (to be discussed in chapter 3), to investigate how 
hierarchical institutions influence social structures that are related to decision-making 
processes in the four selected communities. This thesis starts from the empirical 
observation, obtained from the pilot study, that these communities have segregated social 
structures related to their decision-making processes (an instance of centralization, 
following the hierarchical model described by Simon, 1997 [1945]), in spite of declaring 
their aim of constructing network-like structures. More specifically, this work adopts 
Scott’s (2001) framework on institutional carriers to understand in more detail how 
institutions influence the emergence of segregated decision-making processes in these 
Internet-mediated communities, as the observed dynamic resembles the diffusion of 
institutional features (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b [1983]).
Further, this research draws upon work that has pointed out the relevance of considering 
institutional influences on virtual communities (DiMaggio et al., 2001; Venkatesh, 2003; 
Matzat, 2004; and Souza et al., 2004), and upon Wellman’s (2004: 127) request for 
theory-driven research on Internet phenomena. As, to date, researchers have adopted 
mainly descriptive and exploratory approaches, it becomes increasingly necessary to use 
specific theoretical lenses to produce theoretically sound insights and frameworks. This 
thesis, thus, adopts a theory-driven approach, following new institutionalism to frame its 
question, to guide the data collection and to analyse the resulting data. This investigation 
empirically explores the idea that institutional carriers influence the decision-making 
processes in Internet-mediated communities.
In addition, drawing upon Gregor (2006: 613, 618-619), this research adopts new 
institutionalism as a theoretical lens which helps to explain how things happen in the 
studied phenomenon, without aiming to test the theory. Following Gregor (ibid: 618-619, 
623-624), the aim of this explanation is not to point out a scientific law-like 
generalization that governs a phenomenon, through for instance statistical association.
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The objective is, rather, to discuss a causality that is related to broader mechanisms, in 
order to improve the understanding of the phenomenon: to show a certain way of 
analysing the world (ibid). For Gregor (ibid: 624), case-study research design is 
particularly useful to develop this kind of explanatory theoretical approach, which is the 
methodology adopted by this research (as presented in section 4.2).
1.4.4. Research question
Based on this background, this research has a broad interest in exploring how 
institutionalised hierarchical structures influence the decision-making processes of 
Internet-mediated communities. More specifically, this research proposes to answer the 
following question:
How do institutional carriers influence the establishment o f governance structures 
in Internet-mediated communities that lead to segregated decision-making 
processes (an instance o f centralization) that contrast with the official rhetoric o f  
the communities for non-hierarchical, network-like modes o f operating?
1.4.5. Outline of contributions and limitations
The arguments on the contributions and limitations of this research are detailed in chapter 
8 (concluding discussion). In this introduction, nonetheless, it is worthwhile to briefly 
describe the contribution this thesis makes and also some of its limitations.
First, this investigation intends to fill a gap in the academic literature on virtual 
communities. As discussed in chapter 2, there is a general lacuna in the scholarly 
literature on how institutionalised structures influence virtual communities. This hiatus is 
even more acute in relation to the influence of institutionalised structures on community 
governance structures, and decision-making processes. This research directly contributes 
to reducing this gap.
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Second, in terms of limitations, I am aware that, in choosing one theoretical lens (new 
institutionalism), there are other possible interpretations that will not be developed here. 
As well summarized by Walsham (1993: 7): “Theory is both a way of seeing and a way 
of not-seeing. A particular theoretical perspective blinds us to other perspectives at its 
moment of application”. Thus theory-driven research on the one hand has the advantage 
of guiding the data collection, helping to distinguish relevant observations from irrelevant 
ones (Walsham, 1995: 76; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 29), but on the other hand it 
implies the risk of being more restricted in terms of the possible interpretations of the 
social phenomena (Walsham, 1993: 7; Vaughan, 1995 [1992]: 195).
Based on empirical and theoretical evidence, this study approaches Internet-mediated 
communities in order to understand the institutional influence on their decision-making 
processes. One can argue that this focus somehow glosses the newness of these social 
collectivities, as this research is clearly concerned with studying how these Internet- 
mediated communities resembles institutionalised, hierarchical structures and not how 
they differ. It is thus necessary to make some clarifications on this argument.
This work does not deny that virtual communities have the potential to create network­
like governance structures, and indeed many scholars have discussed this possibility 
(Castells, 2000 [1996]; Delanty, 2003; Steinmueller, 2002; Graham, 1999; Juris, 2005; 
Pickard, 2006). This research, nonetheless, is concerned not with the newness of 
governance structures of the four studied Internet-mediated communities, but with the 
similarity (isomorphism) of their decision-making processes with long-standing 
institutionalised, hierarchical ones. Indeed, the simple fact that this domain is being 
investigated implies that it could be otherwise, that the decision-making processes might 
not have been influenced by hierarchical structures. But in practice, at least the pilot 
study demonstrates that these Internet-mediated communities have been influenced.
Certainly, other research may follow a different path and demonstrate the newness of 
these social collectivities, but still the presence of new behaviour patterns, which do not
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resembles centralized ones, does not constitute evidence against the presence of 
behaviour patterns that resembles old ones. This study thus recognizes its limitations, of 
focusing on one side of the phenomena, namely the institutional influence. It restates, 
nonetheless, that it is possible to investigate the converse phenomena: that governance 
structures that do not only resemble institutionalised ones. Furthermore it argues that its 
concern with institutional influences is valid per se, as the phenomena in question permit 
this approach, as demonstrated by the pilot study.
1.5. Outline of next chapters
This research develops as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on virtual 
communities, indicating the main issues debated in this domain. This chapter describes 
the controversy in terms of the adequacy of using the term community for referring to 
computer-mediated interactions; the need to define community boundaries in this specific 
domain; and the main themes that scholars have discussed in relation to virtual 
communities. Finally, this chapter argues that there is a gap in the academic literature on 
how institutions influence the governance structures of virtual communities.
Chapter 3 presents this research’s theoretical framework, new institutionalism. The 
chapter develops a perspective which explains how institutions and the process of 
institutionalisation are understood in this thesis. The chapter then outlines a specific 
framework on how institutional carriers explain the institutionalisation of social 
structures, drawing mainly upon Scott (2001).
Chapter 4 introduces this research’s conceptual framework, design and data collection 
methods. The conceptual framework follows an interpretive orientation, to understand 
how institutions influence behaviour pattern, highlighting also the relevance of social 
context in the study of social phenomena. The chapter discusses the reasons for designing 
a multiple case-study research, and the methods used to obtain data, mainly a qualitative 
approach of in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the processes of choosing the empirical objects, transcribing the interviews,
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coding and translating, as well as the procedures adopted to ensure the quality of this 
research.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present findings and analyses of this thesis. Chapter 5 focuses on 
mapping the institutional carriers which influence the studied communities in the 
reproduction of segregated decision-making processes. Chapter 6 introduces the role of 
agency in the reproduction of this institutionalised social structure within virtual 
environments, through two constructs: arguments (which are justifications for adopted 
behaviour) and tactics (which are the actual practice associated with the reproduction of 
social structures in the situation). And chapter 7 compares the four cases studied in this 
thesis, exploring both their similarities and contrasts, and related contexts.
Finally, chapter 8 consolidates and discusses the findings and analysis of this thesis. It 
answers the research question in a systematic fashion, explaining the role of institutional 
carriers in the diffusion of social structures through the studied communities. It also 
presents the contributions of this thesis, suggesting that Scott’s (2001) framework on 
institutional carriers may be improved through adding new elements (arguments and 
tactics), which emphasise the role of agency in the process of institutionalisation. 
Furthermore, the chapter points out the limitations of this investigation and suggests 
future researches in the field.
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2. Literature review: The debate on virtual communities
Computer-mediated interactions, especially through the Internet, have permitted the 
emergence of new forms of voluntary collectivities. These formations have usually been 
called: virtual, online communities; or virtual, online social networks; or community 
networks. This chapter presents a review of the literature concerning these new 
collectivities, here called generically, as described in chapter 1, virtual communities, with 
the objective of mapping the academic research in this domain, as well as of identifying 
how this thesis can contribute to scholarly work.
Reviewing this literature, published between January 1993 and March 2006, it becomes 
clear that scholars have strong disagreements about the best term to use when referring to 
these new electronic collectivities. The main disagreement is between those who prefer 
the term community, and those who defend the concept of social network. The first 
section below discusses this theme, as well as the arguments for using the term 
community in this thesis.
The debate among authors, nonetheless, goes further: some argue that a virtual 
collectivity is a community as long as it has clear boundaries, and others use the term 
community in a very loose way, to refer to any computer-mediated group. The second 
section summarizes this discussion and presents Graham’s (1999) proposal that a virtual 
community should have clear boundaries, a criterion that is followed by this thesis in the 
definition of its empirical object (subsection 1.4.2).
Next, this chapter presents the main themes that have been researched by scholars in the 
domain of virtual communities. This third section does not aim to be an exhaustive 
classification, but to picture the main research focuses. In a nutshell, the academic work 
has made six major propositions in relation to virtual communities:
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(i) these collectivities have functioned as channels for exchanging information 
and emotional support;
(ii) they may enable or constrain the formation of social capital;
(iii) they may help local communities to support themselves through computer-
mediated interactions;
(iv) they may foster the construction of identities and sense of belonging among 
dispersed people;
(v) they struggle for long term sustainability; and
(vi) they have rules and norms of governance and behaviour.
In the light of the main theme of this thesis, this literature review thus narrows down its 
focus to exploring how scholars have studied the influence of institutions in virtual 
communities. Although some scholars recognize the relevance of such studies, few 
researches analyse the phenomenon in depth. Due to this gap in the academic literature, 
the fourth section develops the claim that this research may contribute to this scholarly 
domain.
Finally, the last section presents the methodology of this literature review and its limits.
2.1. Community versus social network
The conceptualization of computer-mediated collectivities has received #impressive 
attention from scholars. The main disagreement is whether to call these groups 
communities or social networks. When computer-mediated communication started to 
appear, Licklider and Taylor (1968: 38) proposed calling these emergent collectivities 
online interactive communities, meaning geographically dispersed groups, which share 
common interests rather than location, linked through electronic interactions.
The term virtual community was popularised by Rheingold (2000 [1993]), in the first 
edition of a book that analysed the personal interactions on a Usenet -  User Network -  
group (WELL - Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link), between 1985 and 1993. For Rheingold,
39
“[v]irtual communities are social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough 
people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to 
form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” (ibid: XX). Following Rheingold, 
many scholars adopt the term virtual community (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000: 84; 
Steinmueller, 2002: 21; Castells, 1996: 362; 2001: 125; van Dijk, 1999: 159). Others 
have preferred similar alternatives, such as: virtual communities o f interest (Gomez, 
1998); knowledge communities (Barrett et al., 2004); cybercommunities (Femback, 1999: 
211; Delanty, 2003: 168); computer-mediated communities (Etzioni and Etzioni, 1999); 
and Internet-mediated communities (Bellini and Vargas, 2003).
In spite of being widely spread, some scholars have questioned the adequacy of using the 
term community for electronic interaction. The main argument here is that this concept is 
traditionally related to ideas of kinship and geographical proximity1, by analogy with pre­
industrial societies in which these dimensions defined local, small, rural communities 
(Slevin, 2000: 92-98; Mitra, 1997: 56-59; Watson, 1997: 103; Barab, 2003: 198).
Naturally, this argument is strongly questioned by authors who oppose the idea that 
community must be synonymous with neighbourhood or locality, especially in 
contemporary societies. They claim that people, especially from the 1960s onwards, keep 
strong and weak relationships through many communication media (from letters, to the 
telephone, to the Internet), as well as through transport means (cars, trains and airplanes), 
independent of geographical boundaries and physical presence (Rheingold, 2000 [1993]: 
359; Wellman, 1997: 185; Mitra, 1997: 56-57; Castells, 2001: 125; Anderson, 1999: 
457). Indeed, the criterion of neighbourhood does not explain religious, cultural, ethnic or 
gay communities (Etzioni and Etzioni, 1999: 241-242), as well as open-source software 
communities (Barrett et al., 2004: 4-7; Steinmueller, 2002: 33, 51). There are also
1 Falk (1997: 289), and Kling and Courtright (2003: 224) explain that the traditional concept of community 
derive from the work of the sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies, who links these “village-style” collectivities 
(Gemeinschaft) with locality, closed ties and shared values, in opposition to the idea of “city-style” 
collectivities (Gesellschaft) (society), which are characterized by dispersed social ties and dissimilar 
interests. See Tonnies (1955) for further details.
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arguments that ICTs provide a socially constructed space of communication, 
independently of physical presence (Jones, 1995: 16-17; Carter, 2005: 148; Bellini and 
Vargas, 2003: 4; Wachter, Gupta and Quaddus, 2000: 477), which Rheingold (2000 
[1993]: XVII) calls conceptual space.
Moreover, these authors comment that people have similar experience and interpret in 
similar way their social interactions through online and offline communication channels. 
In both environments they cultivate a sense of belonging and attachment, and they do 
similar things such as debating and exchanging information and emotional support 
(Jones, 1998: 4-5; Delanty, 2003: 168; Rheingold, 2000 [1993]: XVII; Cohen, 2000 
[1985]: 15, 98). Thus it would not be necessary to call them differently only because the 
communication channel is diverse.
Compared to community, the concept social network has the advantage of being 
comprehensive, applying to any group of people, organization and social entity connected 
by social relations through any communication channel (from face-to-face meetings to 
computer-mediated interactions) (Wellman, 1997: 180; Garton et al., 1999: 75, 88). The 
concept, however, has shortcomings. Firstly, social networks do not have clear 
boundaries, such as criteria of membership, forcing researchers to define such limits 
arbitrarily (Crow, 2004: 9). Secondly, social networks do not have governance structures 
(Wijk et al., 2003: 429), unlike many online collectivities. The concept thus is better 
related to loosely defined relationships, rather than more structured interactions.
Many scholars have defended the re-conceptualisation of the term community in order to 
integrate the developments in transport and communication technologies, emphasising 
issues of social relations and interactions, identity and shared interests, rather than 
locality, bounded neighbourhood and face-to-face communication (Warschauer, 2003: 
319; Barab, 2003: 198; Haythomthwaite and Wellman, 2002: 32-34; Castells, 2001: 125- 
127; Preece, 2001: 347-349; Graham, 1999: 132-134; Anderson, 1999: 457-462; Jones, 
1998: 4-12, 1995: 11-20; Howard, 1997: 83; Porter, 1996: 13; Komito, 1998: 99).
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Some scholars follow Anderson’s proposition (2003 [1983]: 6) that “all communities 
larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined”, since modernity has introduced communities, such as nation states, that 
cannot be sustained through personal contact (Bakardjieva, 2003: 293; Femback, 1999: 
213; Komito, 1998: 99; Slevin, 2000: 93; Delanty, 2003: 170; Mitra, 1997: 55). Indeed, 
Watson (1997: 120) proposes that the focus on imagination permits us to judge 
communities from the viewpoint of participants, rather than detached observers.
We can conclude that community is not synonymous with locality, especially in 
contemporary societies, in which people are able to maintain dispersed social ties through 
communication and transport technologies. This further allows us to draw upon work that 
emphasises the view of communities as sense of belonging and emotional attachment, 
and to employ Anderson’s proposition that communities are imagined.
2.2. The boundaries of virtual communities
Reviewing the conceptualization of the term virtual community itself, scholars have 
complained that it lacks a clear definition. The main problem is that it is used 
indiscriminately, meaning anything from groups of people who do not live 
geographically close, but share common interests, to community networks that are 
bounded to specific neighbourhoods (Graham, 1999: 131; Preece, 2001: 347; DiMaggio 
et al. 2001: 317; Komito, 1998: 97; Kling and Courtright, 2003: 221).
On the one hand, some scholars adopt a very loose concept of virtual community. 
Mansell and Steinmueller (2000: 84), for instance, use this concept in a broad sense, not 
only as a network of friends, as suggested by Rheingold (2000 [1993]), but also as “the 
entire gamut of social interchange that may arise from interpersonal interactions in 
electronic commerce, in education, and in scientific research”. Later, Steinmueller (2002: 
21, 28) reaffirms that there is a virtual community when its members interact through 
computer-mediated communication voluntarily. Castells (1996: 362) has a broad
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definition: a virtual community is “a self-defined electronic network of interactive 
communication organized around a shared interest or purpose”.
On the other hand, other scholars favour a restrict definition that provides a boundary 
between membership of virtual communities and non-members. Discussing communities 
in general terms, Cohen (2000 [1985]: 12) states that it is necessary to understand 
community boundaries, in order to clarify what the members of a group have in common 
(their identity), and how they are distinguishable from other groups. The author 
emphasises the symbolic aspect of these boundaries, the meaning people give to them 
through social interactions, while remembering that different members have different 
perception of the location of these same boundaries (ibid: 12-13). Similarly, Kling and 
Courtright (2003: 221) recommend investigating the empirical interactions in order to 
understand whether collectivities are communal.
In considering how to define such boundaries, Graham (1999) relates the concept of 
community to “a body of individuals who are [voluntarily] bound together [...] by the 
contingent fact of having interests in common” (ibid: 132, [142]), who accept adhering to 
rules2 that determine “both what their objective interests are and what their subjective 
interests ought to be” (ibid: 133). If it fulfils these conditions (common interests, rules 
and voluntary membership), an online group has boundaries and can be called a virtual 
community, states Graham (1999: 142).
It would appear that, implicitly, many scholars take into consideration the parameters 
suggested by Graham when determining community boundaries. To start with, authors 
emphasise that people develop virtual ties when they share common interests, from 
finding a job to obtaining emotional support, which create a symbolic boundary for the 
community, giving meaning to their social interaction (Bellini and Vargas, 2003: 4; 
DiMaggio et al., 2001: 317; Femback, 1999: 204; Komito, 1998: 99; Watson, 1997: 103; 
Falk, 1997: 289; Baker and Ward, 2002: 207; Wellman, 2001: 39; Rheingold, 2000
2 Graham (1999: 142) gives examples of rules for admission and exclusion, and norms of behaviour.
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[1993]: 360; Burnett and Bonnici, 2003: 333; Ridings, Gefen and Arinze, 2002: 273; 
G6mez, 1998: 226; Millen and Dray, 2000: 166; van Dijk, 1999: 160).
The relevance of rules to defining community boundaries is also frequently cited. For 
example, those that define forms of participation (including barriers to entry), appropriate 
behaviour, moderation and punishment (including the process of ostracizing those who 
do not respect the rules) (Pankoke-Babatz and Jeffrey, 2002: 221; Bellini and Vargas, 
2003; 6-7; Teo et al., 2003: 674; Kelemen and Smith, 2001: 384; Femback, 1999: 211). 
Burnett and Bonnici (2003: 349), and De Cindio et a l (2003: 395, 404) argue that social 
norms are the glue for the cohesiveness of virtual communities, as they help to define 
identity and boundaries.
The aspect of voluntary participation is less discussed in the academic literature, although 
some authors highlight this aspect as being a mark of an effective community (Wellman 
et al., 1996: 221; Jones, 1995: 11; Bellini and Vargas, 2003: 7; Steinmueller, 2002: 21, 
28). For example, Steinmueller (2002: 27) argues that social grouping for reason of 
employment would not be considered an online community; and Castells (2001: 125) 
relates the idea of virtual communities to communities of choice.
We would agree with DiMaggio et al. (2001: 317) that researchers should distinguish 
between different types of virtual communities, avoiding using the same term to refer to 
very different social interactions. This research thus follows Graham’s (1999) definition 
of community boundaries, based on the parameters of common interests, rules and 
voluntary participation, to state that the empirical objects of this study are indeed virtual 
communities (as explained in chapter 1).
2.3. The main research topics
This section presents the six main focuses of the academic literature on virtual 
communities:
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(i) Virtual communities channel information and emotional support
(ii) Virtual communities affect the formation of social capital
(iii) Virtual communities support neighbourhoods
(iv) Virtual communities foster the construction of social identity
(v) Virtual communities struggle for long term sustainability
(vi) Virtual communities have rules of governance and behaviour
As researchers generally develop multiple approaches, works are often cited in more than 
one theme. The objective of this section thus is not to classify each piece of research, but
to map the main research topics. Less relevant approaches have been excluded from the
list.
2.3.1. Virtual communities channel information and emotional support
Some scholars relate the development of virtual communities to the interests that 
motivate online interactions. The sharing of information and knowledge is certainly one 
of the most important motivations for belonging to virtual communities (Butler, 2001: 
347; Preece, 2001: 347-348; Faraj and Wasko, 2001: 6-7; Mansell and Steinmueller, 
2000: 84-88; Jones, 1998: 4-5; 1995: 19; Wellman et a l , 1996: 213, 219; Wachter, Gupta 
and Quaddus, 2000: 477-478). Some authors argue that these reasons are greatly 
significant because online interactions are fast and inexpensive (Gomez, 1998: 226), and 
e-mails are accessible and efficient (Okunoye and Karsten, 2003: 353).
Furthermore, researchers associate online interaction with social and emotional support 
(Castells, 2001: 127; Butler, 2001: 347; Preece, 2001: 347-349; Rheingold, 2000 [1993]: 
XX\ Garton et al., 1999: 75-78; Wellman et al., 1996: 220; Nip, 2004: 414; Katz and 
Rice, 2002: 133; Komito, 1998: 98). They point out that people are motivated to 
collaborate with virtual communities because they expect some benefits from these 
collectivities, such as a better public reputation (Kollock, 1999: 235; Matzat, 2004: 208-
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222), future help (Faraj and Wasko, 2001: 10; Millen and Dray, 2000: 166), or a more 
efficient political organization (Wellman, 1997: 180; Butler, 2001: 347).
2.3.2. Virtual communities affect the formation of social capital
The research on virtual communities often discusses how computer-mediated interactions 
affect the formation of social capital. Coleman (1990: 304-305) explains that social 
capital is embodied in the relations among people, in such a way that actors may use 
these relations as resources for seeking their interests -  for instance, to find valuable 
information. Merwe, Pitt and Berthon (2004: 13) define social capital as resources that 
are available to members within a social network. Authors who focus on social capital 
also emphasise the relevance of trusting the reciprocity of relations through computer- 
mediated interactions, as a factor that fosters exchanges and collaboration (Kling and 
Courtright, 2003: 227; Ridings, Gefen and Arinze, 2002: 271; Komito, 1998: 97).
As communication is fundamental to enhance social connections, the first idea is that the 
Internet necessarily favours community (Putnam, 2000: 171). However, researchers are 
divided about the effects of online interactions on social capital formation. Some authors 
are optimistic that communication and information networks contribute to strengthen 
social and emotional, weak and strong social connections, as it reduces the obstacles and 
costs to find groups that share common interests and information (Katz and Rice, 2002: 
83, 325-350; Kavanaugh and Patterson, 2002: 339; Castells, 2001: 125-130; Wellman et 
al., 1996: 221; Ester and Vinken, 2003: 672; Rheingold, 2000 [1993]: 364; Preece, 2001: 
348; Haythomthwaite, 2005: 125). Others are cautious, stating that empirical research 
demonstrates that online interactions can either isolate people from both their offline 
environment and their social networks, or improve their involvement (Nip, 2004: 410- 
411; Norris, 2004: 40; Falk, 1997: 289).
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2.3.3. Virtual communities support neighbourhoods
Many scholars concentrate their research on what are known as community networks, 
which are online communication networks used to reinvigorate geographically based 
communities (such as Netville, in Toronto, and Blacksburg Electronic Village, linked to a 
university town in Virginia, USA) through sharing information and communication 
(Carroll and Rosson, 2003: 384; Venkatesh, 2003: 339; Hampton and Wellman, 2001; 
Kavanaugh and Patterson, 2002: 325-327). In these cases, members of the virtual 
community often are the same people that share the locality.
Authors in this field study both how the local communities influence the virtual social 
structures, and how these restricted computer-mediated networks affect face-to-face 
social relations3, within and outside the local community, some local networks permitting 
members communication beyond the community boundaries (Venkatesh, 2003: 344-345; 
Carroll and Rosson, 2003: 384; Hampton and Wellman, 2001: 476; 2002: 345; Lutters 
and Ackerman, 2003: 157). These researchers emphasise that community networks 
improve communication channels, and foster members more active participation in the 
solution of their local problems.
2.3.4. Virtual communities foster the construction of social identity
Studies on virtual communities often highlight how virtual interactions are related to the 
way people construct their beliefs, values, meanings and affinities, in sum, their identity 
(Delanty, 2003: 168; Castells, 2001: 126; Etzioni and Etzioni, 1999: 241; Baym, 1995:
3 Further to studies on community networks, that by definition consider relations between online networks 
and respective neighbourhoods, this literature review observes that few studies focus on how virtual 
arrangements are related to offline collectivities. Exceptions in this review are the studies of Gomez (1998), 
on how Internet-mediated interactions have affected relationships between non-governmental 
organizations, and Nip (2004), on how a virtual community is related to an offline activist group. Indeed, 
Nip (2004: 409) also undertakes a literature review on the study of virtual communities and concludes that 
many scholars suggest the need to understand the interrelation between online and offline collectivities, but 
that very few studies fill this gap. This review confirms that this gap persists.
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161; De Cindio, Gentile and Redolfi, 2003: 396). Wellman et al. (1996: 223), for 
instance, explicate that providing support and information increases individuals’ self­
esteem and social status. Other authors emphasise that people can renegotiate their 
identities in online environments with greater malleability (Jones, 1998: 9; Baym, 1995: 
152-154; Kelemen and Smith, 2001: 374).
The formation and maintenance of identity is particularly discussed in articles that focus 
on diasporic and dispersed communities (Mitra, 1997; Parham, 2004). Moreover, 
research stresses that virtual communities provide and/or reinforce the sense of belonging 
to collectivities (Teo et al., 2003: 680, 692; Wellman, 2001: 18, 40; Gomez, 1998: 226; 
Wellman et al., 1996; 220; Nip, 2004: 413; Roberts, 1998: 360; Jones, 1998; 3), 
especially when people attribute meaning and commitment to their computer-mediated 
groups (Femback, 1999: 211; Mitra, 1997: 58; Pankoke-Babatz and Jeffrey, 2002: 219).
2.3.5. Virtual communities struggle for long term sustainability
Some authors discuss how virtual communities may survive in the long term as 
collectivities (Koh and Kim, 2004: 157; Barab, MaKinster and Scheckler, 2003: 239; 
Preece, 2001: 347; Hopkins, 2005: 379; Steinmueller, 2002: 29; Ridings, Gefen and 
Arinze, 2002: 271-273; Rheingold (2000 [1993]: XX). As Jones (1997: 30) clarifies, the 
Internet permits people to express themselves, but it does not mean that others are 
listening, or that their words make a difference. Thus the sustainability of virtual 
communities in the long term depends on other criteria than providing channels for the 
mere expression of opinions.
Indeed, scholars relate the sustainability of a community to its capacity for helping 
members with information and resources; and avoiding provoking information overload 
and excess of social interaction (Wachter, Gupta and Quaddus, 2000: 477-478; Butler, 
2001: 346; Teo et al., 2003: 674). Members invest more in communities when they feel 
satisfaction with the level of cohesion, effectiveness and help (Roberts, 1998: 361, 367). 
In other words, members participate more when they believe there is a balance between
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the investment of personal resources and the potential to receive similar or greater 
support from the communities over the lifetime of these groups (Falk, 1997: 289).
2.3.6. Virtual communities have rules of governance and behaviour
Many studies on virtual communities focus on their rules and norms of behaviour and 
governance. As discussed in section 2.2, some authors highlight how rules and norms are 
related to community boundaries and social structures (Graham, 1999: 133-134; 
Femback, 1999: 211; Burnett and Bonnici, 2003: 334; Bellini and Vargas, 2003: 6). 
Others investigate norms of online behaviour (netiquette), which define desired and 
disruptive behaviours and sanction mechanisms, such as censorship or exclusion (De 
Cindio et al., 2003: 396; Steinmueller, 2002: 24-25; Preece, 2001: 347-349; Faraj and 
Wasko, 2001: 17-18; Baym, 1995: 159; Bakardjieva and Feenberg, 2002: 183; Pankoke- 
Babatz and Jeffrey, 2002: 219; Bellini and Vargas, 2003: 7-8; Mansell and Steinmueller, 
2000).
Some authors discuss why communities demand and create rules, as well as the benefits 
of having rules, such as fostering cooperation and trust; improving relational capital, 
community sociability and sustainability; and adapting to external events (Pankoke- 
Babatz and Jeffrey, 2002: 220-225; Matzat, 2004: 207; Faraj and Wasko, 2001: 17-18; 
Preece, 2001: 347-349; Komito, 1998: 105; Wachter, Gupta and Quaddus, 2000: 485- 
486; Bellini and Vargas, 2003: 6). Studies on open-source software communities, for 
instance, relate their efficacy in the coordination of projects to the presence of 
governance rules and norms, which embed a certain level of hierarchical decision-making 
processes, and assure quality in return for reputation (Lanzara and Momer, 2003: 1-4; 
Raymond, 2001: 49-86, 101-104; Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001: 310, 318).
Few authors point out that rules in virtual communities are related to institutions, a theme 
that is further discussed below in section 2.4.
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2.4. The influence of institutions in virtual communities
As described in the first chapter, this research is especially concerned with how 
institutions influence the governance structures of virtual communities. In this literature 
review, two conclusions emerge about this issue. Firstly, some scholars point out the 
relevance of studying the theme, but the institutional influence still emerges as a 
secondary theme in their research, rather than the main interest. Secondly, few 
researchers focus effectively on this subject, with the exception, in this review, of Matzat 
(2004) and Souza et al. (2004). These claims are clarified in the first two subsections 
below. The third subsection presents some concluding remarks about how this research 
may contribute to reduce the identified gap in the scholarly literature.
2.4.1. Institutional influence as a secondary theme
A good example of research that has institutional influence as a secondary theme is 
provided by Hauben and Hauben (1997). Studying Usenet groups, the authors (1997: 
179-186) conclude that the libertarian goals of these communities, such as promoting 
cooperative and democratic culture, have become an obstacle to receiving support for 
hosting their discussion forums from commercial, government and university sites, as, 
occasionally, the contents of these discussions could jeopardize these institutionalised 
host organizations. Indeed, members of these communities have questioned whether it 
would not be more efficacious to censor their discussion contents, giving up their 
libertarian goals, in order to receive institutional support.
In the same direction, Venkatesh (2003: 344) recognizes that some community networks 
are more closely embedded in powerful institutions, which are able to impose rules and 
sanctions in order to enforce required behaviour amongst community members. For 
instance, some community networks permit interactions only between users and 
institutional representatives. In other words, in prohibiting direct member-to-member 
contact, these communities allow institutionalised interests to appropriate the network 
(ibid). Venkatesh concludes that horizontal networks (in which members can interact
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freely with each other) are less likely of being strongly institutionalised (ibid: 345). The 
author finally suggests studying at which level institutionalised community networks are 
open to changes, and the degree of freedom members have to oppose institutionalised 
rules (ibid: 344).
Also De Cindio, Gentile and Redolfi (2003: 399), studying a community network in 
Milan (Italy), conclude that the collectivity has transferred institutionalised social rules 
from government, associations, political parties and schools to the computer-mediated 
environment. For instance, the studied community prohibits anonymity in online 
interactions, in order to make members accountable for their acts and opinions (ibid: 398- 
400). Furthermore, their discussion lists are moderated, and members are prohibited from 
distributing illegal information online, exchanging software, and using obscene or 
insulting language (ibid). Strover, Chapman and Waters (2004: 465, 482-483), studying 
community networks in Texas, argue that these collectivities have greater chances of 
being successful when local institutions and the related local community are engaged in 
promoting online interactions.
In a study about time and fragmented identities through the Internet, Holtgrewe (2004: 
133) cites a few examples on how institutions influence open-source software 
communities. For instance, the open source movement maintains strong similarities to 
institutionalised concepts of public goods and open circulation of academic knowledge 
(ibid: 134). Its governance rules embed institutional norms of efficiency in the use of 
technical and human resources, such as: avoiding overload information and waste of 
time; keeping the modularity of projects; and elaborating clear guidelines for coding and 
controlling software versions (ibid: 133, 142). In addition, argues the author, the very 
possibility of open-source projects depends on institutional and social support, as 
companies, governments and individuals donate time and resources for the open source 
movement (ibid: 142).
In a more generic fashion, Gattiker (2001: 16-17, 27) and Ester and Vinken (2003: 668, 
673) recognize that institutional actors (such as governments, churches and political
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parties) influence online interactions. For them, institutions are permanently competing 
for influence over the emerging rules and norms of virtual communities, as their interests 
diverge from those of the new collectivities. In some circumstances, this influence is 
quite strong, such as the restrictions the Chinese government imposes on specific Internet 
contents (Gattiker, 2001: 21). In other cases, it is subtler, such as the influence of 
institutionalised discursive practices in online communication, which are important to 
maintain group unity (Howard, 1997: 148, 165). Finally, other authors comment very 
much in passing upon the theme of institutional influence in virtual communities 
(Kelemen and Smith, 2001: 382; Bakardjieva, 2003: 294; Baym, 1995: 141).
2.4.2. Institutional influence as a primary theme
In this review, only two examples focus on understanding the influence of institutions in 
virtual communities. Matzat (2004) concludes that institutions influence the emergence of 
help-prescribing norms in online research communities. And Souza et al. (2004) discuss 
how groupware tools institutionalise the governance mechanisms of virtual communities, 
independently of the kind of social structures the related informal face-to-face groups 
wish to establish. These studies are described in some detail below.
Matzat (2004: 206, 224) concludes that the outcomes of virtual research communities are 
deeply related to the institutional conditions of these groups, in such a way that, through 
institutional forces, the offline relations effect the online governance structures. Matzat 
(2004: 205, 224) suggests that the level of embedment of a community in the respective 
offline social networks is associated with the creation of a strong help-prescribing norm, 
favouring an environment in which members try to answer the questions effectively 
through public online discussions, thus developing expectations of cooperative behaviour.
The author argues that the greater the social embedment of an online group, the higher its 
network density, thus fostering the development of a strong norm of helping each other, 
because researchers have the aim of constructing a reputation which may improve their 
status in the community (ibid). Matzat further suggests that the study of governance
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structures of online groups may help to understand how institutional influence occurs. 
The author conducted a survey to test hypotheses based on Coleman’s model (1990), 
which states that norms emerge within a group when their ties are sufficiently dense, and 
Becker’s reputation model (1976), which argues that researchers want to maximize their 
status (Matzat, 2004: 207-209).
In the second study, Souza et al. (2004) indicate that technology influences the process of 
institutionalisation of virtual communities. The authors observe that the inscribed rules in 
groupware tools (such as Yahoo! Groups, SmartGroups and MSN Groups) foster 
informal academic discussion groups to adopt explicit structuring procedures (ibid: 635). 
The authors explain that software encodes norms and rules, conducting to a process of 
compulsory institutionalisation, as these rules and norms influence behaviour in spite of 
these groups having different aspirations in terms of how their online interactions should 
be conducted (ibid: 636).
For instance, in groupware systems, the group must be initiated by one person, who thus 
gains automatically the status of owner of the group and leader in relation to other 
members, roles which afford special powers to extinguish the group, and to define rules 
of affiliation and moderation (ibid: 637, 650). Thus the software, in spite of having some 
level of flexibility4, imposes some coercive patterns that contradict the rules and norms of 
informal groups that aim at egalitarian membership, forcing virtual communities to 
conform to its requirements, argue the authors (ibid: 637, 647). The study is based on 
contrasting members’ expectations about possible uses of groupware tools to how the 
groupware tools operate in practice and explores the differences between expectations 
and practice and the effects of these differences.
4 Indeed, these especial rights can be given to some or all of the other members in the group, thus the tool 
permits the cited kind of use, as well as enables other forms of appropriation. In this thesis, I differentiate 
clearly between the technical features which are embedded in Internet tools, how communities customize 
these same tools, and how communities appropriate in practice these tools. Thus this thesis does not agree 
that Internet tools institutionalise the communities compulsorily, as argued by Souza et al. (2004). See 
further discussion about these differentiations in subsection 5.2.10.
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2.4.3. This dissertation’s contribution to the literature
Drawing upon this literature review, one can concludes that there is a gap in the present 
scholarly work in relation to how institutions influence virtual communities, as was 
pointed out by DiMaggio et al. (2001: 329). In this review, as presented, few papers 
discuss the theme and, for the most part, they only explore the institutional aspect as a 
secondary focus, with the exception, already noted, of Matzat (2004) and Souza et al. 
(2004).
Furthermore, few researchers focus explicitly on institutional influence in governance 
structures of virtual communities. Venkatesh (2003) states that institutions influence 
community network governance, for instance disallowing direct communication between 
members. Thus in restricting the access to institutional representatives, the structures 
become more vertical (centralized) than horizontal. Holtgrewe (2004) relates institutions 
to governance rules of open-source software communities. And Souza et al. (2004) 
investigate governance structures that are embedded in groupware tools.
Other articles in this review are concerned with the setup of rules in general, but they do 
not discuss governance structures (Gattiker, 2001; Ester and Vinken, 2003; Matzat, 
2004). Hauben and Hauben (1997) and De Cindio, Gentile and Redolfi (2003) grasp the 
issue of governance only indirectly, discussing how institutions influence (or have the 
potential to influence) the kind of content that is shared in virtual communities.
Finally, none of the reviewed researches either discusses the influence of institutions on 
the decision-making processes of virtual communities, or adopts a theoretical framework 
on new institutionalism, and the role of institutional carriers, to explain this process of 
institutionalisation, as proposed here.
This research thus aims to contribute to the scholarly literature through reducing the 
lacunae in studies of how institutions influence the governance structures of virtual
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communities. More specifically, this research proposes to investigate how institutional 
carriers influence the decision-making processes of a group of Internet-mediated 
communities, a theme that has not been studied in the published literature, thus 
demonstrating the need for and significance of an original scholarly contribution on this 
issue.
2.5. Methodology and limits of the present literature review
The selection of works for this review of the literature on virtual communities has been 
done through both electronic and manual search in the main academic journals5 and 
books, between January 1993 and March 2006. The electronic search has used 
combinations of keywords (virtual/online community, virtual/online social network, 
community network, Internet, institutionalisation, institution, institutionalism, rules, 
norms). Other works before 1993 have been added following the references on selected 
articles, when they are relevant for this thesis.
After a first reading, I have chosen articles and books that were more relevant for the 
objectives of this work, giving preference to more recent publications. Thus researches, 
especially from the same authors, have been selectively excluded where later publications 
expand on and refine the earlier work on similar themes, to avoid excessive repetition.
5 The list of journals are extensive, as this research has used the search engines of ScienceDirect Elsevier 
Science Journals, Ingenta Connect, Swetswise, MetaPress, Business Source Premier, JSTOR, Blackwell 
Synergy, and Sage Publications. Among the main journals covered were: Behaviour & Information 
Technology; British Journal of Management; British Journal of Sociology; Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work; European Journal of Information Systems; Information & Management; Information 
and Organization; Information Society; Information Systems Journal; Information Systems Research; 
Information Technology & People; Information, Communication & Society; International Journal of 
Information Management; Journal of Information Technology; Journal of Strategic Information Systems; 
Media, Culture & Society; MIS Quarterly; New Media & Society; Organization; Organization Science; 
Organization Studies; and Social Movement Studies.
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After mapping of the significant publications disclosed through this search process, and 
selecting main debates and themes, all chosen works have been read again, in order to 
verify how each one relates to these selected debates and themes. In this second reading, 
special attention has been given to the influence of institutions within virtual 
communities, in order to confirm the relevance of this thesis for the scholarly literature.
The selection of articles and books has been qualitative, starting from more recent texts: 
firstly gathering a relevant number of works, and then gradually discarding those that do 
not add new insights beyond the previous selected exemplars, following a theory- 
saturation strategy, as suggested by Mason (2002: 134). This procedure is coherent with 
the objective of mapping the main debates and themes on the domain, and investigating 
whether the academic studies have focused on the institutional influence on virtual 
communities. As this methodology favours more recent studies, the selected material is 
not intended to be a complete picture of the debate on virtual communities over time.
As any qualitative selection of contents, this research may have failed to explore every 
relevant piece of the academic literature on virtual communities. It has been successful, 
nonetheless, in highlighting themes and debates that are relevant in the studied domain, 
and to demonstrate that the influence of institutions on virtual communities has not been 
explored substantially, indicating the potential for a worthy scholarly contribution. The 
selection of works is not concerned with the theoretical and methodological approaches, 
although the investigation has verified at least that no published research on virtual 
communities has adopted a theoretical framework of new institutionalism and 
institutional carriers, as proposed and discussed in the previous section.
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3. Theoretical framework : A new-institutionalist approach
This thesis, as explained in the first chapter, is concerned with understanding how 
hierarchical social structures has diffused to four Brazilian environmental-education 
Internet-mediated communities in such a way that they have organized segregated 
decision-making processes. This investigation draws upon the sociological literature of 
new-institutionalism to develop a theoretical lens to study this phenomenon. This chapter 
thus discusses the framework to understand the processes of institutionalisation: how 
institutions are formed and how they diffuse across settings, which is the main focus of 
this investigation.
A common idea behind institutionalism is that institutions strongly influence how social 
structures are enacted by social actors, in such a way that certain social patterns are 
reproduced. For old-institutionalist authors, the main channels of such an institutional 
influence are the rule systems and the normative controls, which regulate actors’ 
behaviour (Scott and Meyer, 1994: 5; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 15, 27; Scott, 1994a: 
82). For new institutionalist authors, the process of institutionalisation is grounded mainly 
in cultural-cognitive models, and taken-for-granted scripts and schemas, including the 
creation of roles and forms of actorhood (Scott and Meyer, 1994: 5; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991a: 8,15,27; Scott, 2001: 37; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 710-712)'.
1 Discussing these main approaches -  old and new institutionalism -  Scott (2001: 64; 1994a: 98; 1994b: 61) 
explains that institutions involve regulative and constitutive rules (drawing upon Searle, 1995; 1969). 
Regulative rules influence existing activities; meanwhile constitutive rules construct the possibilities of 
certain activities in the sense that they cognitively create reality through defining categories and 
typifications. “Constitutive rules construct the social objects and events to which regulative rules are 
applied.” (Scott, 2001: 64). New institutionalist authors focus mainly on the cultural-cognitive aspects of 
institutions, thus in their constitutive features. These constitutive rules are also related to construction of 
social roles and forms of actorhood (as discussed in subsection 3.2.1).
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These claims deserve a more detailed explanation. Thus before going further in the 
introduction of other concepts, it is necessary to conceptualize the ideas of social 
structures and institutions.
Porpora (1998 [1989]) summarizes four main concepts of social structures, derived from 
different schools of sociology. This thesis specifically follows Giddens’s (1979, 1984) 
conceptualization of social structures as collective rules and resources that structure 
behaviour and are implicated in the reproduction of social systems (Giddens, 1979: 64; 
Giddens, 1984: 17, 25; Porpora, 1998 [1989]: 339). This definition of social structure, 
developed by Giddens in his structuration theory, is consistent with the institutional 
framework adopted by this research, as suggested by W.R. Scott (2001: 67, 75) and J. 
Scott (1995: 214).
Following structuration theory, social structures are understood as memory traces: 
knowledge about how action should be performed (Giddens, 1979: 64; Giddens, 1984: 
17, 25, 377; Porpora, 1998 [1989]: 345). This definition does not imply, nonetheless, that 
social structures define behaviour. Giddens (1979: 70; 1984: 25, 374) claims social
2 Giddens (1979: 65-66) defines social systems as “regularised relations of interdependence between 
individuals or groups, that typically can be best analysed as recurrent social practices. Social systems are 
systems of social interaction; as such they involve the situated activities of human subjects, and exist 
syntagmatically in the flow of time. Systems, in this terminology, have structures, or more accurately, have 
structural properties; they are not structures in themselves”. J. Scott (1995: 204), explaining Giddens, says 
that “[s]ocial systems are seen as the actual patterns of social relations that are formed into interdependent 
social institutions and collectivities” (see also Giddens, 1984: 25). Giddens’s definition of social systems, 
nonetheless, is similar to what some authors call social structures, i.e. “systems of human relationship 
among social positions”, explains Porpora (1998 [1989]: 339). In this conception, organizations (and any 
social entity) are instances of social structures (see similar use in Castells, 2000: 5; and Leinhardt, 1977: 
xiii). Although this thesis does not refer to organizations and social entities as being social structures, it 
acknowledges that the term is currently used with this meaning by some of the cited authors. Thus, when 
citing these authors, this thesis can refer to organizations as being social structures and institutions, as these 
scholars have associated both concepts. In the other parts of this research, the concept of social structure 
has a more restricted meaning than embracing all organizations and social entities, adhering to Giddens’s 
definition.
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structures are both the medium and the product of social action (the duality of structures); 
actors thus constitute social structures through interaction, and they are themselves 
constituted by the social structures . Normative structures constrain and enable 
behaviour, forging regularity, but behaviour is also the source of changing normative 
structures, thus behaviour and norms (agency and structure) shape each other (Giddens, 
1979: 64-66; Scott, 1998: 17-18; Manicas, 1998: 318). In other words, societies have a 
level of consensus about social structures, permitting the emergence and cultivation of 
patterned behaviour, but this consensus is never total, thus there is always space for 
changes in social structures (Giddens, 1984: 14-15; Meyer, 1992: 264; Bhaskar, 1998: 
218; Manicas: 1998: 320).
The understanding of social structures helps to conceptualize the idea of institutions, a 
concept that naturally has been defined in many different ways, as pointed out by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 1). After analysing the new-institutionalist literature, this 
thesis has chosen Scott’s concept (2001: 48), understanding that the author is particularly 
successful in creating a simple, short definition while at the same time revealing the 
complexity of institutions as compounded by regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements:
'Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree o f 
resilience [...] [which] are composed o f culture-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements, that, together with associate activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life. ”
In this definition, Scott emphasises the very nature of institutions as constituted by 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, and the need to integrate, in the 
same framework, these different perspectives. He argues that different theorists focus on 
different aspects of social structures. “Generally speaking, economists stress regulatory
3 Giddens’s conception of social structures is thus similar to what Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 70) 
call social order, as these authors argue that the social is a product of past human activity and only is 
instantiated as far as humans keep producing it.
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factors; political scientists and early sociologists, normative factors; and recent 
sociologists, anthropologists, and cognitive psychologists stress cognitive-cultural 
factors” (Scott, 1998: 133).
Further, Scott’s definition (2001) highlights the central relevance of rules, norms and 
cultural beliefs in institutions (as do many authors, as discussed below), but he also 
introduces two important ideas of “associate activities and resources”, inspired by 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984). In accordance with structuration theory, 
social structures are enacted through social interaction, and agents draw upon rules and 
resources to enact social structures (Giddens, 1979: 64; 1984: 17, 25). In this perspective, 
structures and agency are not dichotomies, but aspects of an interactive process in which 
agency enacts structures, and structures constrain and empower agency (Giddens, 1979: 
66; 1984: 25; see Scott, 2001: 75).
The list of institutions in contemporary societies is extensive, considering its complexity. 
In order to give some examples, Jepperson (1991: 144) suggests a very broad list, which 
ranges from marriage, sexism and handshake, to the contract, wage labour, insurance, 
formal organizations, the army, presidency, the vacation, the academic discipline and 
voting. At a more abstract level, some authors also consider the process of rationalization 
an important institution in modem societies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 342-343; Scott, 
1992a: 14; Scott and Meyer, 1994: 4; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 700).
The list of institutions, nonetheless, is not frozen. As defended by Jepperson (1991: 146), 
one can define whether a social object is an institution only through analyzing the context 
of a given phenomenon. Avgerou and Madon (2004: 175) agree with the proposition, 
arguing that it is not adequate to choose some a priori analytic category when studying 
how institutional forces affect information systems innovation. For them, in the context 
of IS innovation, organizations, associations of professionals and consultants, among 
others, are candidates to be relevant institutions (ibid: 174). In fact, information systems 
themselves may become institutions (Silva and Backhouse, 1997: 390; Avgerou, 2002: 
30-34).
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This research specifically considers as institutions the social structures which reproduce 
the segregation of decision-making processes, an instance of centralization which is 
characteristic of hierarchical organizations (drawing upon Simon, 1997 [1945]: 7, as 
explained in subsection 1.2.1).
In sum, the new institutionalism proposes that there are resilient social structures, called 
institutions, which influence social actors mainly through regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements, in the direction of reproducing the related social structures, 
although they also may do otherwise. The rest of this chapter advances the debate on how 
this process of institutionalisation may occur.
The next section below details Scott’s (2001, 2005) proposal of conceptualizing 
institutions as intertwined regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, and how 
mechanisms of legitimation and enforcement foster the resilience of institutions. Scott’s 
framework permits the understanding of the very same social structure -  such as the 
centralization of decision-making processes -  in its many aspects, a perspective that is 
helpful for this investigation.
The following section explores different approaches to investigating the process of 
institutionalisation. Although this research draws upon different lenses, special attention 
is given here to Scott’s (2001) framework on institutional carriers. As indicated in chapter 
1, this research aims to investigate the role of institutional carriers in the formation of 
segregated decision-making processes in Internet-mediated communities.
Finally, the last section in this chapter clarifies that the new institutionalist approach does 
not imply, per se, that institutions are straightforwardly reproduced by social actors. 
Indeed, a deeper understanding of institutions permits the grasp of the forces of both 
inertia and change in social structures, thus preserving the perception that institutions are 
indeed resilient, but social actors always keep the final ability to do otherwise, as argued 
above in the definition of social structures. It is important to stress these contrasting
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features of institutions as the empirical investigation indeed finds both elements of inertia 
and of change in social structures. Furthermore, this contrast supports the claim that new 
institutionalism is compatible with structuration theory, as proposed by Scott (2001).
There are certainly many other aspects of new institutionalism that could be explored 
here, but this chapter focuses only on the aspects that are directly related to the proposed 
research.
3.1. Conceptualisation of institutions
The idea of institutions has been conceptualised in a broad variety of forms by new- 
institutionalist scholars (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 1). As argued above, this research 
has adopted the conceptualisation proposed by Scott (1998, 2001, 2005), as it is both 
broad and precise. Scott’s framework builds upon much previous research and this thesis 
also explores other authors who help to clarify the elements of Scott’s main arguments.
In an effort to consolidate many approaches, Scott (2005: 465) elaborates a conceptual 
schema, represented in table 3.1 (below), that highlights the differences between 
definitions that emphasise either regulative, or normative, or cognitive aspects (which he 
calls ‘pillars’) of institutions (see also previous development of this framework in Scott, 
2001: 51-52; 1998: 134; and 1995: 35). The table indicates the relevance of rules, laws, 
sanctions and coercive mechanisms of diffusion, in regulative approaches; the relevance 
of certification, accreditation and normative mechanisms of diffusion in normative 
conceptions; and the relevance of prevalence (taken-for granted) models, common beliefs 
and mimetic mechanisms of diffusion in cognitive frameworks4.
4 This present work understands norms and rules in accordance with Burnett and Bonnici (2003: 334-335). 
Thus, in general, social groups enact norms as abstract ideas that members internalise in their minds 
through socialization. Norms establish the limits of acceptable behaviour, and the sanctions upon members 
who do not conform to them. Differently, rules are more explicit and formalized, also having the goal of 
controlling behaviour, and non-conformity with rules implies sanctions applied by members of the group, 
or designate authority. Nee (1998a: 86-87) completes this definition: “Formal rules are produced and
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Table 3.1 Three pillars of institutions
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive5
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness 
Shared understanding
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy
Indicators Rules
Laws
Sanctions
Certification
Accreditation
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of action
Basis of legitimacy Legally
sanctioned
Morally governed Comprehensible 
Recognizable 
Culturally supported
(Source: Scott, 2005: 465)
The table above also helps to understand the role of enforcement mechanisms (coercive, 
normative and mimetic) and basis o f legitimacy (legally sanctioned, morally governed 
and culturally supported) in these systems. As elucidated by Jepperson (1991: 145), 
institutions are highly dependent on sanction mechanisms (reward and punishment). In 
regulative and normative systems, the enforcement is supported by formal mechanisms, 
such as the policy and the judicial system, and informal constrains, such as signals of 
mild disapproval (Scott, 1994b: 66; North, 1998: 248; Nee, 1998: 9; Nee and Ingram, 
1998: 19). These mechanisms are imposed by actors who have control over methods of 
enforcement, from centralized ones (such as state apparatuses) to decentralized ones 
(such as social ties) (Knight and Ensminger, 1998: 106). Power thus is behind any 
sanction mechanism (Scott, 1998: 316-317).
In cognitive systems, differently, patterns of conduct are controlled by how situations and 
identities are defined (Scott, 1994b: 66; Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 72). In other
enforced by organizations such as the state and firm to solve problems of collective action through third- 
party sanctions, while informal norms arise out of networks and are reinforced by means of ongoing social 
relationships.”
5 In the cited work, Scott (2005: 465) uses the term cognitive in the referred table, although in other 
definitions the author prefers the term cultural-cognitive. In this table, I use the term cultural-cognitive thus 
to keep coherence with the adopted definition of institutions.
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words, taken-for-granted assumptions, and the preference for reducing uncertainty, 
constrain actions, even when other mechanisms of reward and sanctions are not present 
(Scott, 1994b: 66; Mantzavinos, 2001: 122).
Legitimacy, complementarity, is the perception (or assumption) that specific actions are 
appropriate within a social system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman 1995: 574). 
When legitimate, actions are made to seem as natural and meaningful (ibid: 576). For 
Scott (2001: 60-61), legitimacy depends on conformity to formal rules (regulative 
systems), to moral bases (normative systems) and to taken-for-granted frames of 
reference (cultural-cognitive systems). As explained by Berger and Luckmann (1967 
[1966]: 79, 111), shared meaning and meaningful behaviours attribute cognitive validity 
to institutions.
In modem societies, some authorities (such as state agents, professional bodies and trade 
associations) have the role of conferring legitimacy, even though these authorities may 
also be in conflict (Scott, 2001: 59-60). In order to obtain legitimacy -  and increase their 
chances of obtaining higher level of trust within their social networks -  social actors may 
conform to specific institutions, adopting behaviours which are not necessarily worthy for 
them considering other contextual aspects (Meyer, 1992: 263, 269; Avgerou, 2000: 236; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 352, 354; Powell, 1991: 190).
3.1.1. Definition of institution
As cited in the introduction of this chapter, Scott (2001: 48; see also Scott, 1998: 133) 
proposes a general concept that incorporates three systems, as all of them are present in 
most institutions, in different degrees: “Institutions are social structures that have attained 
a high degree of resilience6 [...] [which] are composed of culture-cognitive, normative, 
and regulative elements, that, together with associate activities and resources, provide
6 Scott (2001: 48) states that resilience does not mean rigidity, as institutions are subject to incremental and 
discontinuous changes (see more on institutional change in section 3.3).
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stability and meaning to social life”. These three aspects are discussed in this subsection 
in detail.
As regulative systems, institutions are understood as rules of governance which constrain 
behaviour (Scott, 2001: 51; 1998: 133; North, 1998: 248). Generally, the concept of rules 
implies more explicit and formalized procedures, which can be formally controlled and 
enforced by sanctioning mechanisms (application of reward and punishment through 
enforcement apparatuses, such as the policy and judicial systems) (Burnett and Bonnici, 
2003: 334-335; Scott, 2001: 52; Scott, 1994b: 66; Nee, 1998b: 9; Nee and Ingram, 1998: 
19). In regulative systems, legitimacy depends on conformity to formal rules (such as 
legislation) (Scott, 2001: 53, 60). Some organizations, nonetheless, follow formal rules 
only ceremonially, in order to obtain legitimacy in society, meanwhile they cultivate 
informal behaviour that is more adequate to their broader objectives (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 343; Nee and Ingram, 1998: 35).
As normative systems, institutions are related to values, conventions and norms which 
define the desirable, standardized structures and behaviours to different members of 
society (roles) (Scott, 20Q1: 54-55; North, 1998: 248). The concept of norms implies 
more abstract and informal ideas on acceptable social behaviour reinforced by social 
relationships (Burnett and Bonnici, 2003: 334-335; Nee, 1998a: 86-87). When individuals 
deviate from a norm, community members feel they have the right to apply informal 
sanctioning to foster compliance (such as signals of mild disapproval) (Knight and 
Ensminger, 1998: 109; Scott, 1994b: 66; Nee and Ingram, 1998: 19).
People conform to norms because either they fear sanctions (such as being ostracized), or 
they want the reward for their behaviour, or they believe that the norm is the appropriate 
procedure in a context (commitment to common values, sense of obligation) (Knight and 
Ensminger, 1998: 105, 107; Scott, 1998: 134; Burnett and Bonnici, 2003: 334-335; Nee, 
1998b: 9). In normative systems, legitimacy depends on moral bases. In the case of 
organizations, for instance, legitimacy depends on how society values organizational 
goals (Scott, 2001: 60-61; 1991 [1987]: 169).
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As cultural-cognitive systems, institutions are associated with taken-for-granted social 
structures: the shared conceptions and meanings that constitute the social reality of a 
group (Scott, 2001: 57; Jepperson, 1991: 147; Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994: 10)7. The 
process of institutionalisation occurs when the patterns of action are repeated, acquiring a 
collective taken-for-granted meaning for actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 71- 
75, 82; Scott, 1998: 135; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 21). From this viewpoint, people 
make decisions based on the logic of appropriateness -  their judgment about situations, 
identities and rules, considering the frame of reference they have interiorised through 
socialization (March, 1994: 58-59, 101; March and Olsen, 1989: 17, 23, 160-162; March 
and Simon, 1993 [1958]: 8).
In cultural-cognitive systems, the enforcement mechanisms are related to the way people 
define situations and identities, since taken-for-granted assumptions legitimate and 
constrain actions (Scott, 1994b: 66; Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 72; 
Mantzavinos, 2001: 122). Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 72-73) argue that the 
cognitive control is inherent to the process of institutionalisation, and other control 
mechanisms are invoked only when this process is not fully successful. In cultural- 
cognitive systems, legitimacy derives from the taken-for-granted frames of reference that 
attribute cognitive validity to institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 79, 111; 
Scott, 2001: 61).
Scott (2001: 51) submits that the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems are 
separated only as analytical constructs, as in practice they intertwined. Thus institutions 
are constructed by these three systems, which are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, many 
scholars highlight the relevance of rules and norms in the formation of institutions, even 
when their main approach is cultural-cognitive. For instance, Jepperson (1991: 143, 149) 
links institutions with societal rules and taken-for-granted accounts, invoking regulative 
and cognitive aspects. In similar fashion, Avgerou (2000: 236) associates institutions with
7 In the same direction, North (1998: 251) associates institutions to mental models, i.e. the cultural systems 
of classification and categories that people introject through learning process, and that somehow frame the 
way people interpret the world.
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“rule-like procedures in society”, and “taken-for-granted standardized sequences of 
activity”. And Meyer and Rowan (1977: 341) relate institutions to reciprocated 
typifications that may be supported by law, by public opinion, or simply by taken-for- 
granted assumptions, highlighting simultaneously regulative, normative and cultural- 
cognitive elements.
3.2. The process of institutionalisation
This section aims to discuss how institutionalised social structures diffuse through 
settings, in time and space, a process which is referred to as institutionalisation (Avgerou, 
2000: 236). A literature review on new-institutionalism reveals different approaches to 
conceptualizing and explaining institutionalisation through social settings. Without 
claiming exhaustive treatment, this research proposes that the process of 
institutionalisation has been studied mainly from three angles that overlap with each 
other.
The first is the cultural-cognitive approach of Berger and Luckmannn (1967 [1966]), who 
propose that the process of institutionalisation8 has three phases, which have been 
summarized by Scott (2001: 40) as:
i. extemalisation: the production of common meaning systems through social 
interaction;
ii. objectification: the transformation of these common meaning systems in a 
facticity, or reality, outside the self; and
iii. internalisation: the retrojection of these meaning systems into consciousness 
through socialization.
8 Observe that Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]) call institutionalisation both the process of creating 
institutions, and the process of diffusing social structures.
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The second approach is proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]), for whom 
institutionalisation occurs through coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms, in such 
a way that social structures become isomorphic. Without using the same terminology, 
other authors adopt similar concept of institutional diffusion, arguing that the 
environment exerts special influence on organizational structures, mainly through 
relational ties, in such a way that institutions are spread in organizational settings (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1991 [1983]).
The third proposition emphasises the role of institutional carriers to spread out 
institutions through social settings. This is the focus adopted by this thesis as explained in 
chapter 1, following mainly the work of Scott (2001, 2003), although this research draws 
upon other authors as well, as presented below.
These three perspectives are discussed in this section, with greater emphasis to the 
presentation of Scott’s framework on institutional carriers. It is important to highlight, 
nonetheless, that these approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive alternatives, 
but as different forms of analysing the same processes of institutionalisation. To a certain 
degree, these approaches complement each other. Having a cultural-cognitive approach 
(Berger and Luckmann), for instance, does not preclude the recognition either of 
mechanisms of diffusion by relational ties and environmental influences (which also 
imply power relations) (DiMaggio and Powell), or of the relevance of carriers in the 
process of institutionalisation (Scott). Thus this section is helpful as a whole to 
understand the studied phenomena, and the three perspectives are present in this research, 
although with different emphases.
3.2.1. Berger and Luckmann's view of institutionalisation
In The Social Construction o f Reality, Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]) lay out the 
process of institutionalisation in three phases: extemalization, objectification and 
internalisation. In the first phase of externalisation, social actors, through interaction, 
constitute patterns of conduct that become habitualized (ibid: 74). In establishing such
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patterns, social actors are able to perform the same action again and again, with 
economical effort (ibid: 71). This gain, nonetheless, has the cost of limiting the flexibility 
of agents’ action (ibid: 135).
As time goes, these patterns of conduct (reciprocal typified actions) gain historicity, 
becoming crystallized institutions which are experienced by social actors as being an 
objective reality (ibid: 76, 78). Berger and Luckmann call this process objectification 
(ibid: 78), through which institutions become to be experienced as objective reality 
(similar to the natural world) (ibid: 77), as they are perceived as external to individuals, 
persistent in time and resistant to changes, rather than social structures that always can be 
changed by humans (ibid: 78, 106). Discussing how institutions solidify reality, 
Kallinikos (2006: 115) explains these resilient social structures interlock cultural, ethical 
and cognitive elements with legal and administrative mechanisms, and economic 
interests, in such a way that institutions are “hardly negotiable in the short term”.
Finally, “the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of 
socialization”, process that is called internalisation (ibid: 78-79). This process is 
continuous and dynamic, as there is a permanent dialectical dialogue between actors and 
the social world, through successive extemalisations and internalisations of the social 
world (ibid: 78). Thus institutions define the rules of conduct, supplied by “a body of 
transmitted recipe knowledge”, and the roles related to them (ibid: 83).
Many scholars subscribe to this idea of internalisation of social structures and consequent 
enactment of related roles (Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994: 9-10; Scott, 1994b: 67; 
Strang and Meyer, 1994: 104-111). For Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000: 710), the 
process of institutionalisation is sustained through its capacity for constituting forms of 
actorhood; thus institutional features through internalisation “shape the way actors 
understand themselves and their roles” (ibid: 712). Douglas (1987: 112) defends that, 
ultimately, institutions control people’s memory, bringing to the mind only the elements 
which reinforce the chosen social structure, providing categories of thoughts, terms for 
self-knowledge and identities. For Douglas (1987: 4, 8, 45), in situation of crisis,
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decisions are based on institutional thinking, rather than ratiocination; thus thinking, as 
cognitive processes, depends on institutions.
3.2.2. Institutionalisation as isomorphic mechanisms and organizational 
environment
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]: 65-66, 80) propose an understanding of the process 
of institutionalisation, especially in organizational fields9, as the forces that induce 
individual entities to become similar to each other (isomorphism), through norms, 
standards, models and policies, because of the high level of interrelation and 
interdependency between them. The authors argue that, in becoming similar, 
organizations obtain the facility: to transact with others; to contract professionals; to be 
recognized as legitimate; and to attract grants and contracts (ibid: 73). Contextual 
characteristics foster isomorphism, such as the interdependency among organizations, the 
level of environmental uncertainty, and the level of legitimacy that professional 
procedures have in an organizational field (ibid: 74-76)10. In detail, isomorphic forces act 
through coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms.
Coercive mechanisms result from the formal and informal pressures (such as political 
influence and legitimacy) organizations exert upon each other, by use of force (such as 
the legal environment), persuasion, or invitation, and from the cultural expectations of a 
society (ibid: 68-69). They argue, for instance, that the need to obtain legitimacy (and 
funding) from hierarchical institutions is an obstacle to any organization creating a more 
egalitarian governance form (ibid: 68-69).
9 DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]: 65) conceptualize organizational fields as aggregates of suppliers, 
consumers, regulatory agencies and competitors (among others entities) which constitute an institutional 
setting.
10 In other work, Powell (1991: 194-200) emphasises that organizations may become resistant to 
isomorphic forces as well, as organizations are subjected to different institutional forces. This reasoning 
that institutions are related to inertia and change of social structures is developed further in section 3.3.
70
Mimetic mechanisms stem from environmental uncertainty, as organizations understand 
that copying (imitating) a successful behaviour (response) is a way of obtaining 
legitimacy, and avoiding the risk of alternative processes (ibid: 67). The mimetic 
processes may be unintentional (caused, for instance, by the transfer of employees 
between organizations), or intentional (caused, for instance, by the influence of 
consulting firms and industry associations) (ibid: 69).
Finally, normative mechanisms are associated with professions, i.e. the collective group 
of people who define and control how to do a specific work (ibid: 67, 70). This 
mechanism stems from formal education, professional networks (such as professional 
associations) and on-the-job socializations, factors that generate professionals with 
similar profile, who are, to a high degree interchangeable (ibid: 71, 72). Professionals 
thus are strongly subject to mimetic forces and exert mimetic forces in organizations 
(ibid: 71, 72).
This idea of organizational isomorphism is also present in Meyer and Rowan (1977), for 
whom two main aspects justify structural similarity in modem organizing. First, 
organizations become isomorphic in order to have a greater ability to manage increasing 
interdependencies among formal organizations (ibid: 346). Second (and most importantly 
in their article), organizational structures are the enactment of rationalized myths in 
modem societies, independent of their environments and relational networks (ibid: 346). 
Meyer and Rowan state organizations adopt isomorphic structures in order to improve 
their legitimacy in society (among professionals and consultants, for instance), and their 
chances of survival, as they receive more resources when considered legitimate (ibid: 
348-352).
Without using the same terminology as DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991b [1983]) 
arguments on isomorphic mechanisms, other authors discuss the process of 
institutionalisation as being the influence of the environment in organizations (from local
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to global levels). For these authors, the institutionalised environment provides patterns of 
organizing, from which organizations draw their structures.
In this direction, Meyer (1994: 32), for instance, argues that the environment validates 
types of organizations (their identity, such as being a hospital), their appropriate 
structural forms (such as incorporating professionals from specific areas), and activity 
routines (such as types of therapy) (ibid: 33-34). Scott and Meyer (1991 [1983]: 123, 129, 
136) describe the same process in societal sectors11, whose regulatory agencies, 
professional and trade associations, and generalized belief systems define the purposes 
and goals of the sector; the means and procedures to pursue sector objectives; and how 
funds are allocated within a sector. Societal sectors thus influence structures, processes 
and outcomes of organizational units that aim to obtain support and legitimacy from 
society (ibid) (see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977, for similar discussion on the role of 
relational networks in the process of institutionalisation).
Complementarily, Scott (1991 [1987]: 171; 1992a: 14-16) stresses the relevance of 
relational networks, being the way in which organizational contexts are increasingly 
organized, and how their level of centralization, formalization and bureaucratization 
affects the related organizations. Scott claims that institutional environments include “the 
rule and belief systems as well as the relational networks that arise in the broader societal 
context” (1992a: 14), and that powerful actors exert special influence upon others through 
these relational networks (Scott, 1991 [1987]: 171-181).
In another work, Scott (1992b: 161-174) highlights that organizations are nested 
simultaneously in various environmental levels, and that each level influences 
organizations differently. Similarly, Avgerou (2000: 234-235) emphasises that
11 For Scott and Meyer (1991: 108), the concept of societal sector means “all organizations within a society 
supplying a given type of product or service with their associated organizational sets: suppliers, financiers, 
regulators, and so forth”. This concept is similar to DiMaggio and Powell’s idea of organizational field 
(1991b: 65).
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environmental influences stem from international, national, sectoral and intra- 
organizational levels, which may conflict with each other.
3.2.3. Institutionalisation through institutional carriers
This literature review on new institutionalism allows a mapping of the possible 
frameworks for understanding the process of institutionalisation. Scott’s (2001, 2003) 
framework on institutional carriers has been chosen as the most comprehensive one, 
considering how this author combine regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
systems to understand institutions and their diffusion through social settings. This 
subsection thus presents a synthesized definition of institutional carriers, and a short 
summary on how different authors have incorporated institutional carriers in their studies 
of institutionalisation (even when they do not use the term carrier explicitly). The next 
subsection introduces Scott’s analytical framework, as it is used in this research.
After having decided this study would investigate a process of institutionalisation of 
Internet-mediated communities, it was necessary to develop a structured framework that 
would help to operationalize the investigation. From the literature review on new 
institutionalism, it was clear that many authors discuss the process of institutionalisation 
in abstract ways, without offering a model for approaching the field in a more systematic 
manner. Indeed, this research agrees with Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000: 699-700), 
who drawing upon Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]) argue that new institutionalists 
should go beyond an idealistic approach to the diffusion of institutions and consider how 
ideas are embedded in durable social artefacts.
In this work, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos state that meaning systems and rationalized 
beliefs influence actors and organizations, but institutions are not disembodied ideas that 
exist only at the level of subjective agreements among local actors (ibid: 702). 
Bureaucracies, for instance, are objectified in legal and operational texts, models, and 
administrative systems, based on verbal and numerical techniques to organize and to 
control goals and operations (ibid: 703).
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The literature on institutional carriers offers an interesting way of objectifying the process 
of institutionalisation from abstract ideas to durable social artefacts, as proposed by 
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000). In this direction, drawing upon Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1967 [1966]) concept of objectification (as defined in subsection 3.2.1), 
Weber (2002 [1930]; 1978 [1956]), Berger, Berger and Kellner (1973), Jepperson (1991), 
Meyer (1994), DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]), and Scott (2001), this work relates 
the concept of carrier to, inter alia, the social strata, actors, organizations, rules, norms, 
cognitive schemas and artefacts in general that carry institutionalised social structures 
from one to another setting in time and space. Many authors have discussed the role of 
institutional carriers in the diffusion of institutions, even when they do not use 
specifically the term carrier; some of their concepts are discussed next, before subsection
3.3.4, which introduces Scott’s framework of institutional carriers.
Weber, for instance, studies how social strata, groups and organizations were responsible 
for the diffusion of religious ethics and values in different societies. In The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism (2002 [1930]), Weber focuses on how the Protestant 
ethic (from religious organizations such as Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, Baptists and 
Quakers) influenced the methodical-rational organization of work. More specifically, 
argues the author, the Protestant ethic legitimated the idea of profit, and spread the 
conception that hard work is a defence mechanism against material temptations and a 
signal of spiritual salvation (ibid: 17, 26, 105-108). He explains that these religious 
groups and organizations had a particular way of thinking (‘frame of mind’), and carried 
this model throughout the world, influencing other social carriers -  such as 
businesspersons, workers and middle classes -  which, in turn, were also responsible for 
spreading this model that supports modem capitalism (ibid: 18-20, 224). Also in 
Economy and Society (1978 [1956]: 468-515), Weber analyses how different social strata 
and organizations (such as peasantry; warrior nobles; ascetic Protestants; small 
businessmen; artisans; and plebeian, pariah and upper class groups) were carriers of 
religious beliefs in different societies and periods.
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Drawing upon Weber’s work, Berger, Berger and Kellner (1973: 16) submit that 
institutions of technological production and bureaucracy are the primary carriers of 
social change in modem societies. For them, processes, actors, mass media and mass 
education bombard people with ideas and models of conduct, carrying institutionalised 
mental schemas to the level of consciousness (ibid: 43, 65, 92). These authors also stress 
that diffused themes related to technological production and bureaucracy have become 
independent of their primary carrier (original institutions), as these models have spread to 
other spheres of social life. In so doing, they promote social changes, such as the 
migration of the concept of maximization o f results from the sphere of technological 
production into the spheres of education and management of psychological difficulties 
(ibid: 16, 22, 34-35, 40,43). The same has happened in relation to the attempt to organize 
households and families in the fashion of a bureaucratic office, suggest the authors (ibid: 
49).
Discussing the mechanisms of institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (1991b 
[1983]: 67-74) list some institutional carriers. While they do not use the term carrier, their 
intention is clearly very similar when they refer to: legislation; regulation; curricula; 
technical requirements; standard operation procedures; accounting practices; performance 
evaluation; services infrastructures (such as in telecommunications and transport); 
standard criteria adopted by funding organizations and agencies; legitimate organizational 
models; professionals and their associations; universities; trade associations; professional 
networks; specialized magazines; hierarchical status in a community (roles); career paths 
and titles; and concepts of status and prestige.
The list of authors discussing institutional carriers goes further. Jepperson (1991: 150), 
for instance, suggests that formal organization, regimes (codified rules and sanctions, 
such as legal systems) and cultures are institutional carriers. Meyer (1994: 36-44) 
compiles an alternative list, comprised of: contents (such as ideologies); elites; successful 
organizations; world-level organizations (such as the United Nations and the World 
Bank); professionals; consultants; nation-states (and the related legal systems) and 
science (or knowledge). Scott and Meyer (1991 [1983]: 123, 129, 136), discussing the
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environmental influence in organizational structures, list the role of regulatory agencies, 
professional bodies, trade associations and belief systems. Meyer and Rowan (1977: 341, 
343, 347) cite legal systems, rules, norms and rationalized social structures. North (1998; 
251) contends that mental models, learned through socialization, carry institutions.
Empirical studies also demonstrate how institutional carriers promote the diffusion of 
social structures. Souza et al. (2004: 636), for instance, researching face-to-face informal 
groups that create virtual communities, affirm that groupware systems encode group- 
structuring rules (such as the obligatory presence of an owner or administrator who has 
privileged rights in relation to other members), thus forcing a process of 
institutionalisation, as community members should follow rules that they have not 
established through social interaction. Hamilton and Feenstra (1998: 171) point out how 
the standardization of organizational processes (such as financial accounting systems), 
and the formation of regulative organizations (such as banks, stock markets and 
government agencies) influence organizational behaviour, as actors evaluate themselves 
and others in accordance with these formal standards, internalising the need to conform to 
them. And Bjorck (2004: 2-4) argues that international legislation on standards, 
organizational formal policies, routines, market competition, consultants and certified 
security officers are related to the process of institutionalisation of information systems 
security in organizations.
3.2.4. Scott’s framework of institutional carriers
As introduced above, this thesis follows specifically Scott’s framework (2001, 2003) to 
study a process of institutionalisation of Internet-mediated communities. Regarding 
institutions as being intertwined regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems (as 
discussed in section 3.1), he suggests relating institutional carriers to each of his three 
pillars. Scott (2001: 77) submits that institutions are embedded in repositories or carriers, 
and identifies four groups of carriers: symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and 
artefacts.
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Scott claims that symbolic systems (rules, values, culture) are both social phenomena 
external to actors and “subjective, internalised cognitive frames and beliefs” (2001: 78), 
which are present in the mind of individuals, as ideas and values (ibid: 79). Relational 
systems (governance systems, authority systems, identities) are related to role systems: 
the relational expectations related to a social network (ibid: 79). Routines are patterned 
actions and procedures (encoded in repetitive activities) based on actors’ tacit knowledge 
(ibid: 80, drawing also upon Winter, 1990: 272-275). Finally, artefacts are tangible 
objects, such as technology, while emphasising that they are socially constructed, and 
people maintain a level of flexibility in the understanding on how to interact with 
artefacts (ibid: 81). Table 3.2 summarizes this schema.
Table 3.2 Institutional pillars and carriers
Pillars
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive
Symbolic systems Rules
Laws
Values
Expectations
Categories
Typifications
Schemas
Relational systems Governance systems 
Power systems
Regimes
Authority systems
Structural
isomorphism
Identities
Routines Protocols
Standard operating 
procedures
Jobs
Roles
Obedience to duty
Scripts
Artefacts Objects complying 
with mandated 
specifications
Objects meeting 
conventions 
standards
Objects possessing 
symbolic value
Source: Scott (2001: 77)
In a more recent work, Scott (2003) extends the discussion on carriers, exploring different 
kinds of symbolic systems and relational systems (routines and artefacts are not discussed 
in this article). In terms of symbolic systems, the author reinforces the relevance of laws 
(among other examples) but he explores, also, the need to focus on media and 
interpretation (ibid: 884-886). He argues that even laws and regulations, which are 
extremely influential as symbolic systems, are subjected to different interpretations in
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different contexts. Different media also have differing capacity to diffuse institutional 
forms in time and space. The author thus proposes that institutional carriers are not 
neutral vehicles of social structures, as they affect the elements they transmit (ibid: 879).
In terms of relational systems, including individual and collective actors, Scott (ibid: 886- 
890) discusses how they affect the process of diffusion of innovation and reforms, which 
reshape organizational boundaries. Again, the intermediaries in relational systems (such 
as governmental agencies, trade associations, unions, lawyers and also digital 
technologies) are not neutral, but active participants in the construction of the diffused 
ideas. The consensus among major players influences the diffusion of an innovation (and 
thus its institutionalisation), argues Scott (ibid) (a process that Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997, call “organizing vision”). In another work, Scott (2005: 468) proposes that different 
kinds of actors have different impact as carriers of institutions, arguing that the 
understanding of interactive models -  how agents interact in specific situations -  
undermines deterministic arguments about the diffusion of institutions.
In these works, Scott (2003, 2005) emphasizes the relevance of specific contexts, which 
affect how institutional carriers diffuse social structures. Indeed, this thesis agrees that the 
study of carriers demand an understanding of the related contexts, as suggested as well by 
other authors. Weber (2002 [1930]: 5-12; 32-33), for instance, explains how the cultural 
contexts have an impact upon the diffusion of institutions. In the same fashion, Berger, 
Berger and Kellner (1973: 92), drawing upon Weber, develop the idea of “variant 
institutional vectors”: the contextual vectors that interfere in the process of 
institutionalisation, altering the impact of earners. They argue that the diffusion of 
technological production models depends, among other factors, on the degree of local 
technological development, the political environment and the level of resistance to 
foreign cultures in a society (ibid: 97-98, 114, 121-123). In sum, they say that the 
diffusion capacity of a cognitive model depends on the readiness of a society to 
internalise specific new structures, as some processes of institutionalisation demand deep 
changes in the traditional way societies do things and understand the world (ibid: 113, 
118).
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3.3. Institutional change and inertia
The discussion on the nature of institutions and the processes of institutionalisation may 
induce the impression that these social structures impose themselves, in their totality, 
upon social agents. Indeed, institutions have an inherent level of inertia and resist local 
modification. Scholars, nonetheless, have emphasised the role of agency in changing 
social structures (as discussed in the introduction of this chapter), although people face 
obstacles in this process. This section discusses shortly how institutions are related to 
processes of inertia and change, in the context of this research.
As discussed previously, this thesis is concerned with a process of institutionalisation, 
focusing on how institutional carriers diffuse social structures through Internet-mediated 
communities, thus focusing mainly on the inertial aspects of the studied hierarchical 
institutions. It is necessary, however, to understand also how institutions are changed, as 
this investigation may also uncover other kind of phenomena that have not been revealed 
during the pilot study.
Thus this section will firstly clarify that this research understands institutions from both 
standpoints, as forces of inertia and as having the potential for being changed. Secondly 
this section will prepare a theoretical framework to investigate the studied phenomenon 
considering the possibility of finding elements of both inertia and change in this process 
of institutionalisation.
In a nutshell, drawing upon the literature reviewed above, this section will show how 
institutions are seen as constraining and enabling action, having possibilities of 
promoting both inertia and change. On the one hand, institutions constrain behaviour -  
defining rules, norms, cognitive schemas, roles and identities -  thus providing stability 
and order; but, on the other hand, institutions support and empower activities, grounding 
both incremental and revolutionary changes (Scott, 2001: 50; Jepperson, 1991: 146; 
Peters and Pierre, 1998: 566). Some conditions can strongly influence the possibility of 
change, such as the degree of institutionalisation of different social structures: the
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meaning and legitimacy that people attribute to them (Powell, 1991: 195, 199; Avgerou, 
2002: 37).
The outcome of these conflicting forces cannot be identified precisely, as these processes 
are affected by multiple, ambiguous intentions, generating unintended consequences 
(March and Olsen, 1989: 65). As proposed by Peters and Pierre (1998: 567), this 
dichotomy between rigidity and flexibility can be better understood if the theory 
highlights the temporal dynamic of institutions: in the short term institutions tend to be 
seen as structures but in the long term they show their inherent flexibility.
The two subsections below explain in more detail these two divergent forces of inertia 
and change in institutional environments, explaining the main drivers of each process.
3.3.1. Aspects that favour institutional inertia
Scholars point out many reasons to relate institutions to inertial forces. Reviewing the 
literature on new institutionalism, some aspects are recurrent: the costs and risks of 
promoting institutional change; the interdependence between agents; the cognitive 
difficulty of creating alternatives in face of taken-for-granted schemas; and the interest of 
powerful social actors in keeping current institutions. These ideas are clarified below.
Starting from the idea of costs, the construction of institutions implies, necessarily, the 
mobilization of resources that often cannot be recovered in face of institutional change, 
thus creating an obstacle to modifying established social structures (Stinchcombe, 1968: 
120-124; Powell, 1991: 194; Ingram, 1998: 260; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 11; 
Lanzara, 1998: 20). Furthermore certain costs, there are also the uncertain ones, as 
institutional change is also related to increasing levels of risks and ambiguities, which 
again favour the reproduction of old social structures, to the extent that people are risk- 
averse (Lanzara, 1998: 20; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 4). Naturally, the aspect of 
costs is not homogenous, thus different social groups and organizations may see
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differential advantages from promoting institutional change (Ingram, 1998: 262; 
Clements and Cook, 1999: 452).
From the point of view of relational networks, the interdependency between entities 
reinforces institutional inertia, especially in homogenous environments (Powell, 1991: 
191; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 11; Ingram, 1998: 260; March and Olsen, 1989: 57; 
Clements and Cook, 1999: 450). This interdependency in fact reinforces path-dependent 
processes, in which initial choices restrict future options, favouring thus incremental 
rather than radical changes from the initial choice onwards (Powell, 1991: 191; March, 
1994: 96; Nee and Ingram, 1998: 30; North, 1998: 252) (see also subsection 3.3.2, which 
considers the argument that relational networks may favour institutional change in some 
contexts).
Cognitive reasons also make institutions more resistant to change (Powell, 1991: 192; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 11; Clements and Cook, 1999: 445, 454-458; March and 
Olsen, 1989: 55; Avgerou, 2002: 37; Lanzara, 1998: 13-14). The argument here is that, 
through models, schemas and scripts, institutions influence how people understand the 
world, their interests and their identities. Taken-for-granted behaviour is thus perceived 
as natural and legitimate, or even as the only conceivable alternative, which nurtures 
resistance to change, as actors find it difficult to imagine or accept other possibilities. In 
this direction, the way people understand their roles (and adequate forms of actorhood) 
are obstacles to institutional change (see discussion on internalisation of social structures 
in subsection 3.2.1).
Finally, powerful agents defend institutional inertia when the current structures favour 
their interests in controlling more resources (Powell, 1991: 191; Stinchcombe, 1968: 107-
108). Lanzara (1998: 13) describes how institutions support the unequal distribution of 
competencies and resources in societies, permitting powerful groups to continue to 
control most resources. As attempts to promote changes generally depend, in some way, 
on old structures, these structures and their agents can sabotage the establishment of new 
institutions (ibid: 13).
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3.3.2. Aspects that favour institutional change
In spite of their resilience, institutions may change, or even collapse, because social 
actors always maintain a degree of freedom in the enactment of social structures. In this 
subsection, some arguments are explored which explain how agency changes institutions. 
These arguments are not exhaustive, but they aim to picture some interpretations which 
help to understand institutional changes.
In relation to the nature of human action, one important argument is that social actors 
always have agency to create, change, resist, violate and ignore rules, norms and cultural- 
cognitive models; and thus make different choices (Scott, 2005: 467; 1994b: 60, 76-77; 
March, 1994: 73-76; March and Olsen, 1989: 24, 34, 48; Jepperson, 1991: 159). 
Institutions do not speak for themselves; social actors need to interpret how to apply 
appropriate rules and identities to ambiguous situations.
This process is dynamic and context-dependent, allowing new interpretations that 
promote institutional changes (March, 1994: 61, 68, 78-79; March and Olsen, 1989: 24, 
58-65; Mantzavinos, 2001: 90-94). Furthermore, actors have different roles and identities, 
in different institutional environments, thus they need to ponder which action, from a 
range delimited by the norms of institutionalisation, is legitimate in each circumstance, so 
opening opportunities to institutional change (Scott, 2005: 467-468; Mantzavinos, 2001: 
95; Lanzara, 1998: 20; Jepperson and Meyer, 1991: 226-229; March, 1994: 69-70).
Furthermore, there is the nature of institutions themselves. The ambiguity of rules, norms, 
roles, and situations demands that agents interpret institutions in order to choose the one 
that best apply to the situation and so there is not an automatic compliance (March, 1994: 
61; March and Simon, 1993 [1958]: 12; Klijn, 2001: 138; Scott, 1994b: 76; Meyer, 1992: 
263; March and Olsen, 1989: 22, 24; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 29; Clements and 
Cook, 1999: 448-449; Nee, 1998a: 87-88; Scott, 2005: 466). In addition, the very 
contradictions among different institutions are also source of changes, as agents, in 
observing the conflict, do not see institutions as inevitable (March and Olsen, 1989: 167;
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Clements and Cook, 1999: 449-450; Scott, 1994b: 75-76, 2005: 466, 449; Avgerou, 
2002: 39-44).
The relevance of context is also important in institutional change. Exogenous, sometimes 
disruptive, forces can promote institutional change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 30; 
Powell, 1991: 200; Peters and Pierre, 1998: 571-572; Clements and Cook, 1999: 447-448; 
March and Olsen, 1989: 167-170; Lanzara, 1998: 20; Jepperson, 1991: 145). As 
presented by Scott (2005: 473-475), in modem societies, indigenous institutions are 
increasingly exposed to external conceptual models, carried across sectors, fields and 
countries, by consultants, media companies, markets, global inter-governmental agencies, 
international non-governmental organizations and international professional bodies.
Thus local institutions are increasingly facing many forms of external influence. Here the 
idea of relational networks, which may promote inertia (as discussed in subsection 3.3.1), 
can also be the source of change, especially in heterogeneous environments, as 
transformations in one institution affect others, generating the need of arrangements until 
achieving a new equilibrium (March and Olsen, 1989: 57; Peters and Pierre, 1998: 574; 
Clements and Cook, 1999: 447,450-451; Orlikowski and Barley, 2001: 154).
Finally, conflicts of interests and power disputes are strongly related to processes of 
institutional creation and change, as institutions favour the interests of those with greater 
bargaining power in society (Eggertsson, 1996: 12; Mantzavinos, 2001: 96; Clements and 
Cook, 1999: 453-454; Ingram, 1998: 258; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 30-31; Knight, 
1992: 8; Knight and Ensminger, 1998:106-108; Nee and Ingram, 1998: 27, 36; North: 
1990: 68, 101; Stinchcombe, 1968: 112, 186; Jepperson and Meyer, 1991: 226). 
Considering that institutions embed conflicts of interests and power relations, these 
authors argue that dominant actors essay strategies of control and enforcement, in order 
to acquire or maintain power, preserving their interests, in the elaboration and change of 
institutions. Actors create, maintain and change institutions in accordance with their 
interests; thus institutional changes always embed a new disposition of power relations 
(ibid).
83
4. Methodology: A qualitative investigation
As elucidated in chapter 1, this research aims to investigate how institutional carriers 
influence the emergence of segregated, centralized decision-making processes in Internet- 
mediated communities despite their declared intention to create non-hierarchical 
(network) governance structures. In order to conduct this investigation, this research 
selected a group of four Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated 
communities, which have also been part of a previous pilot study to ground this proposal 
in empirical data.
This chapter on methodology continues explicating how this research develops, focusing 
specifically on exposing its conceptual framework (the understanding that 
institutionalised social structures are human creations that influence their own behaviour; 
and that people construct their interpretation of social phenomena through interacting 
with each other), its research design (multiple case-study approach) and its methods 
(qualitative research based on in-depth, semi-structured individual interviews). The 
sections below detail these aspects, presenting both the theoretical arguments that support 
this thesis and describing how this investigation has been conducted empirically.
The first section clarifies the interpretive orientation of this research, drawing upon 
concepts of social constructionism to understand how institutions influence behaviour 
patterns, highlighting as well the relevance of the context and agency in the emergence 
and reproduction of social structures. Furthermore, it shows that the qualitative approach 
is consistent with an interpretive orientation, and that the construction of meaning 
emerges from the interplay between researcher and interviewees.
The second section presents the arguments for adopting a multiple case-study research 
design. The third section discusses the data-collection methods (in-depth, semi­
structured, individual interviews), and how this research conducts the transcriptions of 
tapes, the coding of the obtained data and the translation of excerpts. Finally, the fourth
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section exposes this research concerns with its quality, mainly in relation to criteria of 
validity, reliability and generalizability.
4.1. Conceptual framework and qualitative research
This thesis is grounded in the idea that people, through interaction, create social 
structures, and that these structures influence human behaviour (arguments that are 
detailed in the introduction of chapter 3). Thus social order emerges from people’s 
interactions, in a long-term historical process in which humans make their activity 
meaningful in a socio-cultural context (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 69-72; 
Crotty, 1998: 44, 53; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 13; see also Heidegger, 1962, p. 41, 
on how historicity frames human understanding).
Through socialization, people construct inter-subjective interpretations of their social 
reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 37-40; Crotty, 1998: 42-43, 53-55; Knorr- 
Cetina, 1981: 4, 9; Schwandt, 2000: 198). Thus, in spite of having individual 
perspectives, people have a common ground in society through which to understand 
social structures, “a good deal of cognitive consensus”, in Meyer’s words (1992: 264). 
The social structures that endure in time become institutions (as discussed in chapter 3).
As argued by Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 35, 37-40), people perceive social life 
as being something enduring, a phenomenon that has patterns and order, a taken-for- 
granted reality that presents itself to them as independent of their action, although 
humans always keep the agency to change social structures (Berger Mid Luckmann, 1967 
[1966]: 99; Giddens, 1984: 15; Hacking, 1999: 2; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 14). In 
other words, although institutions are social constructions, they are perceived as an 
objectified reality after their construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 76). As 
discussed in chapter 3, the fact that social structures are supported by reward and 
punishment mechanisms reinforces this perception of institutions as external facts 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 72-73; Scott, 1991 [1987]: 178, 181; 2001: 52-55; 
Jepperson, 1991: 145).
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Indeed, although these institutional generative mechanisms influence behaviour, they are 
not able to cause behaviour. As argued by Sayer (2000: 15, 23), the final effects of 
institutions on behaviour depend on contextual aspects, which explains the emergence of 
phenomena that are not only a reproduction of patterned behaviour. And, further, the 
variety of contexts is such that one should not expect “regular association between causes 
and effects” in social phenomena (ibid: 15-16). Following this reasoning, many scholars 
recommend researchers to pay special attention to the context in which social actors are 
embedded (Walsham, 1993: 53-55; Avgerou and Madon, 2004: 162; Heek, 2000; Sayer, 
2000: 17).
Furthermore, the context in which agency operates is important in the reproduction or 
change of institutions. Indeed, as said above, this thesis contends that social structures 
only exist as far as people reproduce them, and that people may change social structures 
(Giddens, 1979: 69; 1984: 17; Scott, 2001: 67; Bhaskar, 1998: 216, 220; Manicas, 1998: 
318, 320; see discussion on chapters 1 and 3). This approach, which balances the 
relevance of social structures and agency in society, in similar vein to structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1979, 1984), is compatible with this research’s theoretical framework, new 
institutionalism, as proposed by W. Scott (2001: 67, 75) and J. Scott (1995: 214) (see also 
Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 93; and Klijn, 2001).
4.1.1. Interpretive orientation
Starting from this conception on how social structures emerge and influence social actors, 
and the idea that people endow their social structures with inter-subjective meaning, this 
research follows a qualitative methodology, grounded in an interpretive orientation 
(which Habermas, 1981 [1968]: 308, calls the historical-hermeneutical approach). This 
thesis follows the interpretive school in arguing that social research aims to understand 
phenomena through accessing the meanings participants assign to them (Walsham, 1993: 
5, 8-10; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 5, 14; Crotty, 1998: 67-71; Habermas, 1981
86
[1968]: 309-310). As argued by Heidegger (1962: 36-37; see also Gadamer, 1989 [1975]: 
259-260; and Bauman, 1978: 148), humans naturally interpret themselves in relation to 
the way they understand the world. Similarly, Schutz (1990 [1962]: 57) states that people 
access the social cultural world through understanding (Verstehen).
The concept of understanding in Heidegger and Schutz is said to be inter-subjective 
because people construct a common interpretation through social interaction (Heidegger, 
1962: 41; Schutz, 2003: 137, 139; 1990 [1962]: 53, 10, 133)1. From a similar conception, 
Gadamer (1989 [1975]: 304, 385, 389) proposes that people come to a common 
understanding, through conversation, interpreting each other’s viewpoints, thus 
broadening their own horizon (without giving up previous ones) through acknowledging 
other perspectives (see also Habermas, 1981 [1968]: 309-310).
Following Heidegger (1962), Schutz (1990 [1962]; 2003: 137-138), Gadamer (1989 
[1975]), Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 37), Giddens (1995: 240), Bauman (1978: 
14, 180-182) and Sayer (2000: 17), this research investigates the chosen social 
phenomenon through interpreting how participants understand their experiences, attitudes 
and motivations, in specific contexts. This thesis sees people as the primary source of 
data in social research, justifying thus the qualitative approach based on in-depth, semi­
structured, individual interviews, to explore a phenomenon in its context (Mason, 2002: 
1, 3, 56; Hakim, 2000: 34; Esterberg, 2002: 2-3; Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg, 1991: 23; 
Sayer, 2000: 23).
The choice of in-depth interviews implies that this researcher and the interviewees 
reciprocally influence each other in the construction of a common understanding through 
interaction (Mason, 2002: 64, 68; May, 2001: 127; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 14; 
Klein and Myers, 1999: 74; Holstein and Gubrium, 2003 : 4, 14; Walsham, 1995a: 77; 
1993: 8). Thus the emergent interpretation is dependent on the circumstances of its 
production, grounded in both the researcher’s and the interviewee’s previous conceptions
1 Schutz (1990 [1962]: 11, 13) also ponders that part of human knowledge derives from individual 
experience.
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(ibid), which implies that attempts of replicating such a study will have intrinsic 
limitations (see subsection 4.4.2).
In addition, this research contends that the only way to understand phenomena is from a 
particular viewpoint, which permits the researcher to attune to the world within a limited 
range of possibilities (Gadamer, 2003 [I960]: 159; Habermas, 1981 [1968]: 309; 
Bauman, 1978: 163, drawing upon Heidegger). For Schutz (1990 [1962]: 5), knowledge 
depends on how our mind selects impressions from the universal context, in accordance 
with our interests and conceptual frameworks. This implies that one does not face ‘pure’ 
facts, but always interpreted ones, i.e. facts that have meaning in a social context (ibid).
Following Heidegger and Schutz, Gadamer (1989 [1975]: 302) argues that we cannot 
bracket history, putting ourselves out of a situation, as we are essentially historical 
beings, and a situation always implies a viewpoint. Focusing on cognitive aspects, 
Goodman (1978: 2) agrees that our way of describing phenomena is confined to ‘frames 
of reference’, as there is no perception without conception (ibid: 6). In the same direction, 
Weber (2003 [1904]: 118) and Feyerabend (1993: 211-212) emphasise that the 
observation of phenomena depends fully on the theories (or viewpoints) that support an 
observation.
This thesis thus assumes an epistemic relativism (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983: 5): the 
idea that knowledge is relative and subject to changes, being a social product which 
depends on specific historical, cultural and conceptual frameworks, as well as on power 
relations (Jones, 2003: 148, 153; Crotty, 1998: 47, 64; Schwandt, 2000: 198-201; Sayer, 
2000: 47; Walsham, 1995b: 376; Giddens, 1995: 240). As explained by Kuhn (1962: 5, 9,
109), human sensory experiences change in the face of historically different conceptual 
frameworks (paradigms), because these frameworks establish the legitimate conceptions 
of phenomena, questions, methods and acceptable answers.
Accepting epistemic relativism, nonetheless, does not mean endorsing judgmental 
relativism, which is the idea that anything counts as an equally valid interpretation of data
(Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983: 5). As the authors clarify, not all understandings are 
equally adequate to elucidate social phenomena (ibid: 6). Gadamer (1989 [1975]: 267) 
comments that the process of understanding should be grounded in legitimate fore- 
meanings rather than arbitrary ones. Bauman (1978: 20-21, following Heidegger) and 
Sayer (2000: 46) contend that valid interpretations should be contextualized, thus 
avoiding a situation in which any interpretation is regarded as equally acceptable.
This research thus argues that there are many ambiguous interpretations of phenomena, 
but that it is necessary to construct one that is more convincing (Walsham, 1993; Sayer, 
2000: 47; Goodman, 1978: 21), without claiming that the emergent interpretation it the 
correct (Taylor, 2003 [1971]: 182-184; Bauman, 1978: 10). In this direction, this 
researcher draws upon the concept of hermeneutical circle, agreeing that the process of 
understanding depends on the continuous interplay between the parts and the whole from 
a standpoint, in an effort to tune competing meanings to the context (Heidegger, 1962: 
38, 191-195; Gadamer, 1989 [1975]: 266-267, 290-292). See further discussion on 
research quality in section 4.4.
4.2. Multiple case-study research design
This thesis follows a case-study research strategy. Many scholars have argued that this 
design permits obtaining a detailed picture from a contemporary, complex social 
phenomenon in its natural context (Yin, 1981: 59; 2003: 2, 13, 15; Benbasat, Goldstein 
and Mead, 1987: 370; Hakim, 2000: 59; Sjoberg et al., 1991: 52; Hammersley and 
Gomm, 2000: 3; Stake, 1994: 239). This investigation also follows Yin (1981: 59; 2003: 
7), Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987: 370, 372), and Walsham (1995a: 74), 
considering that the case-study strategy is preferred for investigating how and why 
questions. Moreover, Sjoberg et al. (1991: 56) recommend the case-study approach to 
study decision-making processes, and Walsham (1993: 14) says it is adequate to conduct 
interpretive researches. Thus, for multiple reasons, the case-study strategy fits with the
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present investigation, which, as presented in chapter 1, proposes to study how a process 
of institutionalisation occurs through institutional carriers.
More specifically, this research adopts a multiple case-study strategy, understanding that 
this approach permits the replication of the cases (Yin, 2003: 47; Hakim, 2000: 62; de 
Vaus, 2001: 240). This thesis analyses the phenomenon of institutionalisation of Internet- 
mediated communities through the theoretical lens of new institutionalism. It is thus 
expected that the four studied cases help in obtaining similar results (literal replication), 
under similar contexts; and/or contrasting results (theoretical replication) in different 
contexts, which may be understood through the chosen theoretical lens (Yin, 2003: 47) . 
Although this work does not seek general laws that can be applied to a large population, it 
conceives that case studies may help to construct and extend theory, as proposed by Yin 
(1981: 63), and Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987: 369-370, 373) (see discussion of 
analytic generalization in subsection 4.4.3).
4.2.1. Case selection
There are clear rationales for selecting the four Brazilian environmental-education 
Internet-mediated communities as the empirical objects of this research. At the macro 
level, this research is motivated by the need to investigate communities that are 
associated with social movements, in face of the political relevance of civil society 
organizations in the contemporary world (as argued in subsection 1.4.2).
At the micro level, this investigation has two main reasons for choosing these 
communities. First, they have a particular level of entanglement with formal 
organizations, such as government offices, universities and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), even to the extent of depending on these organizations for their
2 The concept of literal and theoretical replications in multiple-case studies is related to the cases 
themselves, and cannot be confounded with the replication of researches, issue discussed in section 4.4.
3 This idea of replicating is a theoretical proposition. Only the collect data shows whether the results are 
similar or different, and how the results are related to the theoretical framework.
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offices and websites, and to organize their events. Thus these collectivities have a form of 
dependency that characterizes them as a specific model of Internet-mediated 
communities.
In this set of four communities, Rebea and Repea have received government funding and 
are supported by NGOs. Reasul has emerged as a result of government funding. Although 
some Reasul members argue that this community had established links before receiving 
this public support, they commonly accept that this sponsorship has been fundamental to 
their organization. A private university (Univale) also supports Reasul through the 
provision of offices, computers, Internet access and professional support. Finally, Remtea 
has not received government funding directly, but the community receives government 
assistance for their face-to-face events and it is anchored in a public university 
(Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso), which offers the community many benefits 
(such as offices, computers, Internet access and professional support).
Second, these communities possess established decision-making processes. Indeed, the 
studied communities often take political positions, mobilize efforts for manifestations, 
arrange face-to-face meetings and organize themselves to participate in public debate 
with specific proposals, among other activities, which demand explicit decision making. 
Naturally, in having these activities, they differentiate themselves from communities that 
are concerned mainly with exchanging information and other material, activities which 
does not demand such a level of coordination.
Having these characteristics, these collectivities offer an interesting opportunity for 
investigating the institutionalisation of social structures related to decision-making 
processes in virtual communities. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 1, a pilot study with 
these communities (and two other similar ones that are not included in this further 
investigation4) indicates that at least some institutional carriers influence the way these
4 The other two communities are: REA/PB -  Rede de Educa?ao Ambiental da Paraiba (Paraiba 
Environmental-Education Network), and RAEA -  Rede Acreana de Educacao Ambiental (Acre
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communities structure their decision-making processes. Thus there are reasons to expect 
that the proposed investigation would allow answering its research question.
The selection of cases by considering previous knowledge about the empirical object has 
frequently been legitimated (Hakim, 2000: 62; Patton, 2002: 234; Hamel, Dufour and 
Fortin, 1993: 41; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 27). The choice of these communities is 
thus pragmatic, as this research focuses on how these cases may improve our 
comprehension of the institutionalisation process of Internet-mediated communities, in 
the light of the chosen theoretical lens (new institutionalism, specifically through the 
analysis of institutional carriers) (Stake, 1995: 3; 1994: 237; Patton, 2002: 234, 238, 239; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994: 27-28; Ragin, 1995 [1992]: 42; Hakim, 2000: 170).
In determining the requisite number of cases for a comparative study such as the 
proposed here, Patton (2002) and Yin (2003) avoid establishing a simple numerical 
criterion. Patton (2002: 244-245) argues that there are no rules for defining the number of 
cases in a comparative study, as the validity of the study depends more on the 
information richness than on the number of cases. Yin (2003: 51-53) also opposes the 
idea of minimum number of cases, arguing that it depends on the complexity of the study, 
as well as the availability of resources. This research thus studies four communities 
considering that they have sufficient similarities and differences to permit us to compare 
and to contrast them, with the reasonable expectation of generating conclusions of 
interest to the academic community.
4.3. Methods
As clarified above, this research obtained its data through in-depth, semi-structured, 
individual interviews. This section explains in more detail how these interviews were 
conducted, as well as the theoretical framework that grounds the choices made. The 
subsections below explore:
Environmental-Education Network). Based on the pilot study, this research chose the four communities that 
were more active, and that had a more intense use of the Internet-mediated communication channels.
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4.3.1 how the interviewees were selected;
4.3.2 the procedure for gaining informed consent before the interview;
4.3.3 the practical conditions for the conduct of the research (such as the period, 
the language and tape-recording processes);
4.4.4 the interview guide (themes to be discussed with the interviewees);
4.4.5 the processes of transcription and translation; and
4.4.6 the process of coding.
4.3.1. Selection of interviewees
This research selected the interviewees purposively, according to their characteristics, 
considering that members with varying group roles and experiences could help gaining an 
understanding of the phenomena in question from diverse perspectives (Mason, 2002: 
124, 127; Morse, 1994: 229; Warren, 2002: 87; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 29; Bauer 
and Aarts, 2000: 19; Esterberg, 2002: 93). Specifically, this research has been concerned 
with selecting members who participate and who do not participate on the segregated 
decision-making processes. Thus members are classified in two categories: those that 
participate on the segregated discussion list (identified as management or leadership 
members); and those that participate only on the general list (identified as ordinary 
members).
The selection of interviewees was done through a snowball process. The investigation 
started with key informants, who indicated other people to be interviewed (Esterberg, 
2002: 93; Warren, 2002: 87). The first contact with the communities was always with 
their spokespeople, as formalized on their websites (in general main leadership 
members). These contacts provided references to others from the two major groups, here 
identified as management members and ordinary members. This second set of members 
proposed further names and so on, summing up 58 members.
93
In spite of the efforts to diversify the types of respondents in relation to their position in 
the community, the majority of interviewees are from management groups. Other, 
ordinary members were contacted by email and telephone, but they did not agree to 
interviews. The final distribution of respondents is:
Table 8.4 -  Types of respondents
Community Distribution of interviewees
Rebea 8 management members; 8 ordinary members
Repea 8 management members*; 3 ordinary members
Remtea 11 management members; 4 ordinary members
Reasul 11 management members; 1 ordinary member 
3 other members**
* One management member hadjo ined  the group recently before the interview.
** These three members theoretically belonged to the management group, but in practice they did  
not have experience in decision making, as they related in their interviews.
As discussed in chapter 7, some dissimilarity among cases may be related to this uneven 
distribution between ordinary and management members. On these occasions, the degree 
to which the findings could be compromised by the skewed distribution of respondents is 
clarified. For instance, in relation to tactic 3C-1A (do not inform ordinary members about 
the existence o f a leadership group, and the segregation o f discussion lists), Remtea’s 
management members may have hidden this practice on purpose (subsection 7.1.3), 
justifying the few citations5 (both from ordinary members). Still, the interviews of these 
both ordinary members have permitted to grasp the tactic.
A second example is related to tactic 9C-2 (reinforce respect fo r  the role o f executive 
secretary by blocking ordinary members from representing the community or taking 
decisions), which is not cited by Reasul members. There are contextual reasons to explain 
this omission (see subsection 7.1.9), but it could also be related to the cited bias in the 
types of interviewees, although in this example Repea and Remtea related the practice in
5 This dissertation does not make inferences from the number of citations, as explained in chapters 5 and 7. 
It is only when the contextual evidence may attribute meaning to the citations that the frequency is 
analysed. Here the ambiguity emerges from the fact that there are a greater number of management 
members among Remtea interviewees, which could have affected the obtained data.
94
spite of also having more management members among their interviewees. Thus it is not 
clear whether this data derives indeed from the fact that there are more management 
members among Reasul respondents, as there are other competing interpretations.
In general, the differences among cases appear to be related to other contextual aspects, 
as it is discussed in the next chapters. Indeed, the findings related to Rebea, which has an 
even balance between management and ordinary members, are very similar to the 
findings related to the other communities, with only three clear exceptions in relation to 
tactics of: ignoring complaints against centralized structures, or questions related to 
accountability and transparency (3C-2); avoiding conflict with and criticisms o f sponsors 
(4C-2); and excluding from debate within the management group those who do not agree 
with the leadership orientation (4C-3). Although these tactics could have been more 
emphasised because the community has more ordinary members among respondents, in 
fact many management members are among those that cited these practices (see citations 
in subsections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4). This consistency between the findings of Rebea and the 
other communities suggests that the distribution of respondents is not a problem in this 
research.
Furthermore, there are political disputes among management members in all these 
communities. The management groups are not homogeneous in terms of individual 
interests or stances. Many management members were deeply critical about their 
governance models6 and the influence of sponsors on their communities. These disputes, 
for instance, appear clearly when four Remtea leaders7 criticizes the centralization of 
decision making in Rebea, although they accept the same structure in Remtea. In
o
addition, management members have differing levels of power and legitimacy inside
6 As cited in subsection 7.1.3, in relation to tactic 3C-2, many management members disagree with the 
centralized decision-making structure in Rebea. Citations: Rebea01.08; Rebea06.16; Rebea07.15; 
Rebeal4.17; Rebeal6.06; Repea08.03; Remtea08.14; Remtea11.05/08; Reasul01.08; Reasul05.13.
7 Citations: Remtea01.23; Remtea02.18; Remteal 1.05/08; Remteal4.03. They are also Rebea members.
8 It was not possible, however, to differentiate between management members with different degrees of 
power. The differentiation between management members and ordinary members is simple, based on who 
is on the segregated discussion lists. The same distinctions could not be made within the management
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their community, as exemplified in the presentation of findings9. Divergences and 
disputes among management members may explain the fact that interviewees discussed 
communities’ governance structures with a reasonable level of disclosure, also because 
some tactics are used against management members as well, if they do not comply with 
the prevalent power structures.
In sum, although including more ordinary members could have enriched the picture 
obtained, this research presents cohesive findings, within cases and cross-case analysis. 
As the tables in chapters 5 and 6 indicate, there is an impressive level of consistency 
among respondents who gave congruent interpretations, which is a criterion of reliability 
in qualitative research (Trauth, 1997: 242; Stake, 1994: 241; 2000: 443-444; Oram, 
Feagin and Sjoberg, 1991: 19; Patton, 2002: 556). Furthermore, the logical consistency 
between findings and theory support the significance of this study (Patton, 2002: 467; 
Eisenhardt, 1989: 548). Also, by regarding the findings related to Rebea as a good 
indicator of the variation between the interpretation of management and ordinary 
members, the consistency of findings among the other communities can be confirmed.
group, because I did not have access to these lists and thus I could not observe who, in practice, makes 
decisions inside the management group.
9 For instance, that Rebea’s executive secretary negotiated with the federal government directly, without 
acknowledging other management members, the EA.Net (as discussed in subsection 6.1.4, in relation to 
argument 4B-1). Also one Reasul leadership member admits that in a specific project to obtain funding 
only a few management members were enrolled, as there was not enough money for rewarding the efforts 
of more members in this group (as discussed in subsection 6.1.4, in relation to tactic 4C-1A). Furthermore, 
the practice of consensus (see section 5.1 in relation to table 5Y; and tactics 3C-1B and 3C-1C in 
subsection 6.1.3) in these communities are centralized in a few management members, which implies that 
other management members are excluded similarly to the ordinary members, although the ordinary 
members also do not have access to the debates on the segregated discussion list. In addition, as discussed 
in carriers objects meeting conventions and standards (11A-1) (subsection 5.2.11), a few members in the 
management groups control in practice the publication on the websites and the discussion lists in the four 
communities. Consequently, management members may also be ostracized from decision making for other 
more powerful leaders. See for instance tactic 4C-3 (subsection 6.1.4), which is related to the fact that some 
management members have been excluded from the decision making without previous negotiation.
96
4.3.2. Informed consent
This thesis strictly conformed to the requirement that interviewees should be informed 
about the kind of research they are participating, and that the confidentiality of their 
answers was guaranteed, in order to protect informers from any kind of harm from 
participating in this study (Mason, 2002: 79-80; Stake, 1995: 57, 244; Fontana and Frey, 
1994: 372; Warren, 2002: 88-89; Johnson, 2002: 115; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 97-104, 
112; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992: 79-87; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 290- 
296; Babbie, 1998: 438-441; Kvale, 1996: 112-114).
Drawing upon these authors, in this research, each respondent received a document 
(informed consent10), introducing this researcher, explaining the objectives of the 
interview and describing how confidentiality of data was guaranteed. Consequently, this 
thesis does not reveal the names of the interviewees, nor any kind of data, even in the 
excerpts, that could identify the respondent to their peers. The consent document also 
stated that the interview would be voluntary (people were not pressured to participate), 
and that the interviewee could ask to stop the conversation at any time during the 
dialogue. In addition, the document indicated that the interview was tape-recorded, and 
that interviewees could demand the tape-recorder be turned off (as sometimes happened). 
All interviewees signed the informed consent document, authorizing the interview under 
these conditions, before starting answering the questions.
4.3.3. Practical conditions of the research
Data was collected between April and June 2006, through in-depth, semi-structured face- 
to-face individual interviews, at the place each respondent chose (for the most part, they 
preferred their workplaces, although some chose their homes or public places). As the
10 The informed consent draws upon the formal LSE ethical procedures, and the cited authors who discuss 
ethical issues in social research. The proposed informed consent was approved by Professor Jannis 
Kallinikos (supervisor of this thesis).
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interviewer is an outsider (not related to the studied communities, or to the field of 
environmental education), she was involved with the interviewees only by the reason of 
the present research, which preserves a level of distance from the empirical object 
(Walsham, 1995a: 77). All interviews have been conducted in Portuguese, the mother 
tongue of both the interviewer and the interviewees.
All interviews were tape-recorded, in order to permit a subsequent deeper analysis of 
data, respecting as far as possible the original words of the respondents (accuracy), 
following recommendation of scholars (Walsham, 1995a: 78; Esterberg, 2002: 106; May, 
2001: 137-138; Warren, 2002: 91-92; Johnson, 2002: 111; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 110). 
As noted above, at some points respondents asked for the tape-recorder to be turned off 
when discussing issues that they felt sensitive about. In general, after re-stating the 
confidentiality of the interviews, these respondents have agreed to the tape-recorder being 
turned on again. Although the informed consent document explicitly states the 
confidentiality of the interviews, some respondents preferred to reconfirm this condition 
before giving certain information.
On some occasions, I decided to turn the tape-recorder off, particularly when respondents 
started to talk about very personal issues that were not connected to the research. These 
digressions were a surprise because the research is about Internet-mediated communities 
but some interviewees felt comfortable enough to talk about their personal lives. In order 
to respect the privacy of the respondents either I turned the tape-recorder off (when I 
noted the kind of issue that was at stake), or I eliminated these parts from the transcripts.
Notes were taken during the interviews, in order to have a second source in case 
something went wrong with the tapes (Patton, 2002: 383; Johnson, 2002: 111; Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005: 110). On a few occasions the notes helped to clarify some parts of the tapes 
in which the words were not absolutely clear; furthermore, the notes substituted for a 
small segment of a tape that was lost due to a technical mistake. The great majority of all 
analysed data, nonetheless, comes from the tape-recorded material. This researcher has 
observed that some respondents feel uneasy about the tape-recorder, because they could
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not feel confident that their confidentiality will be respected. This lack of confidence may 
have affected the results of this research, although in general, considering the sensitivity 
of the findings, most respondents appear to have overcome their initial barriers and 
trusted the researcher.
4.3.4. Interview guide
This research has elaborated an interview guide11 (below), which is a set of themes to be 
developed during the interviews (Mason, 2002: 24, 62-66; Hakim, 2000: 35; Esterberg, 
2002: 87; May, 2001: 123; Fontana and Frey, 1994: 366; Warren, 2002: 83). Unlike 
structured questions, the interview guide has the advantage of allowing enough flexibility 
to adjust the order and formulation of questions to the context (Gaskell, 2000: 40; Mason, 
2002: 67; Esterberg, 2002: 94; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 13-14, 135-136).
This format allows the researcher to explore the different paths respondents follow in 
their reasoning. This approach also permits interviewees to emphasise their own 
perspective, in their own terms, highlighting specific contexts and complexities that the 
researcher would not be able to access otherwise. In practice, the precise formulation of 
questions arose from the situation, based on the contents of previous answers but having 
the interview guide in mind.
The interview guide is grounded in the primary findings of the pilot study, the theoretical 
framework on new institutionalism, and the proposed research question. The interviews 
thus have developed the following five broad themes:
1. How members describe their communities in terms of being network 
organizations.
The studied Internet-mediated communities call themselves networks, and state 
on their websites that they are network organizations. Also in the pilot study 
members reinforced this aspect as being part of their identity. Thus it is necessary
11 The interview guide is also called topic guide by Gaskell (2000: 40).
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to explore why they believe their communities are network organizations, in order 
to contrast this ideal model with their actual governance structures. As a general 
rule, the interviews started with this question. I thought it would be easier to 
investigate first the ideal model, as people could be less willing to talk about it 
after describing actual practices that are not consistent to the network 
organization.
2. How members perceive the actual governance structures of their communities, 
particularly in relation to their decision-making processes.
Although these communities are informal (they do not have legal existence such 
as being an NGO) and interact mainly through the Internet, they have some 
offline activities, such as mobilizing efforts to influence public debates on policy 
and educational programmes. Thus they have some decision-making processes to 
enable them to organize their face-to-face and Internet-mediated activities. This 
theme has been discussed extensively with interviewees, in order to identify 
communities’ governance structures. In other words, further details were asked in 
relation to their effective practices of governance, in order to map their procedures 
step by step, aiming to understand their effective social structures in their specific 
situation (thus exploring aspects of context as well).
3. How members explain the contrast between their ideals of creating network
1 9organizations and their actual governance practices .
This point is sensitive, as it exposes the incoherence between the models (ideal 
versus actual). In the pilot study, for instance, members have justified their actual 
practices blaming: (i) the governmental rules to fund projects; (ii) the tradition 
(some members have more legitimacy than others to represent the communities, 
which creates an obstacle to the idea of equal membership); (iii) the need to keep 
control on misbehaviour (for instance, restricting the access for publishing on the 
community website); (iv) the limitations of the e-mail lists as tools for
12 This theme was explored as far as the member confirms the existence of this contrast during the 
interview.
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establishing network structures (although these limitations result more from the 
fact that they customize the tools in standardized ways than from the technical 
features inscribed in the tools); and (v) the need to keep some level of 
centralization in order to take decisions with necessary speed. Understanding how 
members justify the centralized governance structures in spite of their ideal model 
of structuring network organizations helps to investigate the institutional roots of 
their decision-making processes. This theme has to be explored in a diplomatic 
way in order to avoid discomfort and resistance, as some members could feel 
uneasy when questioned about the incoherence between their ideals and practices. 
Indeed, during the data collection, interviewees confirmed that this theme is very 
sensitive, although many members frankly talked about these contrasts.
4. How those members who recognize the discrepancies between their ideal model 
and their actual model of decision-making processes plan to bridge the gaps in 
order to construct a network model in the future.
The difficulty in spelling out how to transform their ideals into actual models 
helps to investigate the cognitive force of institutionalised, hierarchical 
procedures, vis-a-vis the abstract conception of a network organization. These 
difficulties can also point out the strength of institutionalised procedures within 
Internet-mediated communities.
5. How the communities are associated with sponsoring organizations, such as 
government offices, universities and NGOs.
The idea of creating such Internet-mediated communities for promoting 
environmental education originated in the Global Forum of NGOs in the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 
in 1992 (as described in the chapter 1). The original concept was that these 
communities should be independent, informal, non-hierarchical collectivities, 
supported by voluntary, individual membership, rather than by formal 
organizations. In practice, nonetheless, as the pilot study has pointed out, some of 
these communities were not structured robustly enough to keep their
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independence. Rather they linked themselves to formal sponsors, mainly 
universities and NGOs. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Brazilian federal 
government offered funding to help some of these Internet-mediated communities 
to organize themselves. The idea was to offer these communities the opportunity 
of creating their websites, purchasing their own computers and servers, and 
providing news services to members. It is thus useful to explore how these 
external formal organizations have influenced the internal governance structures 
of these communities.
During the interviews, I asked exhaustively details about the described processes, in order 
to reduce the risk of accepting taken-for-granted assumptions. For instance, when a 
member said “we decide in consensus”, I explored how the consensus is formed from the 
moment one person gives the first suggestion, to the development of debates, and to the 
closing process. I explored ideas such as: who may give suggestions; who participates in 
the debate; who closes the debate; what is a legitimate consensus; who may change the 
consensus, or direct the consensus to other directions; and what happens when the 
consensus is not coherent with the leaders’ proposals.
Another interesting example: I did not take for granted the meaning of the sentence “all 
members participated in this decision”. Every single time that a member said this 
sentence, the meaning was the opposite: only few members participated in the decision. It 
became evident only because I asked them to clarify details such as: the names of ‘all 
members’ related to the decision; the names of those that had disagreed with the decision 
(and how the decision attend or not their demands); and the meaning behind the silence of 
members. In sum, in each situation I used a different tactic, depending on the presented 
arguments. The strategy behind the questions, nonetheless, was the same: to grasp the 
actual model of governance. When asked about details, in general, members came with 
the description of their actual procedures, making clear that the ideal model was an 
abstract schema that has not been implemented in practice.
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Lastly, before starting the recorded interview, the researcher always engaged in an 
introductory, informal discussion with the respondent, in order to create a basis of trust 
between the parties (Johnson, 2002: 109; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 92).
4.3.5. Transcriptions and translation
This research adopts a policy of partial transcription (non-verbatim ones) of the tape- 
recorded interviews, following orientation of Mason (2002: 78), Kvale (1996: 164-173), 
Poland (2002: 629-630), Bernard (2000: 206) and Esterberg (2002: 108). As proposed by 
the authors, this approach is adequate when the transcripts focus on the content of the 
interviews (what is said), rather than the ways respondents have articulate their reasoning 
(how it is said). In this direction, the parts of interviews that were not relevant to this 
research were omitted.
As elucidated by Flick (2002: 17, 171-172) and Kvale (1996: 164-165, 171), excess of 
exactitude is not necessary in sociological questions (although it is in linguistic and 
psychological analyses), thus the transcript should focus on the issues that help to address 
the research question. Also for this reason the verbal structure has been tidied up to omit 
the many utterances and digressions that really do not express ideas. In other words, in 
order to facilitate the reading and analysis of the contents and make meaning clearer, the 
sentences have been summarized, following the format of a written text, avoiding thus the 
usual informal mode and structure that is characteristic of speech, but without changing 
the meaning interviewees have expressed, as suggested by Rubin and Rubin (2005: 204), 
Flick (2002: 173), Poland (2002: 630-633) and Kvale (1996: 164-166, 170).
Finally, only few excerpts that are used as examples in the thesis are translated to 
English. The translation is not literal, but a summary of the meaning, as understood by 
the researcher, encapsulated in the sentences, in order to facilitate clarity. As explained in 
chapter 5, the presented citations are in indirect speech, as the use of quotations would 
not be adequate after these adaptations from oral to written discourse.
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4.3.6. Coding
In this research, the process of coding was done manually (without software). The main 
concern with establishing the coding pattern was that only following key words (such as 
rules, legislation or role) would not uncover all the relevant data, because similar 
concepts are expressed in a great variety of ways. This research thus adopts an 
interpretive coding processes (Mason, 2002: 78; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 217), which 
requires that sentences are read, and meaning attributed to them in accordance to the 
expression of ideas in the specific context of the objective of this research. In other 
words, the coding process respects the approach of exploring the common sense, inter- 
subjective meaning actors attribute to their social world, in order to preserve the validity 
of the findings (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 37-40; 69-72; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991: 13; Knorr-Cetina, 1981: 4, 9; Gadamer, 1989 [1975]: 267; Sayer, 2000: 
46).
As suggested by Esterberg (2002: 158-159, 177), Charmaz (2002: 683-684), and May 
(2001: 138-139), this research draws upon some techniques prescribed by grounded 
theory13. Following these authors, this researcher started with an open code, identifying in 
the transcripts themes that would be relevant to this thesis, considering the research 
question and the theoretical framework. It implies that this research is not following a 
grounded theory approach (which would not be driven by prior theorisation), but only 
drawing upon some of its techniques.
In fact, any research starts from a theoretical standpoint and the researcher is not neutral 
in the construction of findings (Gadamer, 2003 [I960]: 159; 1989 [1975]: 302; Goodman, 
1978: 2; Habermas, 1981 [1968]: 309; Schutz, 1990 [1962]: 5; Weber, 2003 [1904]: 118; 
Feyerabend, 1993: 211-212). Even grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990) starts from disciplinary assumptions or initial theoretical perspectives,
13 Grounded theory has been proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). A further development may be found 
in Strauss and Corbin (1990).
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which sensitize the data collection and the coding process (Vaughan, 1995 [1992]: 195; 
Charmaz, 2002: 683).
V
Indeed, the theorization of the studied phenomena emerged from my effort to match a 
theoretical framework with the empirical evidence (Flick, 2002: 177; Rubin and Rubin, 
2005: 207-222). In this respect, the findings and analysis do not emerge from 
interviewees’ interpretation of their world, but from the way I understood their 
interpretations through the theoretical lens of new institutionalism. Certainly, in many 
cases the link between data and the theoretical framework emerged easily. For instance, 
many respondents identified that Brazilian legislation (carrier rule) has influenced the 
governance structures of the studied communities straightforwardly. In other occasions, 
the identification of the carrier demanded more interpretation.
One example related to the carrier hierarchical schema may help to understand this 
process of interpreting data through the theoretical lens. In order to uncover meaning, I 
applied the principles of hermeneutics: throughout successive interpretations, the parts 
and the whole have been understood as a coherent body (hermeneutical circle). In this 
process, I identified the carrier in three discursive forms: the direct conceptualization of a 
hierarchical schema; the comparison of community governance structure with other 
hierarchical structures; and the taken-for-granted assumption that decision-making 
processes should be centralized. In more details:
i. First, some interviewees used the term hierarchical model to explain why their 
communities were reproducing this organizational form. For instance, the 
respondent Rebea03 said : “We live in a vertical social system, with hierarchies. 
When we propose a horizontal model, things do not work, because the social 
relations are vertical.”
ii. Second, other respondents did not formulate concepts of models or schemas, but 
pondered that the communities mirror society. As ReasulOl formulated: “In
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society, some people have power to give orders; and others should be wise to 
follow these orders.”
iii. Third, other members implied the carrier hierarchical schema exactly because 
they could not think other alternatives. In these cases, the carrier is internalized 
thus it appeared nonsensical to question the functionality of the hierarchical 
organization. Repea04, for instance, said: “It is impossible to conduct a process 
totally horizontally because it is necessary to execute tasks, to contract people and 
to be transparent about expenses.”
These three examples highlight the kind of effort that has been done to constructed a 
meaningful interpretation, through successive interactions with data, considering the 
theoretical lens. The three citations show how the very same carrier are embedded in 
different discourses, demanding an interpretative effort which also consider the context in 
which the interviewees were conducted. It is thus necessary to be aware that this process 
of interpretation brings a level of subjectivity which is inherent to qualitative research.
In order to reduce the impact of my biases in this research, I adopted two main 
procedures. The first procedure was during the interviews. No questions were directly 
about institutions or carriers. I always asked about description of processes, in the 
maximum detail. As the interviews averaged of two hours, I had time enough to explore 
the details which were used in the elaboration of the large number of carriers, arguments 
and tactics.
The second procedure was during the coding process, which had two distinct phases. The 
first coding was open (done between July and August 2006). The framework on carriers 
was at the back of my mind, but at the same time other findings emerged. Comparing the 
first findings with the theory, I tried to consolidate the code in terms of carriers. I realised 
then that many answers were about justifying their governance structures. Furthermore, I 
realised members related interesting forms of interaction that reproduce the segregation 
of decision making.
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During this effort to match code and theory, I developed the idea of linking justifications 
(arguments) and procedures (tactics) to each carrier (explained in chapter 5). Thus after 
consolidating the code and having expanded the concept of category, it was necessary to 
return to the data to match the evidence with the categorization effectively. This process 
started in November 2006, after the consolidation of the first code.
In order to improve the quality of the findings, in addition to reading the full 
transcriptions, I adopted three other processes. Firstly, in exploring similarities between 
carriers, arguments and tactics (discussed in subsection 8.1.3), I re-analysed the 
statements related to similar issues to investigate whether they match other categories as 
well. Secondly, I explored key words to revisit themes that were related to the elements 
under scrutiny. A simple example is the carrier legislation1*, which was searched for by 
key words such as legislation, law, funding, government, project and sponsor. Thirdly, in 
the last phase, I cross-referenced the data using the tables as a guide, to verify whether I 
would still interpret the citations in the same way I did initially through the coding 
process.
This process of coding through revisiting the data many times has been useful. Firstly, it 
has created a kind of critical sense about the developed code. Some categories that 
emerged in the first code were consolidated or eliminated. The second coding was 
improved through the many comparisons with data. For instance, tactics 3C-1 and 5C-1 
were divided into sub-tactics, providing a greater level of information.
Secondly, it creates a kind of proximity with the data, which gave me two strong 
impressions. Firstly, that the interviews had indeed achieved the level of theoretical 
saturation in relation to answering the research question (Mason, 2002: 134; Johnson, 
2002: 113; Charmaz, 2002: 689; Flick, 2002: 64) (see subsection 4.4.1). Secondly, that 
the understanding of the parts was consistent with the interpretation of the whole. This
14 The search for by key words in the transcribed data has used Portuguese words, as the original transcripts 
are in that language. The cited examples are in English to facilitate the understanding.
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iterative process between the parts and the whole to construct a coherent meaning is 
recommended for qualitative studies (a hermeneutic circle) (Heidegger, 1962: 38; 
Gadamer, 1989 [1975]: 290-292; Giddens, 1995: 242; Bauman, 1978: 17, 168; Sayer, 
2000: 17; Klein and Myers, 2001: 224).
This process of coding through phases in different periods is a way of improving 
reliability, in the sense that the same technique, applied on the same data, should have 
similar results (Babbie, 1998: 129; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 25; de Vaus, 2001: 
29; Bernard, 2000: 47; Mason, 2002: 40). The ideal process would have been to contract 
a second coder to apply the final categorization in order to test the reliability of the 
findings through inter-coder agreement (Silverman, 2000: 9), but I did not have the 
resources for that. Thus the idea of coding in different periods, as well as cross- 
referencing the code from the tables to the original data has helped to reduce mistakes 
and omissions in this process.
4.4. Quality in qualitative research
This researcher has undertaken some measures in order to increase the quality of her 
analysis, recognizing that qualitative research demands specific processes unlike those 
used by quantitative investigations (Mason, 2002: 38-39). This researcher has attempted 
to understand the meaning interviewees give to the studied phenomena in order to reduce 
personal biases as much as possible, as well as to avoid leading the interviewees in their 
answers.
Theory-driven research may incur the risk of being less flexible in its possible 
interpretations, thus it is necessary to pay particular attention to emerging meanings, in 
order to be able to change preliminary frameworks when necessary, including being 
prepared to modify or reject the theory (Walsham, 1993: 7; 1995a: 76; Vaughan, 1995 
[1992]: 195; May, 2001: 127; Fontana and Frey, 1994: 367; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 32- 
37). Indeed, drawing upon Esterberg (2002: 8-9, 87), Ragin (1995 [1992]: 218), King,
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Keohane and Verba (1994: 29) and Babbie (1998: 4, 60), this thesis contrasts its 
theoretical framework with the empirical evidence, thus interleaving both inductive and 
deductive reasoning, finally proposing some improvement to the adopted framework on 
institutional carriers (as discussed in the next chapters).
In a more systematic fashion, this research is concerned with reinforcing its validity, 
reliability and generalizability. Still, this research has some weaknesses that are 
important to acknowledge. These themes are detailed below.
4.4.1. Validity
Validity in this investigation is obtained through grounding the analytical arguments in 
appropriate evidence and elaborating arguments that are coherent and plausible in relation 
to the way data is linked to explanations and theory (logical consistency) (Chua, 1986: 
614; Mitchell, 2000 [1983]: 183; Mason, 2002: 39; Numagami, 1998: 3; King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994: 25; Babbie, 1998: 134,136; Lincoln andGuba, 2000: 179; Kvale, 1996: 
236; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 278-9; Yin, 2003: 36; de Vaus, 2001: 27-28, 30).
Furthermore, this research has interviewed an adequate number of subjects who have 
knowledge about the issues of concern, 58 (without considering the pilot study), and 
reached the theoretical saturation, understood as the point in which additional 
interviewees stop telling new things in relation to the research question (Mason, 2002: 
134; Johnson, 2002: 113; Charmaz, 2002: 689; Flick, 2002: 64; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 
64, 67; Morse, 1994: 230; see also Glaser and Strauss, 1967, on theoretical saturation). 
Naturally, new things are always presented, but one cannot continue doing interviews 
indefinitely, thus the question is to balance the increasing costs involved in adding new 
interviewees and the decreasing volume of new data being obtained (Bauer and Aarts, 
2000: 33-34; Eisenhardt, 1989: 545). Gaskell (2000: 43) argues explicitly that more 
interviews do not mean better understanding.
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In adopting in-depth interviews as the data collection method, this research achieved a 
detailed level, affording a thick description of contexts (Hakim, 2000: 36; Gaskell, 2000: 
42; Mason, 2002: 135-136). The selection of interviewees guaranteed access to a 
sufficient variety of stakeholders (leaders, ordinary members, more or less active 
members, younger and older members), reducing bias through the elaboration of diverse 
perspectives (Lincoln and Guba, 2000: 180-181; Stake, 1994: 241; Rubin and Rubin, 
2005: 64, 67). The interviewees, nonetheless, are more from management groups in three 
communities (Repea, Remtea and Reasul). Only in Rebea they are equally divided (see 
the evaluation of this selection of interviewees in subsection 4.3.1).
In addition, this thesis has provided a certain level of confirmation (referred to as 
triangulation15) of interpretations within each case (comparing different interviewees), 
between cases (comparing the four studied communities) (Babbie, 1998: 133; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 278-9; Silverman, 2000: 177, 179; Vaughan, 1995 [1992]: 199; Orum, 
Feagin and Sjoberg, 1991: 19), and in relation to other academic studies (Esterberg, 2002: 
176). As discussed in the following chapters, the presented interpretations emerge from a 
reasonable number of respondents; the findings have a high level of similarities between
15 This idea of triangulation is criticized by some authors, such as Walsham (2001: 7) (see also Stake, 
1995: 108, 115). For Walsham, the interpretive approach accepts multiple perceptions, thus it does not 
make sense to triangulate to try to construct a true interpretation. On the one hand, I agree with Walsham 
that multiple interpretations are possible in social research, and that even one simple citation can add 
relevant information to our understanding, as far as it is inserted in the effort of making sense of the 
phenomenon as a whole. On the other hand, nonetheless, I am concerned to grasp the inter-subjective 
meaning respondents attribute to the observed phenomenon, as discussed in the current chapter. In this 
direction, confirming that an interpretation is shared by some members helped to construct my own 
understanding of the phenomenon. Thus the idea of triangulation in this research does not have a positivist 
approach. In other words, the confirmation helped both to understand the inter-subjective meaning, and to 
improve the quality of this investigation. This researcher, nonetheless, does not use the cited triangulation 
to claim either that her interpretation is the final truth about the phenomenon, or that there are not other 
possible interpretations of the studied phenomenon. Furthermore, this research does not claim judgmental 
relativism, as discussed in subsection 4.1.1. Thus in the process of selection of relevant interpretations, 
some aspects have been given more emphases, in accordance with the empirical evidence and the 
theoretical framework.
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cases (and differences are contextualized); and conclusions are coherent with previous 
academic researches, which indicate the influence of institutions in virtual communities, 
and the theoretical framework.
This research also has not accepted any kind of information as self-evident or self­
confirming, as respondents can, consciously or unconsciously, distort, fabricate or omit 
information (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 73). Thus, ambiguities have been clarified, and 
cross-checked with other respondents (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 73, 76; Mason, 2002: 25). 
Indeed, some community members have given information that systematically is not 
confirmed by peers, or even is contradicted by other members. In these few cases, the 
unreliable data has been discarded. As Gaskell (2000: 44) notes, a researcher should 
avoid invalid inferences based on omitted or distorted information.
4.4.2. Reliability
This research improves its reliability through three main procedures. First, it makes an 
effort to cross-check data (as discussed above in relation to validity and about the coding 
process in session 4.3.6), although different, but coherent, interpretations helped to 
understand the whole of the phenomenon through the investigation of anomalies and 
contradictions (Trauth, 1997: 242). Second, it chooses a data-collection method (in-depth, 
semi-structured individual interviews) that is consistent across settings, as well as 
coherent with the research design and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 25; Miles and Huberman, 1994; 278).
Third, it records the procedures adopted in this study, from the formulation of the 
question to the coding processes and analysis, in order to permit the judgment of peers 
(providing accountability) (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 25-26; Yin, 2003: 38; 
Babbie, 1998: 134). In this research, the objective of providing accountability is not 
related to the idea of replication, common in quantitative research. Indeed, this study 
understands that in qualitative research the interaction between respondents and
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researcher is inserted in particular situations that cannot be reproduced fully (Esterberg, 
2002: 211; Walsham, 1993: 5; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 26; Numagami, 1998: 3). 
Another researcher would necessarily find different settings, also because the researcher 
is enrolled in creating the researched setting.
4.4.3. Generalizability
The generalization from qualitative research divides scholars between those who defend 
and those who deny this possibility (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000: 5). Although this 
debate on generalizability has many flavours that cannot be explored in this thesis, it is 
fruitful to highlight two aspects considered by this present investigation.
First, the viewpoint adopted here is that the meaning of generalization in qualitative 
research is different from the concept of statistical generalization in quantitative studies. 
In qualitative research, the goal is not to provide generalizations from settings to 
populations, but to use the understanding of a phenomenon to inform our investigation 
and knowledge about other settings (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 5; Ragin, 1995 
[1992]: 42; Walton, 1995 [1992]: 125; Stake, 2000 [1978]: 22-25; 1995: 3-4; 1994: 243; 
Lincoln and Guba, 2000 [1979]: 39; Klein and Myers, 1999: 75).
Walsham (1995a: 75, 79) comments that the objective of qualitative research is not to 
generate truth or social laws, similar to quantitative research, but to understand the 
generative mechanisms of social phenomena as tendencies that can explain particular 
contextual situations. The author argues that case studies are valid not in statistical sense, 
but because of the plausibility of their logical reasoning (ibid: 15, 247).
In seeking to inform other researchers and settings, this thesis may aid the investigation 
of other similar social collectivities, such as informal virtual communities, which have 
both strong interaction with formal organizations and established decision-making 
processes. Moreover, the findings of the current research would aid in contrasting studies 
in relation to other social movements (such as the Indymedia) that, despite the complexity
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of their activities, keep non-hierarchical decision-making processes (Pickard, 2006) (see 
discussion in subsection 8.4.1).
Second, qualitative case-studies permit some level of generalization from data to the 
development of theory and concepts, at the analytical level, without fostering ideas of 
predictions, and always respecting the limits of the context in which the research has been 
done (Lee and Baskerville, 2003: 236; Walsham, 1995a: 79-80; Klein and Myers, 1999: 
72; de Vaus, 2001: 237; Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg, 1991: 13-15; Hamel, Dufour and 
Fortin, 1993: 39; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 28, 279; Kvale, 1996: 233).
Yin (2003: 10, 32-33) argues that case studies can be generalized to theoretical 
propositions (analytic generalization), rather than to populations (statistic 
generalization). A theory is applied and used as a template, permitting analysis of 
whether the cases under study support (replicate) the theory or not. This research 
develops the concepts of arguments and tactics (as discussed in chapters 5 and 6), and 
suggests a theoretical proposition of including these elements in the adopted framework 
on carriers (Scott, 2001) (see discussion on section 8.2), thus constructing an analytic 
generalization from the analysed empirical evidence.
4.4.4. Limitations in data collection methods
This empirical investigation adopted a series of measures to increase its quality, as 
discussed above. Still, there are always some aspects that could have been improved. 
Specifically, this research could not diversify data-collection methods, being focused 
only on the in-depth interviews as discussed previously. Two other possibilities have not 
been possible: analysing related documents; and observing the differences of interaction 
between the general and segregated Internet-mediated discussion lists, as explained 
below.
In the first case, the communities do not document their procedures and rules 
systematically. Their websites carry general statements in relation to their ideal model of
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organizing but not the actual one. In the second case, the studied communities have two 
types of Internet discussion lists. One type is called general list, and it is open to all 
members. A second type is the segregated discussion list, accessible only to management 
members. The communities’ leadership strata have not given me access to their 
segregated lists, or. even to a copy of selected discussions. Thus this thesis is based 
exclusively in the in-depth interviews. The number of informants, nonetheless, is large 
enough to be confident about the quality of data, as discussed above.
Lastly, this research considered that surveys would not be useful to investigate the 
proposed phenomena, because of its complexity and the need to understand its contexts 
(Mason, 2002: 1, 3; Johnson, 2002: 105). See further discussion on the limitations of this 
research in section 8.3.
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5. Findings and analysis I: Internet-mediated communities and 
institutional carriers
This research is concerned with understanding how institutional carriers influence the 
governance structures of Internet-mediated communities. Specifically, it questions the 
role of these carriers in fostering the segregation of decision-making processes, an 
instance of centralization similar to hierarchical organizations (Simon, 1997 [1945]), in 
communities which at least rhetorically aim to be non-hierarchical, network 
organizations. In order to develop this investigation, this research follows Scott’s (2001) 
proposition of considering 12 categories of carriers, detailed in the table below (as 
presented in section 3.2.4).
Table 3.2 Institutional pillars and carriers
Pillars
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive
Symbolic systems Rules
Laws
Values
Expectations
Categories
Typifications
Schemas
Relational systems Governance systems 
Power systems
Regimes
Authority systems
Structural
isomorphism
Identities
Routines Protocols
Standard operating 
procedures
Jobs
Roles
Obedience to duty
Scripts
Artefacts Objects complying 
with mandated 
specifications
Objects meeting 
conventions 
standards
Objects possessing 
symbolic value
Source: Scott (2001: 77)
Considering this framework, this chapter presents the first findings of this thesis, using 
the grid of 12 categories of carriers. The collected data (obtained between April and June 
2006) for each case-study (four Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated 
communities identified by their acronyms Rebea, Repea, Remtea and Reasul) (see 
chapter 1) has been classified in accordance with this framework. Taking into account the
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four case-studies, the empirical evidence indicates that the 12 categories of carriers have 
influenced the studied communities in diffusing segregated decision-making processes, 
although not all cited carriers, in the examples provided by Scott, have been observed1.
Furthermore, the findings show that social actors have an active role in the diffusion of 
institutions. As presented below, carriers diffuse social structures, along their regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars. Social actors, nonetheless, interpret the carriers 
in their own environment. Firstly, they try to make sense of the adopted social structures 
in relation to their contexts2. Secondly, they adapt their actions in accordance with then- 
specific circumstances in order to reproduce the institutionalised social structures locally.
In other words, institutional carriers are important elements in the diffusion of social 
structures, but they need to be understood in the situation. The carriers diffuse institutions 
through time and space (Scott, 2001, 2003). It is through agency, nonetheless, that 
institutions are reproduced or changed. As proposed in Giddens’s (1979, 1984) 
structuration theory, social structures only exist as the result of human agency (see 
discussion in the introduction of chapter 3). Thus on the one hand, carriers are the 
objectifications (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]) of social structures realised through 
legislation, conventions, schemas, roles, scripts and symbolic values (among other 
possibilities). On the other hand, social actors need to reproduce these social structures 
through their actions, which demand people make sense of the reproduction and adapt 
their actions to their situation in order to really permit the enactment of institutions.
This interaction between carriers and agency is presented in the next chapter. For each 
category of carrier, other two analytical constructs have been added: arguments and
1 Following Scott’s examples in the grid, the institutional carriers rules, values, categories, typifications, 
regimes, structural isomorphism, protocols and obedience to duty have not been observed in the present 
study. Still, the observed carriers are sufficient to represent the 12 categories.
2 The concept of context in this thesis is used in a broad fashion, not only as geographically localized 
factors, but also as any other kind of influence which could be relevant from the viewpoint of actors, and 
which affect the situation through any kind of media, as suggested by Scott (2005: 474).
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tactics3. The arguments are statements that social actors invoke in their discourse to 
justify the reproduction of segregated decision-making processes, which contrast to their 
idealized model of constructing network organizations. The tactics, complementarily, are 
how effectively agents act to reproduce the social structure in the situation (which may be 
in online or offline contexts).
Both constructs have been inspired by Barley and Tolbert (1997: 105), who recommend 
researchers on institutionalisation to consider how actors interpret their behaviour, and 
how they effectively establish patterns of interactions. This approach is coherent with 
Scott’s framework on carriers. Indeed, Scott emphasises both procedures in the diffusion 
of social structures through institutional carriers: the suggestion of observing how actors 
decode (interpret) ideas, and negotiate activities in specific situations (2003: 884-885; 
2005: 468).
This thesis claims that institutional carriers are important in the diffusion of segregated 
decision-making social structures among the studied Internet-mediated communities. 
However, it points out that social actors adapt their discourse and actions to make 
possible the reproduction of institutions in their situation, thus emphasising the relevance 
of agency in this process, drawing upon Giddens (1979, 1984). Chapters 5 and 6 present 
data supporting these claims.
In order to introduce the findings on institutional carriers, the first section below presents 
the contrast between how the studied communities (Rebea, Repea, Remtea and Reasul) 
idealize their organizational model and how they organize themselves in practice. As 
discussed in chapter 1, a pilot study revealed that the studied communities have an ideal 
of adopting a network-like form of organization, meaning mainly non-hierarchical social 
structures. In practice, nonetheless, the communities follow hierarchical models, at least 
in relation to their decision-making processes, which segregate the majority of members 
from these processes. As proposed by Simon (1997 [1945]), the centralization of decision
3 Thus categories in this research include institutional carriers, arguments and tactics. In Scott’s (2001) 
framework, categories are only related to institutional carriers.
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making is characteristic of hierarchical organizations (see also Weber, 1922, cited in van 
Dijk, 1999: 93). Thus, in accordance with the pilot, there is a clear contrast between the 
ideal and the actual models of governance followed by these communities.
Indeed, the evidence presented below reinforces the findings of the pilot study. 
Community members hold two parallel perceptions of their governance structure. On the 
one hand they describe their model as being a network organization, in which members 
have the same right of participating in decision making (table 5X). On the other hand 
they describe their actual practice as having a level of centralization in decision-making 
processes (table 5Y). Furthermore, some members clearly understand that their 
communities live in this contradiction between the ideal and the actual models (table 5Z).
The next section presents the findings related to the 12 categories of institutional carriers. 
Then the third section summarizes the chapter, concluding that Scott’s framework helps 
to understand the processes of institutionalisation in the studied communities, in relation 
to the diffusion of centralized decision-making social structures.
For the sake of simplicity in this thesis, the respondents will be identified by the name of 
their main community (Rebea, Repea, Remtea and Reasul), and numbering (which is 
used to offer anonymity to interviewees). In the citations, an extra number is added to 
identify the segment in which the related statement is cited. Thus Rebea01.05 means that 
the respondent identifies herself4 mainly as a Rebea member (she is talking mainly, but 
not only, about Rebea, as interviewees are members of more than one community), that 
her number is 01 (thus this respondent is always identified in the thesis as being 
RebeaOl), and that the exact part of her interview in which the data has been cited is the 
segment 05 (each interview has been divided in many segments).
When describing statements, this thesis uses indirect speech. This format is chosen 
because excerpts demanded a certain amount of editing, to eliminate digressions and 
meaningless sentences. Furthermore, to protect respondents’ identities, some statements
4 Gender has been kept in accordance with the respondent indeed.
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could not be presented in their original forms. Thus if a respondent says “I have done X”, 
the peers could identify the respondent through his or her work. Thus some adaptations 
have been made to keep the agreed confidentiality. In this example, the sentence would 
be changed to “the respondent says a member has done X”. In this way, the action is 
considered in the findings, but the actor is presented as an observer of the action. These 
small changes do not alter the meaning or the results of this study, and permit the 
fulfilment of the ethical requirements of this thesis in relation to protecting the identity of 
respondents (as discussed in subsection 4.3.2). In addition, the translation of excerpts 
from Portuguese to English also implies a certain level of editing. Considering these 
restrictions, I chose to adopt indirect speech, thus avoiding quotations in constructions 
that the respondent did not utter in exactly the way they are presented.
Lastly, the number of citations in tables should be considered by their consistency, rather 
than by their frequency. Many authors argue that qualitative studies should be concerned 
with the consistency of the interpretations among respondents and also in relation to 
theory (Trauth, 1997: 242; Stake, 1994: 241; 2000: 443-444; Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg, 
1991: 19; Patton, 2002: 467, 556; Eisenhardt, 1989: 548). Thus this research uses the 
citations to construct the elements of each category from the interpretation of the 
empirical evidence, drawing also upon the emphasis respondents give to their own 
interpretation. The constructions emerge from the contrast of empirical evidence and 
theory. There are thus interpretations which emerge from few citations (or even one 
citation), but still they are considered where the statements are consistent with the whole 
meaning which emerges from the data (the idea of the hermeneutical circle), as well as 
with the theoretical framework which supports this thesis (Walsham, 2001: 7; Mason, 
2002: 39; Yin, 2003: 36; Babbie, 1998: 134; Gadamer, 1989 [1975]: 266-267, 290-292; 
see further discussion in subsections 4.1.1. and 4.4.1). This approach is coherent with the 
interpretive orientation of this research (as explained in chapter 4).
It is important to recall here that this investigation is qualitative, thus it does not aim to 
infer conclusions based on frequency of citations. It is only when the qualitative 
interpretation of evidence permits the speculation of meaning from the emphases
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members attribute to a specific construct that such an association is made, always in 
hypothetical terms, as this thesis does not test such associations. This procedure becomes 
clearer in chapter 7, which draws upon the tables presented in chapters 5 and 6 to make 
the cross-case analysis. Furthermore, citations in footnotes provide more specific details 
about statements which are not supported straightforwardly by tables, thus they are not 
mere repetition.
5.1. Ideal versus actual models
This research’s empirical data reinforces the pilot study’s conclusions, that members of 
the four studied communities recognize both the ideal (network) and the actual 
(centralized) models of decision-making processes. Although community members claim 
that they respect the network-like form of organizing, in practice decisions are centralized 
in a leadership group, which assumes roles related to managing the collectivities.
As explained in chapter 4 ,1 started interviews asking respondents about the reasons why 
they call their communities ‘networks’, exploring their ideal model of organizing. In the 
sequence, themes related to their actual governance models were explored. Before the 
data collection, I was concerned that respondents would avoid being inconsistent in their 
speech. My worries were that respondents would try to cover up the actual model of 
governance, making it as similar as possible to the ideal network model. Indeed, the 
opposite happened. Most respondents were spontaneous in their description of the actual 
model, either because they were not concerned with the inconsistency in relation to the 
ideal model, or because they tried to explain the gap between both models considering the 
circumstances. The arguments presented in chapter 6 derive from these attempts to justify 
the inconsistency between the ideal and actual models of governance.
The tables below introduce these three sets of data. The first table (5X) presents how 
members idealized their governance model as being a network organization. The second 
one (5Y) adds information about their actual model, which has segregated decision­
making processes and related social structures. The third one (5Z) confirms that at least
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some members are aware of the incoherence between the ideal and the actual models of
organizing in these communities.
Table 5X -  Characteristics of the idealized network model
Item Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
1 -The community has 
non-hierarchical, 
decentralized decision­
making structures 
(horizontality).
Rebea02.03 
Rebea03.01/03 
/18
Rebea04.01
Rebea06.04
Rebea09.02
Rebea 10.03
Rebeal2.02
Rebeal4.01/05
Rebeal7.01
Repea01.12
Repea04.01/05
Repea06.02
Repea07.01
Repea08.02
Repea09.01
Remtea01.01/12
Remtea02.01
Remtea04.04
Remtea06.14
Remtea08.01
Remteal 1.02
Remtea 13.02
ReasulO 1.01/21
Reasul04.06
Reasul05.02/04
Reasul07.06
Reasul09.19
Reasull2.02
Reasull4.03
2 -  All members have the 
same rights and power, thus 
there is not subordination 
between members 
(equality).
RebeaO 1.01/04
Rebea02.07
Rebea03.12
Rebea04.03
Rebea06.04/13
Rebeal 7.01/02
Repea01.01/12
Repea03.02
Repea04.02
Repea05.01
Repea06.02
Repea07.01
Repea09.04
Repeal 1.09
RemteaOl.Ol 
Remtea04.04 
Remtea06.25 
Remtea09.04 
Remteal 0.04 
Remteal 0.18/26 
Remteal 1.01/02 
Remteal 3.02
ReasulO 1.02 
Reasul02.08 
Reasul04.13 
Reasul05.04 
Reasul07.13 
Reasul 11.11 
Reasull2.07 
Reasul 14.03
3 -  All members have the 
same right of 
communicating and 
expressing (freedom of 
speech, non-censorship).
RebeaO 1.02/03 
Rebea03.12 
Rebea06.04 
Rebea06.26/28 
Rebea 14.01
RepeaO 1.01/02 
/10
Repea05.02 
Repea09.02 
Repeal 0.12
RemteaOl.Ol 
Remtea02.08/12 
Remtea08.03/05 
/II
Remteal 2.02 
Remtea 13.05 
Remtea 14.03
Reasul02.08 
Reasul03.08 
Reasul07.06 
Reasul08.09 
Reasul 10.16
4 -  Decisions are taken by 
consensus, attending the 
different interests of 
members.
Rebea02.03 
Rebea05.02 
Rebea06.04/10 
Rebea09.08/13 
Rebeal 4.01 
Rebeal 6.12
Repea03.05
Repea04.04
Repea05.01
Repea06.02
Repea07.10
Repea09.13
Remtea01.04 
Remtea02.09/10 
Remtea06.11 
Remtea07.11 
Remtea08.13 
Remteal 0.04 
Remteal 4.11 
Remteal 5.06
Reasul04.02/10 
Reasul06.05 
Reasul07.18 
Reasul 11.05/06 
Reasull2.05
5 -  The community has 
many leaders, and promotes 
the development of multi­
leaderships.
RebeaO 1.27 
Rebea02.07 
Rebeal 0.11 
Rebeal 3.06 
Rebeal 3.16
Repea02.01 
Repea04.01 
Repea07.09 
Repea08.02/23 
Repea09.02/04 
Repeal 0.06 
Repeal 1.18
Remtea01.21 
Remtea06.21 
Remtea08.01/18 
Remteal 1.24
ReasulO 1.21
Table 5X indicates the criteria members use to define their communities as network 
organizations. As explained in chapter 1, the studied communities are named networks, 
arguing that they organize themselves as network organizations. In particular, attention is 
given to the fact that the communities are horizontal organizations, i.e. they do not have
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hierarchical, centralized decision-making processes (item 1). Repeating the pilot study, 
some members also cited Martinho’s book (2003) as a reference on how to organize their 
activities in non-hierarchical models5.
Indeed, the second characteristic -  that all members have the same rights and power
f  £
within the community -  is the expression of the first statement in other words . Other 
characteristics are close to this meaning as well, such as the idea of having the same right 
of communicating and expressing (item 3), and having individuals’ opinions taken into 
account in the formation of consensus (item 4).
The last characteristic of their communities as network organizations is more ambiguous. 
Members recognize that the community has many leaders, i.e. the network organization is 
not understood here as a collectivity without leadership, but as a space with multiple 
leaders. To a certain degree, this characteristic goes against the other concepts of equal 
membership. However, an important element of members’ perceptions is that the 
community fosters participants to take initiatives, thus there is no such thing as a limited 
number of leaders, as they emerge in accordance to their activities and motivations. It is 
interesting to keep this ideal characteristic in mind when analysing tactic 4C-1 (chapter 
6), which blocks ordinary members7 from joining the management group, thus working 
against this idea of multi-leadership.
5 Citations: Rebea01.29; Rebea03.18; Rebea05.16; Repea09.02/05; Reasul01.04; Reasul08.02.
6 Table 5X preserves both characteristics distinctively in order to acknowledge how members emphasise 
different perspectives of the same horizontality.
7 In this thesis, community members are classified in two groups: ordinary and management (or leadership) 
members. The ordinary members are those that only participate on the general, open discussion lists. The 
management members are those that belong to a leadership group, which has segregated discussion lists 
(i.e. lists that are not open to other members). In general, the so called moderators and facilitators are also 
members of the management group (at least in this investigation, all members in these roles also declared 
that they participate on the segregated discussion lists). Members who publish on the website are part of the 
management groups, at least at the time of this investigation.
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Table 5Y -  Characteristics of the actual organizational model
Item Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
1 -  Community has a 
leadership group*, which 
centralizes decision-making 
processes, and which 
organizes its discussions 
through a segregated 
discussion list.
*Called either management 
group, or facilitation group, or 
moderation group.
RebeaOl.04/08 
Rebea02.04 
Rebea03.15/22 
Rebea04.03/04 
Rebea05.06 
Rebea06.07/09 
/16
Rebea07.07 
Rebea08.02/10 
Rebea09.15 
Rebeal 3.08 
Rebeal 4.02/18 
Rebeal 6.05 
Remteal 1.04/08 
ReasulO 1.08 
Reasul05.03
Repea01.04
Repea02.02
Repea04.08
Repea05.01
Repea06.03
Repea07.01
Repea08.12
Repea09.06
Remtea01.04
Remtea02.01
Remtea04.04
Remtea06.20
Remtea07.15
Remtea08.01/12
Remteal 0.11
ReasulO 1.15 
Reasul02.03 
Reasul03.02 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul07.13 
Reasul09.09 
Reasull0.17 
Reasul 11.02 
Reasul 12.02
2 -  The leadership group 
decides which members 
represent the group in 
external events and 
courses.
RebeaO 1.23 
Rebea02.07 
Rebea03.19 
Rebea05.06/12 
Rebea07.03/09 
Rebeal 0.08 
Rebea 14.16 
ReasulO 1.08
RepeaOl. 13/14
Repea03.02
Repea04.10
Repea05.01
Repea06.08
Repea07.07
Repea08.14
Repeal 0.04
Repeal 1.17
Remtea01.06 
Remtea02.15 
Remtea04.04/12 
Remtea05.03/04 
Remtea06.27 
Remtea07.17 
Remtea08.04/12 
Remteal 0.18 
Remtea 13.04 
Remteal 5.04
ReasulO 1.09 
Reasul03.06 
Reasul04.10 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul06.04 
Reasul09.18 
Reasul 12.04
3 -  Communities have 
moderators and facilitators 
(validated by the leadership 
group).
RebeaO 1.07/08
/14/21
Rebea02.04
Rebea03.15
Rebea05.01/12
Rebea06.03/28
Rebea07.04
Rebea08.10
Rebea09.16
Rebeal 0.04
Rebeal 4.21/22
Rebeal 6.05
RepeaOl.04/09 
/13/21
Repea02.04/06
Repea03.01/02
/03
Repea04.02/05 
Repea06.03 
Repea08.04 
Repeal 0.01 
Repeal 1.01
Remtea02.04/10
Remtea03.03
Remtea04.03
Remtea06.01
Remtea07.15
Remtea08.04
Remteal 0.08/19
Remtea 13.04
Remteal4.07
Remteal 5.04
ReasulO 1.14 
Reasul02.04/06 
Reasul07.04 
Reasull3.01 
Reasul 14.03
4 -  Leadership group 
controls website 
publications and 
communications.
RebeaO 1.20 
Rebea02.06 
Rebea05.09 
Rebea08.02 
Rebeal4.22 
Rebeal 6.05/18
RepeaOl. 16/17
Repea02.06
Repea03.14
Repea04.14
Repea06.06
Repea07.08
Repea08.25
Repeal 1.13
Remtea01.20
Remtea02.26
Remteal3.14
ReasulO 1.10 
Reasul02.15 
Reasul04.05 
Reasul09.05 
Reasull0.18 
Reasull2.03 
Reasull3.01
5 -  Decisions are not based 
on voting. The formation of 
consensus has specific 
meaning in the 
communities.
Rebea02.08/09 
Rebea05.02 
Rebea06.06 
Rebea07.14 
Rebeal 4.13
Repea04.11/12 
Repea06.08
RemteaOl .08/09 
Remtea02.15 
Remtea06.20/27 
Remtea08.13 
Remteal 3.10 
Remteal4.11
Reasul03.02 
Reasul 11.06 
Reasul 14.10
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Table 5Y summarizes the main characteristics of the actual governance model of the 
studied Internet-mediated communities. The first characteristic, clearly recognized by 
members, is that the collectivities have leadership groups which centralize decision­
making processes (item 1). This characteristic straightforwardly opposes the main 
structure of a network organization, as defined in table 5X by community members. The 
segregation of discussion lists (communities operate with two discussion lists, one for the 
management group and another for all members) also clearly denies the principles of a 
network organization (again taking into account how interviewees understand such a 
model). In general, the segregated discussion lists are recognized as important channels 
for decision making, although in Rebea, Repea and Remtea some decisions are discussed 
on the general list. This does not happen in Reasul, as ordinary members only receive a 
news bulletin through the general discussion list, and their contributions are always 
mediated by a moderator (these findings will be explained further in this and sequential 
chapters).
This form of segregating decisions is reinforced by other characteristics. For instance, the 
leadership group chooses which members can represent the community to outsiders (item 
2). Usually, the executive secretary, or someone close to the core leadership group, 
represents the community. The leadership group also chooses moderators and facilitators 
for discussion lists, which are the main communication channel of these communities 
(item 3). Moderators enforce netiquette, such as keeping discussion lists focused on a 
range of themes, and inhibiting offensive opinions and spam. Facilitators are more 
engaged in promoting debate and distributing news. Both moderators and facilitators tend 
to be members of the leadership group (participating also on segregated discussion lists),
Q
with different rights and obligations in relation to. ordinary members . Furthermore, the 
leadership group controls the website contents through restricting the distribution of 
passwords for publishing (item 4).
8 In the four studied communities, moderators and facilitators are members of the management group, 
although it could be otherwise, as there is no necessary link between the moderation of a general list and 
the participation on another segregated list.
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The last characteristic in table 5Y is that decisions in general are not based on voting, but 
on what they call the formation of consensus. Independent of being decided on the 
general or segregated list, some members relate that communities do not count votes to 
make a decision. In these communities, the formation of consensus is a process in which 
a member makes a proposition, and then other members agree or disagree, suggesting 
alternatives. The last alternative is considered a consensus at the moment that other 
members accept it or stop fighting against it.
An interesting aspect here is the role of leadership members, who usually interpret the 
consensus for the community. In general, the consensus does not emerge unaided, but 
through the intervention of leadership members, in such a way that they are in fact the 
spokespeople for the community as a whole (see tactics 3C-1B and 3C-1C in subsection 
6.1.3 for more details). This characteristic implies that the so called consensus may 
reflect the interests of the majority, or the interests of a noisy small group, or the interests 
of the leadership member who assumes the role of spokesperson in a specific debate. In 
any situation, the mediation of consensus formation gives leadership members more 
power to frame the decisions.
Table 5Z -  Identification of conflict between the ideal and the actual models
Item Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
Member recognizes the 
incoherence between 
community’s ideal and actual 
models of governance.
RebeaOl.04/10
Rebea02.07/10
Rebea03.01
Rebea06.16
Rebeal 0.03/09
Rebeal7.01
Remtea 11.08/19
Repea02.16 
Repea08.12/18 
Repea04.22
Remtea01.05 
Remtea02.22 
Remtea04.04 
Remtea08.14 
Remteal 1.05/19
Reasul01.08 
Reasul03.02 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul07.13 
Reasul09.19 
Reasul 10.22
Table 5Z confirms that respondents identify the incoherence between the ideal and the 
actual governance models, specifically in relation to the centralization of decision-making 
processes.
125
Starting from these contrasting tables, this research investigates then how institutional 
carriers influence the studied communities in the reproduction of segregated decision­
making social structures. The findings are presented in the next section.
5.2. Carriers of segregated decision-making processes
Starting from the discussed difference between the ideal and actual models (tables 5X and 
5Y), this section explores in detail the role of institutional carriers9 in the diffusion of 
segregated decision-making processes, an instance of centralization associated with 
hierarchical structures (Simon, 1997 [1945]), which oppose the ideal model of network 
structures.
Some clarifications are needed here in relation to the code used in this thesis to refer to 
carriers, arguments and tactics. Firstly, grounded in Scott’s (2001) framework, this study 
has 12 categories, constituted of 12 types of carriers (identified by codes from 1A to 
12A), which are associated with 12 types of arguments (identified by codes from IB to 
12B) and 12 types of tactics (identified by codes from 1C to 12C).
It happens that in many of these 12 categories there are more than one carrier, or one 
argument or one tactic, which are identified separately by additional numbers. Thus for 
instance, in the category normative symbolic systems (subsection 5.2.2), the general code 
for the related carrier is 2A. There are, nonetheless, two carriers in this category, which 
are identified then as 2A-1 {societal expectations) and 2A-2 {members’ expectations). 
The very same logic is used in chapter 6 in the identification of arguments and tactics.
Even in the categories where there is only one carrier, the code respects the same logic. In 
the category regulative symbolic systems, for instance, the only carrier is the legislation, 
coded as 1A-1. Furthermore, in some circumstances a specific tactic is split in other
9 The definition of institutional carriers is presented in section 1.3 (Chapter 1), and subsections 3.2.3 and 
3.2.4 (chapter 3).
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associated tactics, in order to provide further level of information. Tactic 3C-1 (make 
governance rules blurred and ambiguous) (subsection 6.1.3), for instance, is 
compounded by tactics 3C-1A, 3C-1B, 3C-1C and 3C-1D. In this situation, tactic 3C-1 
should be understood as a group of associated tactics.
5.2.1. Regulative symbolic systems
Table 5.1
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
1A-1
Legislation
In order to obtain government 
funding, the community should 
be represented by a formal 
(anchor) organization.
RebeaOl.05/11/13 
Rebea02.05 
Rebea05.15/16 
Rebeal3.01/12 
Rebeal 4.06/08/09 
Rebeal 6.03/04 
Remtea 11.06/11
RepeaOl .03/04 
Repea02.01/04 
Repea03.01 
Repea04.08/09 
Repea06.04 
Repea08.03/11 
Repea09.06/10 
Repeal 1.02/07
(*) ReasulO 1.01/04
Reasul02.07/18
Reasul03.07
Reasul07.12
Reasul09.01/09
Reasul 10.06
(*) Remtea has not received government funding directly as the other three communities.
Brazilian legislation10 has permitted the studied Internet-mediated communities to receive 
government funding, where these informal collectivities are represented by formal (called 
anchor) organizations, which are legally accountable for executing the respective contract 
(each project has one anchor organization and other five formal associated organizations).
The government funding is related to specific projects. Thus members of these formal 
organizations, which represent the communities in these funded projects, acquire 
differentiated rights (as they receive the money and have legal power to decide about the 
projects) and obligations (as they need to guarantee that resources have been used 
correctly) in relation to other members as a result of this legislation (which is enforced by 
coercive mechanisms such as the legal contract and sanctions).
10 Specifically a special funding provided by the FNMA -  Fundo Nacional do Meio Ambiente, in the 
beginning of 2000s.
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Legally, these differentiated rights and obligations are related exclusively to the specific 
projects, thus the legislation does not interfere in the community governance structures as 
a whole. Furthermore, the legislation demands that some members become accountable 
for specific projects, but it does not interfere directly in how the community makes its 
decisions, either in relation to the funded projects or in relation to other decisions. 
Members of the anchor organizations, nonetheless, argue that horizontal decision making 
would leave them unable to fulfil the contracts with the government, considering targets, 
deadlines and bureaucratic procedures related to accounting11.
Therefore, the legislation carries centralized decision-making processes, as the anchor 
organization is subjected to coercive mechanisms which do not affect all members. As 
summarized by Repea09.10, the legislation reinforces the power of centralized structures 
rather than empowering the roots of these communities.
Furthermore, it is important to point out that the legislation applies to these communities 
as far as they have demanded government funding. Thus the influence of this carrier is 
also the outcome of agency, as the legislation is not imposed, but voluntarily accepted at 
least by the anchor organization and the other associated ones12. Remtea, interestingly, is 
not affected by this carrier, as this community has not received direct government 
funding.
11 Citations: Repea01.04; Repea04.08/09; Remteall.06; Reasul01.04; Reasul09.09.
12 The available data does not permit a conclusion on the level of involvement of members in general in the 
development of the funded projects. Thus the anchor and the associated organizations certainly were 
involved in the projects (their representatives had to sign up a contract with the government), but other 
members may have been excluded from this process.
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5.2.2. Normative symbolic systems
Table 5.2
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
2A-1
Societal expectations
Society expects that the 
community should be 
represented by members 
who have formal roles 
(such as executive 
secretary).
RebeaO 1.05/06 
/24
Rebea05.06 
Rebea06.05 
Rebea07.07/09 
Rebea09.03/13 
Rebeal 4.16 
Rebeal 6.21 
Remtea01.24 
Remtea07.17 
Remteall.19
RepeaOl.15/21
Repea02.15
Repea04.10
Repea06.08
Repea07.08
Repea08.14
Repeal 1.12
Remtea01.33 
Remtea02.05 
Remtea07.17/18 
Remtea 10.02 
Remteal0.18 
Remteal 4.01/02
Reasul01.21 
Reasul03.06 
Reasul07.20 
Reasull3.11/12
2A-2
Members’ expectations
Members assume that the 
leadership group should 
represent the community, 
take initiatives and 
manage conflicts.13
RebeaO 1.04/05 
Rebea03.22/23 
Rebea05.01/02 
Rebea06.27 
Rebea08.02 
Rebea09.02 
Rebeal 0.14 
Rebeal 4.20 
Rebeal 1.09 
Remtea 11.20
Repea02.06/13 
Repea03.02/03 
/12
Repea04.13 
Repea06.08 
Repea07.06 
Repeal 0.02/09 
Repeal 1.17
Remtea01.05/10 
Remtea02.10/12 
Remtea04.02/03/l 2 
Remtea06.1020 
Remtea07.06/15 
Remtea08.01/02/12 
Remteal 0.08/20 
Remteal 3.04/08 
Remteal 4.07 
Remteal 5.04
Reasul01.05 
Reasul02/06 
Reasul03.03/06 
Reasul04.07/12 
Reasul07.01/05 
Reasul09.09/20 
Reasul 10.02 
Reasul 12.02/09
Considering the available data, there are two carriers in the category normative symbolic 
systems, both related to expectations, which favour the idea of fostering some kind of 
hierarchical differentiation between members. Ordinary members lose degrees of 
freedom in decision making where other members have formal roles as representatives, 
moderators and facilitators, as these last members have attributions (rights and liabilities) 
that others do not have. In other words, members who have formal roles become the 
spokespeople and gatekeepers of the community, acquiring status of legitimate authority, 
as long as specific attributions are in place (and they are, as discussed in subsection 
6.1.2).
13 It is important to highlight that this expectation is not unanimous in the communities. Indeed, some 
members argue that the community cannot be represented and that the community should not aim to have 
political demands to discuss with government offices and society (citations: Rebea02.04; Rebea06.13; 
Rebea09.02; Rebeal0.08; Rebeal3.06; Rebeal6.21; Repea01.14; Repea06.03). The objective of this 
research, nonetheless, is to point out the carriers which favour the centralization of decision-making 
processes. In this direction, the carrier 2A-2 is very pervasive and effective, as indeed the communities 
conform to these expectations, although they are not unanimous among all members.
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Firstly, society as a whole (such as government representatives, journalists, companies 
and citizens) expects that the community should have formal representatives (for 
instance, an executive secretary), an address, a telephone and a formal website, in order 
to establish interaction (2A-1). The community could lose legitimacy if such a formal 
interface is not clear. As summarized by RebeaO 1.06, people do not agree to interact with 
a community which does not have some formality, such as an executive secretary. 
Remtea01.33 adds that organizations always send invitations to specific members or to 
the executive secretary, rather than keeping them open to any community member who 
could represent the community.
Secondly, members themselves, in spite of their discourse favouring a network 
organization, expect someone to assume more responsibility, manage community issues 
(such as conflict among members) and take initiatives (2A-2). Respondents RebeaO 1.04, 
Reasul01.05 and Reasul04.12 describe a general expectation that others would make 
decisions and take initiatives in the name of the community. As explained by 
Reasul02.06, in a culture which cultivates passivity, it is necessary to have leaders to 
push the community forward. Furthermore, some members take it for granted that it is 
necessary to have moderators to control conflict in communities (Rebea05.01/02; 
Repea02.06; Reasul07.05).
5.2.3. Cultural-cognitive symbolic systems
Table 5.3
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
3A-1
Hierarchical
schemas
People copy 
the hierarchical 
model they are 
used to.
RebeaO 1.01/04/22/26 
Rebea02.08 
Rebea03.20 
Rebea09.01/11/13 
Rebeal 0.03/14 
Rebeal 3.09 
Rebea 14.03/14 
Rebeal 7.10 
Remteal 1.03/08 
Reasul05.06
Repea01.05/16 
Repea02.13/14/18 
Repea04.08 
Repea05.04 
Repea06.13 
Repea07.03 
Repea09.10 
Repeal 0.02 
Repeal 1.02/20
Remtea01.05 
Remtea02.01/23 
Remtea04.04 
Remtea06.20 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.04/08/09 
Remteal 0.11/18
Reasul01.05 
Reasul02.06 
Reasul03.02/07 
Reasul04.07 
Reasul05.02/15/16 
Reasul07.13/15 
Reasul09.02/05/l 1 
/20
Reasul 11.05 
Reasul 15.06
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In order to organize their processes, the communities invoke hierarchical, traditional 
organizational models, here understood at the cultural-cognitive level. The community 
enacts structures that allow certain members (management group) to have more decision­
making power in relation to others. Hierarchical schemas (carrier 3A-1) appear mainly as 
a taken-for-granted perception of how things should be done -  despite members arguing 
that they are trying to construct network organizations, and despite the opposition of 
many members against the prevalent power structures14.
As explained by RebeaO 1.01, the libertarian possibilities of networks attract the social 
movements, but the organizational models in society are pyramidal, thus members keep 
their vertical models as they do not know how to work horizontally. Rebea03.20 
exemplifies this arguing that all social relations are hierarchical, with people who decide 
and people who obey, thus it is not simple to implement a horizontal model in such a 
society. Reasul05.15/16 goes in the same direction, alleging that if there are two people 
together, one is the boss. All these perceptions undermine the idea of constructing a 
network organization.
The term hierarchical schema is used in this thesis with this circumscribed meaning of 
having members with different degrees of power in decision making. This is the meaning 
that emerges from the interviews. Naturally, the term hierarchy evokes many other 
concepts that are not explored in this thesis. This is firstly because it is not the objective 
of this study, and secondly because the respondents focus on this interpretation when 
contrasting the term with network models.
14 Many respondents identify that some members do not feel it is legitimate that leaders have more power 
than others in decision-making processes. Citations referring to Rebea: RebeaO 1.08; Rebea06.16; 
Rebea07.15; Rebeal4.17; Rebeal6.06; Repea08.03; Remtea08.14; Remteal 1.05/08; Reasul01.08; 
Reasul05.13. Citations referring to Repea: Repea08.17/18; Repea09.12. Citations referring to Remtea: 
Remtea08.15. Citations referring to Reasul: Reasul09.10; Reasul 10.17.
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5.2.4. Regulative relational systems
)
Table 5.4
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
4A-1
Power systems -  the 
influence of sponsors
Sponsors (or potential 
sponsors) -  such as the 
government, universities 
and NGOs -  influence 
community social 
structures through funding 
projects, events and 
meetings.
Members related to these 
power systems have more 
central positions in the 
decision-making 
processes.
RebeaOl.10/11/12
/13/14/16/18/19
Rebea02.03/05
/06/13/14
Rebea03.03/19
Rebea04.02/04/08
Rebea05.09/10/ll
Rebea06.18
Rebea07.18
Rebea08.03/04/05
Rebeal 3.03/05
/09/11/12
Rebea 14.02/03
/07/08/12/14
Rebeal6.01/19
Rebeal 7.06/09
Repea06.10
Remtea01.30
Remteal 1.03/14
Reasul05.06
Reasul 10.12
Reasul 14.08
Repea01.13/15 
/18/23/24/26 
Repea02.12/15 
/23
Repea04.10/14 
/15/18
Repea06.10/11 
Repea08.06/09 
/10/26
Repea09.06/07 
Repeal 0.04/06 
Repeal 1.01/02 
/11/15
Remtea01.01/19
/20/29/30
Remtea02.0716
/21
Remtea04.02/10
/II
Remtea05.04
Remtea06.02/06
/07/28
Remtea07.01 
Remtea08.07/08 
/14/17
Remtea09.04 
Remteal 0.06/18 
/23/24/25/26 
Remteal 1.14 
Remteal 1.22
ReasulO 1.03/26 
Reasul02.18 
Reasul05.07 
Reasul07.10/12 
/18
Reasul09.13 
Reasul 10.03 
Reasul 14.08
4A-2
Governance systems
The community imitates 
the sponsor’s governance 
system.
[not cited] [not cited] Remtea01.20
Remtea02.21
Remtea04.02/04
Remtea06.02
Remtea08.07/17
Remteal 0.06/24
/25
Remteal 1.22 
Remteal 3.03
[not cited]
The carrier power systems, related to the influence o f sponsors (4A-1), is one of the most 
powerful examples of how social structures are diffused through the studied 
communities. As summarized by Rebea14.07/08/12 and Repeal 1.15, the leaders in the 
communities represent the powerful people in society: those who have power in 
universities, government and NGOs, and can obtain resources for the community. 
Furthermore, through members who are related to power systems, effective or potential 
sponsors influence the communities by giving preference to some representatives and
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excluding others from the debate (RebeaO 1.10) (a situation that is discussed in the carrier 
authority systems 5A-2).
Interviewees stressed that sponsors influence the communities throughout different 
channels, including also the simple possibility of offering future benefits. For instance, 
the sponsor may fund the community directly. As discussed in the carrier legislation (1A- 
1), three of the studied communities have been funded by the government. These 
contracts with the government impose obligations, which have affected members in their 
common activities, as well as their perception of legitimate authority. Also in the case of 
Remtea, which is supported mainly by an academic research group (GPEA/UFMT15), 
members of the management group link their activities with the research project, in such 
a way that power in the university is translated into power in the community16.
A second channel of influence, according to a number of respondents, is through indirect 
benefits. More specifically, the government has contracted some community leaders as 
consultants, as well as published their academic work17. Furthermore, the government has 
invited communities’ leaders to participate in specific government projects18. For these 
interviewees, through these benefits, the government has extended its influence over the 
communities, with the help of their leaders, even though the money does not go directly 
to the community.
The second carrier in this category is related to governance systems (4A-2). In this 
investigation, it occurs clearly in Remtea, because the boundaries between the community 
and the main sponsor are not clear. In this community, the majority of its leadership 
members are also members of a research group (GPEA/UFMT). In the interviews, it
15 Grupo Pesquisador em Educafao Ambiental, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso.
16 Citations: Remtea01.20; Remtea02.21; Remtea04.02; Remtea06.02; Remtea08.07/17; Remteal0.06/25.
17 Citations: RebeaOl. 14/16; Rebea07.18; Repea01.24; Repea02.23; Repea04.15; Remtea04.11.
18 Citations: RebeaO 1.10/19; Rebea03.03; Rebea08.04; Rebeal7.09; Repea01.13/18/23; Repea02.15; 
Repea04.14/18; Repea06.10/ll; Repea08.06/10; Repeal 1.11; Remtea01.30; Remtea04.10; Remtea08.14; 
Remteal0.06/25; Remteal 1.14; Reasul05.07; Reasul07.18; Reasull0.03.
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emerges that members do not differentiate clearly between Remtea’s activities and their 
research project, thus the same governance structure is copied straightforwardly from the 
research group to the community.
5.2.5. Normative relational systems
Table 5.5
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
5A-1
Authority systems -  
status
Reputation and legitimacy 
in society have being 
transformed into legitimate 
power within the 
community.
RebeaO 1.04/16 
/18
Rebea02.il/16 
Rebea03.03 
/10/11/12 
Rebea05.04 
Rebea06.27 
Rebea08.17 
Rebeal 3.01 
Rebeal3.17/19 
Rebea 14.02 
/04/07/08/18 
Rebeal 7.08 
Repea02.21
Repea02.15
Repea03.12
Repea07.05/07
Repea08.03
Repea08.06
/09/26/30
Repea09.09
Repeal 0.12
Repeal 1.17/19
RemteaO 1.04/05 
/06/15
Remtea02.02 
/07/24 
Remtea04.01 
/02/04/05/06 
Remtea06.15/20 
Remteal 0.05/26 
Remteal 1.22 
Remteal 3.07 
Remteal 4.02
Reasul02.09 
Reasul05.07/08 
/II
Reasul06.01 
Reasul07.02/03 
/07/17 
Reasul 10.05 
Reasul 15.04
5A-2
Authority systems -  
government influence
The government influences 
the legitimacy of members, 
in recognizing publicly 
some as community 
representatives.
RebeaO 1.10 
Rebea08.04 
Rebea 14.10 
Repea01.27 
Remteal 1.15 
Reasul 10.12
RepeaO 1.25/27
Repea04.10/14
/15/17
Repea06.08
Repea07.07
Rebea08.il/14
/17/26
Remtea02.02/05 
Remtea04.10/11 
/12
Remtea07.04 
Remtea08.02/14 
Remteal 0.02/18 
Remteal 1.15
ReasulO 1.07/24 
Reasul 12.04 
Reasul 13.06
The carrier authority systems related to status (5A-1) is cited many times by members of 
the four communities, confirming that reputation in society, such as being government 
officials, NGO leaders and academics, is translated into more legitimacy to make 
decisions in the studied collectivities. As summarized by Remtea04.04/05/06, people who 
have high status in a private company or in the university have more authority in the 
community. The power is implicit because members know each other in the community, 
continues the respondent (members are not anonymous). Also Rebea01.04 confirms that 
in the community respect comes from reputation and from what people know. For some
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respondents, this explains why the academics are those who participate most in the 
communities (Rebeal3.17/19; Rebeal4.02; Rebeal7.08).
The carrier authority systems related to government influence in the perception of 
legitimacy in the community (5A-2) is also identified by the four communities. This 
influence can be positive or negative. On the one hand, when the government publishes 
research, it is a form of legitimating the researcher (Repea04.15). On the other hand, 
when the government stops inviting a member to formal meetings, it undermines his or 
her legitimacy in the communities, affecting community power structures (RepeaO 1.27).
5.2.6. Cultural-cognitive relational systems
Table 5.6
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
6A-1 A
Identities RebeaO 1.20 RepeaO 1.23 RemteaO 1.22 Reasul05.07XUVliit iiviS
Community leaders share Rebea02.12/13Rebea04.02/08
Repea08.07 Remtea07.21
Remtea08.21
Reasull2.17 
Reasul 13.09
similar identity (history, values, Rebeal 6.20/21/22
and ideas) with other leaders in RemteaO 1.30
society, mainly in the Reasull4.01
government (A) and universities
B
Rebea02.03(B). Repea02.16 Remtea02.16 Reasul05.09
Rebea03.04/09 Remtea03.04 Reasul06.02
Rebea07.10 * Remtea04.06 Reasul07.02
Rebeal 7.08 Remtea06.06 Reasul09.06
Repea02.22 Remtea07.01 Reasul 10.05
Reasul 14.11 Remtea08.02 
Remteal 0.06 
Remteal 3.01 
Remteal 5.01
Reasul 14.11
The carrier identities (6A-1) reinforces the links between community leadership and other 
leaderships in the government and university, thus leveraging the influence of power 
systems (4A-1) and authority systems (5A-1 and 5A-2). In cultivating a common identity
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among the main leaders, other members are excluded from the group and consequently 
from decision making19.
In these communities, many leadership members are also associated with the political 
party20 which is in power in the federal government. For some members this association 
affects the independence of the communities. The argument is that members do not want 
to oppose the government, as the boundaries between civil society and the government 
are not clear (Rebea02.12/13). Also for Rebeal6.20/21/22, the identification between the 
government and Rebea leaders is such that it is difficult to differentiate the government 
from the social movement. The main argument is that the same peers with whom Rebea 
leaders have worked in the social movement are now members of the government. Thus it 
is difficult to distinguish between who represents the government and who represents 
social movements in terms of identity.
5.2.7. Regulative routines
Table 5.7
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
7A-1
Standard operating 
procedures
The management group 
segregates decision­
making processes, 
excluding ordinary 
members.
RebeaO 1.04/08 
Rebea02.04 
Rebea03.22 
Rebea04.03 
Rebea05.06 
Rebea06.07/09 
Rebea07.07 
Rebea08.02 
Rebeal 3.08 
Rebeal 4.02/18 
Rebeal 6.05 
Remteal 1.08 
Reasul01.08
RepeaO 1.04 
Repea02.02 
Repea03.10 
Repea04.08 
Repea05.03 
Repea06.06 
Repea07.02 
Repea08.12 
Repea09.06 
Repeal 0.04 
Repeal 1.04
RemteaO1.04/09/10 
Remtea02.01 
/04/06/10/19 
Remtea04.08 
Remtea06.01/20 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.01/04 
RemtealO.l 1/14
ReasulOl.Ol 
Reasul02.03 
Reasul03.02 
Reasul04.08 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul07.13 
Reasul08.07 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 10.07 
Reasul 12.04/12
19 This exclusion does not affect only ordinary members. Within the management group, members have 
different levels of power, forming tiers (situation that is discussed in many examples through this thesis). 
The carrier identity thus also reinforces the stratification of members within the management group.
20 Partido dos Trabalhadores.
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The carrier standard operating procedures (7A-1), in this thesis, is related to the 
segregation of decision making by management groups. Although the communities state 
their aim of organizing themselves as networks, in practice they are influenced by 
centralized decision-making processes, which characterize hierarchical organizations 
(Simon, 1997 [1945]). This carrier thus is very close to hierarchical schemas (carrier 3A- 
1). There the model emphasises the differentiation between leaders (who decide) and 
ordinary members (who do not). Here the routine stresses the segregation of decisions, 
i.e. the fact that some are not allowed to join in the making of decisions. These 
communities reproduce this carrier when they enact structures which permit leadership 
groups (also called management groups, moderation groups and facilitating groups) to 
centralize decisions (see explanation on tactics 7C-1, 7C-2 and 7C-3, in subsection 6.1.7).
5.2.8. Normative routines
Table 5.8
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
8A-1
Jobs and roles
Formal jobs and roles in society 
influence the way members 
behave in the community.
RebeaOl.01/26 
Rebea02.12 
Rebea03.25 
Rebeal 3.02 
/04/05
Remteal 1.10
RepeaO 1.02 
/03/23/24/26 
Repea02.16 
/20
Repeal 1.21
Remtea02.21 
Remtea04.01/02 
Remtea07.10/20 
Remtea08.15 
Remteal 1.10 
Remteal 2.03
Reasul07.05
/10
Reasul 13.07 
Reasul 14.12
The carriers jobs and roles (8A-1) imply that people behave in the community in a way 
that is compatible with their formal links in society. This is a quite obvious behaviour, as 
these communities are not anonymous, and indeed many members share with other the 
same face-to-face environment, as in their work and activities in general. These carriers 
favour the centralization of decisions as members avoid opposing their bosses or 
academic supervisors (or potential future bosses or academic supervisors). Thus some 
members, even if they do not agree with the segregation of decision making in the 
communities, avoid disputing this aspect with the people that have power over them in 
their jobs and in their relations in society.
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5.2.9. Cultural-cognitive routines
Table 5.9
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
9A-1
Scripts
Titles such as executive 
secretary, coordinator, 
moderator and facilitator 
influence how members 
understand the role of those 
who occupy these 
positions, and the role of 
others in relation to the 
former ones.
RebeaO 1.04 
/05/06/24 
Rebea03.19/22 
Rebea05.01/12 
Rebea06.03/05 
Rebea07.07/09/l 7 
Rebea08.02 
Rebeal 0.10 
Rebeal 1.11/12/13 
/14
Rebea 14.16/22/23 
Rebeal 6.12 
Remteal 1.20
RepeaO 1.12
/13/17
Repea02.04
Repea03.06
Repea04.13
Repea05.05
Repea06.07
/08/09
Repea07.03/04 
Repea08.04 
/09/11/14 
Repea09.06 
Repeal 0.02/09 
Repeal 1.03
RemteaO 1.09 
Remtea02.12/15 
Remtea03.03/06 
Remtea04.07 
Remtea06.10/ll 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.05 
Remteal 0.03/08 
Remteal 3.04/08 
Remteal 4.03/07
Reasul01.26 
Reasul02.12 
Reasul07.01 
Reasul08.06 
Reasul09.05 
ReasulOlO.lO 
Reasul 11.11 
Reasul 12.09 
Reasul 13.01 
/02/05/11 
Reasul 14.04
The carrier scripts (9A-1) appears many times in the interviews. Members take it for 
granted that titles, such as executive secretary, coordinator, moderator and facilitator, 
should mean something which differentiates these members from others without titles. 
Thus scripts also influence the community in order to create different categories of 
membership, reinforcing the legitimation of segregated decision-making processes.
Members also associate activities with these scripts, not necessarily because they have 
been informed about them beforehand, but because they have a previous understanding 
on the meaning of these words in society. The title ‘executive secretary’, for instance, is 
associated with ideas of representing the community, elaborating projects, controlling the 
website and solving conflicts. And ‘moderators’ are linked with the idea of solving 
conflicts and enforcing netiquette, such as preserving the norm of keeping the discussion 
focused on certain themes.
An ordinary member in Rebea, for instance, remembers when she had the first formal 
contact with the community. On this occasion, a Rebea representative introduced herself 
as ‘the executive secretary’. In the interpretation of this ordinary member 
(Rebeal 1.11/12/13/14), when a person introduces herself by the formal role, it means that
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this person has powers that others do not have, and that the opinion of an executive 
secretary should be respected. Indeed, Rebeal 1 immediately followed the orientation of 
the executive secretary in relation to a community activity, understanding that this would 
be the correct thing to do. Rebeal 1 admits to having feared to disobey the given 
orientation, because at that time she did not know the formal structures of the community 
to understand which kind of power was associated with the title ‘executive secretary’. 
Thus the respondent assumed an attitude of subordination to the orientation basically 
because of the referred title ‘executive secretary’.
5.2.10. Regulative artefacts
Before advancing in the analysis of the last three carriers, it is necessary to make a 
clarification. This thesis adopts the three following perspectives to analyse artefacts as 
carriers. When the discussion is strictly related to the artefact itself and the embedded 
functionalities (technical features), it is considered a regulative artefact, i.e. an artefact 
that has specifications (10A-1). Although these specifications have not been imposed by 
law necessarily, in practice it does not matter, because the functionalities are available as 
they are, and not otherwise. From the point of view of a user, the embedded 
specifications operate as a taken-for-granted constraint (Doherty, Coombs and Loan- 
Clarke, 2006; Kallinikos, 2002: 287-289; Souza et al.y 2004).
When considering a regulative artefact, this thesis is concerned with how the chosen 
Internet tool (websites and discussion lists) carries structures which favour the 
centralization of decision-making processes. The fact that other tools which could foster 
more horizontal relations have not been chosen reinforces the role of chosen artefacts as 
carriers of centralized structures.
A second distinction occurs when the discussion focuses on the standardized way the 
selected tools are customized (11A-1). The analysed tools (websites and discussion lists) 
have embedded specifications, which permit a level of flexibility in their appropriation
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(Orlikowski, 2000; Walsham, 2001: 44). Thus the way these tools are customized by 
communities is strongly related to standardised, social conventions. They could be 
appropriated in different ways, within the range of specifications, but they are customized 
in specific ways, following the institutionalised perception of adequateness (Kallinikos, 
2002: 290; De Cindio, Gentile and Redolfi, 2003: 398; Orlikowski and Barley, 2001: 149, 
154).
When the discussion focuses on standardized ways of customizing the tool, this thesis
considers the tool a normative artefact. When focusing on this aspect, this investigation
0 1explores how the standardized, conventional way of customizing the Internet tools has 
favoured centralized decision-making processes in these communities. When analysing 
artefacts from the normative viewpoint, the ways the tools are not customized also 
insights into the kind of social structures that have been fostered.
The differences between these two approaches -  regulative and normative -  are subtle 
and sometimes blur, as many people are not able to differentiate the standardized way of 
customizing from the technical functionalities themselves. A simple example may help. 
On the discussion lists, the tool gives different power to different membership roles: a 
moderator, for instance, has powers that an ordinary member does not have. The decision 
to inscribe the name of a member as a moderator or an ordinary member, nonetheless, is 
not in the tool, but in the way the tool is customized. The same tool could give equal 
power to all members: all can be classified as moderators. Thus the decision on 
classifying members in the discussion list is related to customization, rather than to a 
technical feature imposed by the tool.
21 The customization should not be confounded with the way people use the tool in practice, as suggested 
by Orlikowski (2000). To be sure, one aspect is the technical features which are embedded in the tool; a 
second aspect is how those with power over the tools customize these functionalities; and a third aspect is 
what social structures people effectively enact in use, in the situation. In this chapter, the focus is on 
carriers of social structures. The aspect of how members use artefacts (technology) in practice are related to 
agency, as discussed in tactics 6.1.10 and 6.1.11.
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The third distinction is related to the idea that the artefact has symbolic value. In this case 
the tools are considered by the value people attribute to them, rather than by their 
restrictive functionalities or by the way people customize them effectively. When the 
Internet tool analysed in this thesis carries these values, it is considered a cultural- 
cognitive artefact. When the focus is on symbolic values, this research is concerned with 
how these values, attributed to the artefact, favour centralized social structures as well. 
Other values associated to Internet tools are not explored in this thesis.
The current subsection presents the discussion on regulative artefacts. The next two 
subsections discuss normative artefacts (5.2.11) and cultural-cognitive artefacts (5.2.12) 
respectively.
Table 5.10
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
10A-1
Objects complying with 
specifications
Web-tools such as websites 
and discussion lists have 
technical features, which 
permit some members to 
appropriate the control of 
these channels.
RebeaO 1.20/21 
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Rebea03.24 
Rebea05.01 
Rebea 14.22/23 
HA
Rebeal 6.18
RepeaO 1.09/16 
Repea02.06/07 
Repea03.02/07 
/14
Repea04.19 
Repea07.08 
Repea08.12/25 
Repeal 1.10/13
RemteaO 1.10/20 
Remtea02.26 
Remtea04.03/14 
Remteal 0.03/16 
Remteal3.14
ReasulOl.09/10
Reasul02.10/15
Reasul04.05
Reasul05.02
Reasul08.05
Reasul09.05
Reasul 10.18
In the studied communities, two artefacts meet the condition to be considered institutional 
carriers of segregated decision-making processes. The carriers objects complying with 
specifications (10A-1) are websites and discussion lists. First, the website tools are 
protected by passwords. Only members who have the passwords can publish on the 
website, thus permitting a level of centralization in decision-making processes related to 
the website contents.
Second, the groupware tools give special powers to who creates discussion lists. The 
creator can extinguish the list, include and exclude members and moderate messages, as 
well as delegate these powers to other members. The creator and his or her delegates have
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more power in relation to other members, thus also permitting segregation of decision 
making.
5.2.11. Normative artefacts
Table 5.11
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
11A-1
Objects meeting conventions 
and standards
Internet tools such as websites 
and discussion lists are 
customized in such a 
standardized way in order to 
keep the control of these 
channels with leadership 
groups.
RebeaO 1.20 
12X122 
Rebea03.24 
Rebea 14.23 
Rebeal6.18
RepeaO 1.09/16
Repea02.06
/07/09
Repea03.02
/07/14
Repea04.19
Repea07.08
Repea09.12
Rebeal 1.13
RemteaO 1.10/20 
Remtea02.26 
Remtea04.03/14 
Remtea 10.02/16 
Remteal3.14
ReasulO 1.09/10 
Reasul02.01/15 
Reasul04.05 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul08.05 
Reasul09.02/05 
Reasul 10.18 
Reasul 13.01 
Reasul 14.03
The carriers objects meeting conventions and standards (11A-1) are related to the way 
the communities customize the adopted Internet tools. Actually, the leadership groups 
control the publishing on the websites (through passwords), and have the last word in 
relation to the discussion lists, through their power of moderation, as well as by the 
creation of a segregated discussion list which is not open to all members.
More specifically, the websites have passwords, and the leadership groups control the 
content. Three processes are associated with this centralization of decision making in the 
studied communities. First, the four communities centralize the publishing to leadership 
members (only a few members from management groups publish, which excludes 
ordinary members as well as other management members). Second, in the case of Repea, 
only the main leadership members (related to the anchor organization) can validate the 
content suggested by other management members. In other words, Repea’s management 
members can publish, but the referred content only becomes available on the website 
after approval of the main leadership. Third, in Reasul one main leader has kept the 
power of moderation, thus this person can exclude content that other leadership members 
have included.
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In relation to the discussion lists, they have moderators with differentiated powers in 
relation to other members. In general, the activities of these moderators are associated 
with keeping the netiquette (such as avoiding impolite behaviour) and solving conflicts 
(see more details in subsections 5.2.2. and 5.2.9). Moderators, nonetheless, also have 
special power to moderate messages (a member can be filtered independently of others) 
or even exclude people from the lists, independently of the opinion of other members.
As discussed in tactic 6C-4 (subsection 6.1.6), Remtea leadership group expelled a 
member without consulting ordinary members. This centralized decision is only possible 
because of the way the tools are customized by the leadership. Also moderators are 
gatekeepers of segregated discussion lists, guaranteeing that only members approved by 
the leadership members have access to these closed lists. The general lists also demand 
the approval of a moderator, but in general any non-anonymous person can join the 
discussion (it is only necessary to give minimal data about who is applying for 
membership).
Here the main aspect is that tools permit a certain level of flexibility that has been 
customized in ways of reinforcing the segregation in decision-making processes. Thus 
leadership members configure Internet tools in a standardized, conventional way 
(considering the hierarchical models of keeping centralized structures of decision 
making), which keeps the control of these tools in their hands.
5.2.12. Cultural-cognitive artefacts
Table 5.12
Carriers Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
12A-1
Objects possessing 
symbolic value
In communication, 
Internet tools are less 
efficient than face-to- 
face interaction.
Rebea03.02/13 
Rebea06.01 
/02/03/18/19 
Rebea07.24 
Rebea08.05 
Rebeal 3.05/18 
Rebeal 6.04
RepeaOl. 11/22 
Repea02.04/05 
/19
Repea04.03
Repea06.01
Repea08.12
RemteaOl.08/17/25 
Remtea02.11 
Remtea04.06 
Remtea05.02 
Remtea07.16 
Remtea08.06 
Remteal 0.15 
Remteal3.12
ReasulO 1.18/27 
Reasul02.20 
Reasul03.05 
Reasul04.03/11 
Reasul06.04 
Reasul08.02 
Reasul09.17 
Reasul 10.15/21/24
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The four studied communities have cultivated the understanding that, in communication 
processes, Internet tools are less efficient than face-to-face interaction, especially when it 
is necessary to discuss themes deeply. In the adopted framework, this belief is associated 
with the objects possessing symbolic value (carrier 12A-1). The formulation of this 
symbolic value is quite intriguing, as in these communities the most important 
communication channels, considering the volume of exchanges, are through Internet tools 
(even in Remtea, whose management group is clustered in the same university)22.
Indeed, some respondents cite this belief when they are trying to undermine the general 
discussion list as a space for decision making, or the ordinary members of the general list 
as authentic members23. Rebea06.18 (one of the main leaders), for instance, admits that 
the exclusion of ordinary members from decision making through the segregated 
discussion lists should be discussed, but feels that this debate should be in a face-to-face 
meeting open to all members. The respondent admits, however, that it is not possible to 
have such a meeting, because the community cannot sponsor all members to attend the 
event. In sum, the requirement of having a face-to-face meeting to discuss governance 
structures becomes in practice an obstacle to changing the segregation of decision 
making. Another interesting formulation comes from RemteaO 1.08/17, that the general 
discussion list is not a space to make decisions, because the virtual interaction hides 
human values such as the smile and affection.
The same value has not been associated by respondents with the segregated discussion 
lists. In other words, respondents feel that Internet tools are less efficient than face-to- 
face communication either generically (mainly talking about the relevance of keeping 
offline meetings) or in relation to the general list. In the interviews, the same association 
has not been made when discussing the segregated lists, which are normally used for 
decision making. The fact that respondents also associated the Internet tools with very
22 Citations: Rebea06.02; Rebea08.05; Rebeal3.05; Repea02.05; Repea06.01; RemteaOl.25; Remteal0.15; 
Reasul01.27; Reasull0.24.
23 Citations: Rebea07.24; Repea02.04/19; RemteaOl.08; Remtea02.11; Remtea08.06; Reasul01.18; 
Reasul06.04.
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positive values for the communities -  such as the community development, the possibility 
of sharing information and the strength to promote political mobilization24 -  reinforces 
the interpretation that undermining the relevance of the discussion list as a channel for 
communication could be more a matter of rhetoric than a matter of fact.
It is necessary to add two comments to the previous evaluation. First, this research is not 
questioning that members prefer to make decisions in face-to-face meetings. What is 
being questioned here is that, in spite of this statement, the decisions have been made 
through both, face-to-face meetings and Internet-mediated interactions, mainly through 
segregated discussion lists. As the symbolic value developed here does not imply that the 
segregated lists have lost their relevance in decision-making processes (see references in 
tables 5X and 6.14), necessarily there is an element of rhetoric in repeating this belief. 
Second, this symbolic value is powerful independently of being rhetorical, as far as 
members believe in such a value and act in accordance with it, undermining the general 
discussion list as a space for decision making.
5.3. Concluding remarks on findings I
This chapter opens by contrasting the differences between how members of Internet- 
mediated communities, which aim to construct a network-like organization, idealize their 
governance structures (referred to in this thesis as their ‘ideal’ model), with how they 
describe their effective governance practices (‘actual’ model). More specifically, this 
study is interested in contrasting the features of both models in relation to their processes 
of decision-making, as discussed in chapter 1.
24 Citations: Rebea02.02; Rebea06.01/16; Rebea07.10; Rebea08.05; Rebea09.07; RebealO.Ol 
" Rebeal 1.02/08; Rebeal2.02; Rebeal3.05/11/12; Rebeal6.03/10; Rebeal7.02/07; RepeaOl.03; Repea06.02 
Repea08.26; Repea09.05; Remtea03.02; Remtea08.06; Remteal0.02/15/17; Remteal 1.04/17; Reasul01.28 
Reasul02.10; Reasul 10.24.
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Focusing on this aspect, table 5X indicates that community members idealize having 
decentralized decision-making structures (also described as non-hierarchical and 
horizontal), in which members are not subordinated to each other. Respondents make 
such claims when questioned about why they call their communities ‘networks’. 
Sequentially, members were asked to describe their decision-making processes in greater 
detail, through counting cases and experiences. Tables 5Y and 5Z emerged from these 
statements, which make clear that the communities have leadership groups (called 
management groups) that centralize decision-making processes. Furthermore, 
interviewees indicate that the main communication channels between leadership members 
are segregated Internet discussion lists, which are closed to ordinary members, who only 
have access to debates on general discussion lists.
Starting from this gap between the ideal and the actual models, section 5.2 describes how 
institutional carriers influence the process of diffusion of centralized, segregated 
decision-making processes, a common feature of hierarchical organizations, in 
communities which are informal (thus not subject to the same rules of formal 
organizations, such as corporations, governments, churches, schools etc.), and which aim 
at least rhetorically to construct a network form of social arrangement. As explained in 
chapter 1, for these communities, which have strong roots in social and environment 
movements, it is important to construct social structures which challenge the traditional, 
hierarchical models in society. They, nonetheless, reproduce the social structures that 
they are meant to be rejecting.
In order to investigate the diffusion of institutions through the studied communities, this 
thesis has chosen Scott’s (2001) framework, which includes 12 different categories of 
carriers (symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and artefacts), in their regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive aspects (see subsection 3.2.4 for full description of 
Scott’s framework). The broad coverage of this framework has demonstrated its value in 
helping to understand the complexity of the studied phenomena.
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Indeed, the collected data shows that the 12 categories of carriers are related to the 
process of institutionalisation of segregated decision-making structures in the studied 
communities. Naturally, it could be otherwise. For instance, the carrier legislation (1A-1) 
(in the category regulative symbolic systems) does not apply for Remtea, as the 
community has not contracted government funding for its activities. On the other hand, 
the carrier governance systems (4A-2) (in the category regulative relational systems) only 
applies to Remtea, as its structure is mingled with an academic research group. Thus the 
presence of carriers depends on the kind of phenomena which have been investigated. In 
this sense, this study is particularly favoured by having found such complex Internet- 
mediated communities, which have permitted the exploration of all the 12 categories.
The next chapter presents the additional set of analytical constructs, referred to, in this 
thesis, arguments and tactics, to understand the diffusion of centralized decision-making 
structures through institutional carriers. It seems clear that the carriers have a great deal 
of influence in this institutionalisation of hierarchical processes, but it is necessary to go a 
step further to understand the associated role of social actors in this diffusion.
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6. Findings and analysis II: Logics of justification and action
The empirical findings presented in chapter 5 suggested that the diffusion of segregated 
decision-making processes in a group of four Internet-mediated communities (Rebea, 
Repea, Remtea and Reasul) has been influenced by institutional carriers. In this chapter 
complementary findings are set forth. Drawing upon Scott’s (2001) framework of 
institutional carriers, and Giddens’s (1979, 1984) structuration theory, this thesis suggests 
paying special attention to how actors reproduce and change social structures in their 
situations, emphasising the relevance of agency in the process of institutionalisation. This 
research also draws upon Barley and Tolbert (1997), who propose combining new 
institutionalism with structuration theory, and investigating the diffusion of social 
structures through analysing actors’ patterns of interaction, and interpretation of their 
behaviour. The focus on interpretation and interaction is supported by Scott (2003, 2005).
In this direction, this study argues that the influence of carriers is supported by the fact 
that members cultivate arguments to justify the reproduction of the related social 
structures in their Internet-mediated interactions. In this study, these arguments are 
especially relevant considering the contrast between how these communities imagine 
their governance structures and how they actually develop them. The discourse thus helps 
to gloss the differences and paradoxes between both ideal and actual models of decision­
making processes.
Furthermore, this research argues that the influence of carriers depends on how people 
adapt their action to reproduce the social structures in the situation. In this study, these 
actions are called tactics: procedures which aim to permit the reproduction of 
institutionalised social structures in the context. In relation to how tactics are understood 
in this thesis, it is necessary to make two observations, as follow.
Firstly, this study is concerned with the role of carriers in the diffusion of a particular 
institutionalised strutture defined as segregation of decision-making processes. Thus only
148
the tactics which foster this diffusion are focused on. It may happen that communities 
have other tactics working against the segregation of decision making. However if such 
counter-tactics are present, they have not successfully impeded the observed 
institutionalisation. Furthermore, it may be that the management group has been efficient 
in constructing counter-counter-tactics. For instance, respondents related that certain 
members keep criticizing the centralization of governance in the communities, but the 
management group ignores such complaints (tactic 3C-2). In Remtea, a member 
systematically criticized the mainstream ideology, but he was expelled from the 
community by the management group (tactic 6C-4). Thus the prevalent tactics are those 
that support the actual governance structures, which are reflected in the tables below.
Secondly, this thesis is aware that the term tactic may imply the idea of planning for 
promoting a desired result. Indeed, it is not possible to affirm whether the identified 
tactics have been created consciously with the interpreted intention of supporting the 
diffusion of the related social structures. Thus this research is describing a picture, 
considered at the moment of data collection, from a particular standpoint of finding 
situated actions which support the reproduction of the carried social structures in the 
studied contexts. These patterned actions may have been created in a more complex 
environment, in which many factors have been considered, rather than only the idea of 
supporting the segregation of decision making. Indeed the term tactic is used in this 
investigation as a hindsight analysis of a given situation, and does not intend to convey 
the idea of consciously planned action.
The first section below presents the arguments and tactics related to each category of 
carriers. As the carriers in each category are very close in their nature, the arguments and 
tactics are related to the category as a whole. The second section summarizes the main 
findings of this chapter, preparing the analysis and discussion that follows in the next 
chapters.
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6.1. Reproducing institutions in the situation: Arguments and tactics
The subsections below present the arguments and tactics related to each category, 
following Scott’s (2001) framework. The carriers discussed in chapter 5 are again listed 
here, in order to facilitate the reading, in the introduction of each topic. The arguments 
and tactics listed in this section are constructions based on the collected data, in order to 
convey the meaning respondents embed in their statements about their reasoning and 
practices.
6.1.1. Regulative symbolic systems
Three communities (Rebea, Repea and Reasul) demonstrate the influence of the 
legislation (carrier 1A-1). Although these communities are informal collectivities (thus 
they are not subject to laws in general), Brazilian legislation influenced the communities 
because it permitted them to obtain government funding1. The condition to access this 
resource, however, was that the community should be represented by a formal (anchor) 
organization (furthermore having other associated organizations which support the 
project), for the elaboration and execution of specific projects. The legislation 
differentiated between community members from the moment it gave the anchor 
organization special rights and obligations. Nonetheless, the legislation imposed rules on 
project outcomes, rather than on the governance structures of the communities or the 
projects.
Table 6.1
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
IB-1
The community needs to comply 
with legislation to receive 
government funding.
Rebea01.13 
Rebea05.15/16 
Rebeal 4.06/08 
/09
R em teall.ll
Repea01.04
Repea02.04/14
Repea03.15
Repea04.08/13
Repea08.04
Repeal 1.07
(*) Reasul01.04 
Reasul02.18 
Reasul03.07 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 10.06 
Reasul 12.16
(*) Remtea has not received government funding directly as the other three communities.
1 At the time of the interviews, the government funding was no longer available.
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Argument IB-1, the community needs to comply with legislation to receive government 
funding, is based on the awareness that the community cannot be eligible for money 
without the support of an anchor organization. The problem is that these communities are 
informal collectivities, thus they do not have either legal status or bank accounts to 
receive public resources (Rebea05.15; Rebeal4.06/09). Indeed the community could 
receive funding through its individual members, but respondents report that sponsors 
have resisted funding individuals. Thus communities use this alternative channel, of 
having an anchor organization to interface formally with sponsors.
Table 6.2
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
1C-1
Make the community’s 
governance structure 
similar to the 
governance structure of 
the funded project.
RebeaO 1.04/05
/13/17
Rebea02.07
Rebea03.16
Rebea05.15
Remtea 11.06
RepeaO 1.0407 
Repea02.01/03/05/11 
Repea03.02/09 
Repea04.14 
Repea06.04 
Repea08.03/11/26 
Repea09.06 
Repeal 1.02/07
(*) Reasul01.04
Reasul03.07
Reasul09.02/03
/04
Reasul 10.06
1C-2
Concentrate power and 
visibility in the anchor 
organization (and its 
representatives).
RebeaO 1.13 
Rebea02.05/07/16 
Rebeal4.06
RepeaOl.03/05/13/14
Repea02.05/11/12
Repea03.02
Repea04.08
Repea05.03
Repea06.04
Repea07.04
Repea08.03
Repeal 0.06
Repeal 1.10
(*) ReasulO 1.01/04
Reasul02.01
Reasul03.07
Reasul04.06
Reasul05.02/15/16
Reasul07.12
Reasul08.05
Reasul09.09
Reasul 10.23
Reasul 11.05
Reasul 12.09
(*) Remtea has not received government funding directly as the other three communities.
Tactic 1C-1, make the community’s governance structure similar to the governance 
structure o f the funded project, is the outcome of agency, not an imposition of legislation. 
As related by Reasul01.04, on many occasions the leadership group blended the 
management of the community with the management of the funded project, because the 
anchor organization would not have been able to fulfil contractual targets and deadlines if 
they had tried to develop different structures. Naturally the rules are blurred, and some 
members do not understand the difference between the governance structures of the
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funded project and of the community. This tactic thus favours the centralization of 
decisions -  not only the ones related to the funded projects -  in the anchor organization.
In relation to tactic 1C-2, concentrate power and visibility in the anchor organization, the 
fact that an anchor organization is responsible for a funded project does not imply that 
other members could not have a say in decision making. The legislation did not impose 
centralized decision-making structures per se. There is thus agency behind this procedure 
of centralizing decisions in the anchor and associated organizations, which also have 
members in the main community roles (such as the executive secretary or the 
coordinator).
As explained by RebeaO 1.05, a leadership member, the community created the role of 
executive secretary only after asking government funding. Previously, Rebea only had 
executive secretaries to organize face-to-face events (every two years), rather than to 
manage the community as a whole in a continuous fashion. Also in Repea, the 
differentiation between members (called nodes), with the related segregation of 
discussion lists, was only established because of the legislation during the funded project 
(Repea01.04; Repea02.01/03).
It is interesting that in Rebea and Repea the same structure is kept even after the end of 
the funded projects. The communities, at the time of the data collection (April and June 
2006), were no longer receiving government funding related to this legislation. 
Conversely, Reasul05.15/16 and Reasul07.12 conclude that their community (which was 
created with this specific government funding) started to move to a more horizontal 
structure after the end of the funded project.
6.1.2. Normative symbolic systems
The four communities are influenced by two carriers in the category of normative 
symbolic systems. First, the one related to societal expectations (2A-1), as the 
government, organizations and citizens expect that the community should be represented
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by members who have formal roles (such as an executive secretary). Second, the one 
related to members ’ expectations (2A-2), as some suppose leaders should represent the 
community, take initiatives and manage conflicts.
Table 6.3
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
2B-1
The community should 
have a formal, legitimate 
interface with society, in 
order to voice its political 
demands.
RebeaO 1.10 
Rebea05.06/10 
/12
Rebea06.05
Rebea07.07/09
/20/21
Rebea09.03/13
Rebeal3.13
Rebeal4.17/18
Remtea01.32
RepeaO 1.18/21 
/23
Repea02.15 
Repea03.12 
Repea04.09/10 
/14/23
Repea06.08/11 
Repea08.10 
Repeal 1.12/16
RemteaOl .06/30 
Remtea02.03/05 
Remtea04.11/12 
/13
Remtea07.0406 
/10/15/17 
Remtea08.02/07 
/18/20
Remteal 0.02/06 
/18/23
Remtea 14.01/02
ReasulO 1.21/23 
Reasul04.10 
Reasul07.18/20 
Reasul08.05 
Reasul 12.04 
Reasul 13.02/06 
/II
Reasul 15.05
2B-2
It is necessary to have a 
group to resolve conflicts 
and reduce opportunistic 
behaviour among members.
RebeaO 1.05/22 
Rebea05.01 
Rebea08.01 
Rebeal0.14 
Rebeal 4.21/22
Repea02.06 
Repea03.02/03 
Repea06.09 
Repeal 0.02/09
RemteaOl. 10 
Remtea02.12 
Remtea04.03 
Remtea06.10/20 
Remtea08.12 
Remteal 0.08 
Remteal 3.04/08 
Remteal4.07
Reasul07.01/05 
Reasul 13.05
2B-3
It is necessary to have a 
group which takes 
initiatives, such as 
organizing meetings and 
events.
RebeaO 1.04 
Rebea02.10 
Rebea08.01/02 
/09
Rebea09.10 
Rebeal 2.06
RepeaOl. 15/21 
Repea02.17 
Repea06.02 
Repeal 1.02
RemteaOl .04/05
Remtea02.10
Remtea04.02
Remtea06.03
Remtea07.15
Remtea08.15
Remteal 0.11
Remteal4.12
Remteal 5.04
ReasulO 1.05 
Reasul03.03/06 
Reasul04.07/12 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 10.02 
Reasul 12.02
The four communities present arguments to legitimise the normative expectations of 
having differentiated roles among members. Argument 2B-1, the community should have 
a formal, legitimate interface with society, in order to voice its political demands, 
undermines the concept of a network organization, as it implies that the community 
would not be able to voice their collective demands without such formal representation. 
The respondent Rebea07.07/09 argues that communities do not want to have 
representatives to outsiders, but that it is strategic to have well-prepared spokespeople to 
diffuse the concept of network organizations. In other words, the community should
153
accept this contradiction of depending on a kind of vertical structure (as the spokespeople 
have more power in decision-making) to promote its beliefs on network structures.
Arguments 2B-2, it is necessary to have a group to resolve conflicts and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour among members, and 2B-3, it is necessary to have a group which 
takes initiatives, such as organizing meetings and events, also undermine the concept of a 
network organization, as they imply that a horizontal organization is not able to solve its 
conflicts and takes initiatives. Thus the three arguments directly support some form of 
segregation (in the sense that members should have different roles), and serve to 
legitimise the respective carriers (2A-1 and 2A-2).
Table 6.4
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
2C-1
Conform to social 
expectations, keeping 
gatekeepers 
(moderators, 
facilitators) and formal 
representatives.
RebeaO1.02/06/24
Rebea02.06
Rebea03.01/19
Rebea05.12
Rebea06.05
Rebea07.09
Rebea08.01
Rebea09.03
Rebeal 1.09
Rebeal3.10
Rebeal4.14
Rebeal 6.15/21
RemteaOl.24
Remteal 1.19/20
RepeaOl.09/14/15
Repea02.06
Repea04.09
Repea03.02/12
Repea06.08
Repea08.14
RemteaOl.33 
Remtea02.05/10 
Remtea04.02/03 
/12/13
Remtea06.10/20 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.12 
Remteal 0.08/18 
Remteal 3.04 
Remteal 4.01
ReasulO 1.05/21 
Reasul02.03 
Reasul03.03 
Reasul04.12 • 
Reasul07.05 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 10.02 
Reasul 11.02 
Reasul 12.09
Tactic 2C-1, conform to social expectations, keeping gatekeepers (moderators, 
facilitators) and formal representatives, reproduces the social structures carried by the 
carriers expectations, legitimating members which embody these roles. In practice, the 
communities reinforce the differentiation between members. For instance, the websites 
inform readers about who assumes the interface between the community and society, 
reinforcing their legitimacy in relation to other members. Also in government projects, 
the community keeps the same interlocutors, with the argument that it is necessary to 
guarantee continuity and legitimacy, thus excluding other members from the interaction 
(Repea04.09).
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The legitimation of some members as gatekeepers, spokespeople and representatives 
implies that other members have less potential to be accepted by society and peers as 
having the same power. It could be otherwise. The communities could try to defend their 
ideal that in network organizations all members have the same rights and voice, 
permitting the continuous emergence of leaders (as summarized in table 5X).
The permanent rotation of representatives could foster greater transparency, as the 
continuity of processes would only be possible as far as previous discussions and 
decisions were shared with the whole community. In centralizing the representation of the 
community in a few people, it is not necessary to keep the same level of transparency to 
have continuity. Ordinary members cannot be sure the spokespeople represent their 
interests when transparency is not assured.
Furthermore, tactic 2C-1 should be understood in conjunction to other tactics, such as the 
fact that the leadership group defines who community representatives and gatekeepers are 
(summarizing tactics 7C-2 and 7C-3), and creates obstacles for ordinary members 
joining the management group (tactic 4C-1). Tactic 2C-1 is also very similar to tactic 9C- 
1, centralize the representation o f the community in the executive secretary, which 
conforms to scripts (carrier 9A-1).
6.1.3. Cultural-cognitive symbolic systems
Members of the four communities recognize the influence of hierarchical schemas 
(carrier 3A-1) in their governance models. These schemas imply that some members have 
more power than others in the community, i.e. it is taken for granted that some will 
concentrate power. This assumption supports the idea of segregating decision-making 
processes.
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Table 6.5
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
3B-1
It is difficult to manage the 
community without 
following a hierarchical 
model.
RebeaO 1.05/08 
/23
Rebea02.11 
Rebea03.17 
Rebea05.05 
/11/19 
Rebea08.10 
Rebea09.16 
Rebeal 2.04 
Rebeal 3.08 
Rebeal 4.18/19 
/20
Rebeal 6.06 
Remteal 1.05/06 
ReasulO 1.16 
Reasul05.03
RepeaO 1.05/21 
Repea02.13/14 
/16
Repea04.08/09 
/21/22 
Repea08.18 
Repea09.10/11 
Repeal 1.05/07
RemteaOl.05
Remtea02.17
Remtea04.02
Remtea06.01/04
/05
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.05/13 
RemtealO.l 1/14 
Remteal4.12
Reasul02.06
Reasul03.07
Reasul04.08
Reasul05.03
Reasul09.05/10
/II
Reasul 11.09
3B-2
There are cognitive 
obstacles to creating a 
network organization in a 
hierarchical society.
RebeaOl.01/08
Rebea03.20
Rebea05.14
Rebea06.07/16
125/26
Rebea07.06/12
m
Rebea09.01/02 
RemteaOl.25/26 
Remteal 1.08 
Reasul 10.12
RepeaO 1.15 
Repea04.08/21 
Repea08.07 
Repeal 0.07
RemteaOl.25 
/27/32
Remtea02.23
Remtea07.17
ReasulO 1.05
Reasul03.07
Reasul04.06
Reasul07.13/15
Reasul09.20
Reasull 0.15/22
The arguments associated with hierarchical schemas try to explain the incoherence 
between the ideal model of constructing a network organization and the actual model of 
segregating decision making. In recognizing the segregation, members then try to make 
sense of this paradox. Both arguments are related to cognitive reasoning: it is difficult to 
manage the community without following a hierarchical model (3B-1); and there are 
cognitive obstacles to creating a network organization in a hierarchical society (3B-2). 
The arguments reinforce the interpretation that the network model is closer to an ideal 
than to an actual practice.
Argument 3B-1 directly undermines the concept of a network organization, also relating 
the difficulty to ideas that the community has an increasing number of members, assumes 
more complex tasks and needs to fulfil deadlines. Even members who have discussed 
network forms of organization for years argue that excess of work leads to hierarchical
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models (RebeaO 1.05). In more strong words, Rebea05.11 states that democracy is 
beautiful, but if one were to try to make a project through collective discussion, one 
would need 1,000 years. It is for this reasons that ordinary members have not been 
consulted on complex projects, argues this leadership member. A core leadership 
member, Rebea05.19 admits explicitly that it is always a small group who decides, 
especially the more sensitive issues, through the segregated list. This argument 
reproduces the conventional perception that the segregation of decision-making processes 
improves the coordination of collective tasks (as summarized by Simon, 1997 [1945]: 7).
Argument 3B-2, differently, ponders that it is difficult to construct a network 
organization, as members in general do not know how to organize things in a network­
like form, but it does not say that it is impossible. As explained by Rebea03.20, social 
structures are based on hierarchical, vertical models, thus members do not have sufficient 
empirical experience with horizontal models to be able to implement such a schema 
inside the community. ReasulO 1.05 adds that as we are used to living in societies with 
hierarchical structures, in which some people give orders, the communities also have 
some leaders who make decisions for others. Some members go further2, defending the 
structure by stating that the management group has knowledge of how to organize 
networks, more so than other members, thus justifying the segregated decision making. 
This kind of reasoning supports the idea that there are two membership categories, those 
who are able to work in a network model (the management members) and those who are 
not (ordinary members)3.
2 Citations: Rebea05.14; Rebea06.07; Rebea07.17; Remtea01.25; Repea04.21; Repeal0.07.
3 This argument that management members know how to work in network structures may also support 
tactic 6C-1: create ambiguous categories o f membership, reinforcing the identity o f the leadership group in 
relation to other members.
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Table 6.6
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
3C-1
Make governance rules 
blurred and ambiguous. 
Members do not know 
how things are decided, or 
who chooses community 
representatives. *
(*) This tactic is an 
aggregation of the 
associated sub-tactics below.
RebeaO 1.08/23/24 
125
Rebea02.09 
Rebea03.16/19/20 
Rebea05.03/05/10 
/II
Rebea06.06/08/l 5 
Rebea07.07/12 
Rebea08.03/15 
Rebea09.12 
Rebea 10.04 
Rebeal 3.06 
Rebeal4.07/13/17 
123
Rebeal 6.12 
Rebeal 7.11 
RemteaOl.33 
Reasul05.06/13 
Reasul 10.11
RepeaO 1.06/07 
Repea02.02/10 
Repea03.10/11 
Repea04.10/ll 
/13/23/24 
Repea05.03/05 
Repea06.04/07 
109
Rebea08.07/17 
18/19/30 
Repeal 1.06/07 
/08
RemteaOl.09 
Remtea02.01/03 
/15/20
Remtea03.04 
Remtea05.09 
Remtea06.19 
Remtea07.13 
Remtea08.13 
Remtea 10.06/19
ReasulOl. 12/13
Reasul02.03
Reasul05.02
Reasul06.02/03
Reasul09.03
Reasul 11.07
3C-1A
Do not inform ordinary 
members about the 
existence of a leadership 
group, and the segregation 
of discussion lists.
RebeaO 1.08 
Rebea03.15/16/17 
/19
Rebea05.08/19 
Rebea06.25 
Rebeal4.17 
Rebeal 6.08 
Remteal3.12
RepeaO 1.06 
Repea02.10 
Repea04.25 
Repea08.17/18 
/19
Repea 10.05 
Repeal 1.06/07
Remtea05.03
Remtea09.05/06
Reasul ordinary 
members are 
informed that they 
do not participate 
in decision 
making.
3C-1B
Call consensus the 
agreement of a few 
members.
Rebea05.06 
Rebea09.12 
Rebeal 1.10
Repea03.05
Repea07.06
Remtea06.20
Remtea08.13
Reasul03.08
Reasul04.09
Reasul07.18
3C-1C
Centralize the process of 
defining the consensus (or 
closing the discussion) in 
the leadership group.
Rebea05.07
Rebea09.13
[Not available] RemteaOl.09 
Remtea02.15 
Remtea04.06/13 
Remtea06.il/19 
/20
Remtea07.16 
Remtea08.13 
Remteal 3.08
Reasul03.08 
Reasul 11.06
3C-1D
Do not base decisions on 
numbers of votes, but on 
the quality of arguments.
Rebea02.08/09
Rebea05.02
Rebea06.06
Rebea07.14
Rebeal 3.06/07/08
Rebeal4.13
Repea04.11/12 
Repea06.08
RemteaOl.08/09 
Remtea02.15 
Remtea06.19/ 
20/27
Remtea08.13 
Remteal 3.10 
Remteal4.11
Reasul03.02 
Reasul 11.06 
Reasul 14.10
3C-2
Ignore complaints against 
centralized structures, or 
questions related to 
accountability and 
transparency.
RebeaO 1.07/10/15 
Rebea03.15/16 
Rebea08.10 
Rebea09.17 
Rebeal 0.03/04/05 
Rebeal 6.11 
RemteaOl.23 
Remtea02.18 
Remteal 1.05/08 
Remteal4.03 
ReasulO 1.08 
Reasul05.03/13
Rebea08.03/17/
18/30
Remtea06.25
Remtea08.14/15
Reasul07.15
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The tactics in group 3C-1, make governance rules blurred and ambiguous, are powerful, 
because they affects the cognitive perception of the actual model of governance. In this 
group, the rules are blurred to mask a situation in which some members are more 
powerful than others in decision-making processes4. Thus members do not know how 
things are decided, or who chooses community representatives.
In this group, tactic 3C-1A, do not inform ordinary members about the existence of a 
leadership group, and the segregation o f discussion lists, is quite interesting. In fact, 
many members ignore the actual governance structure of these communities, really 
thinking that all members have equal power in decisions through general discussion lists. 
Respondent Rebea03.15/16/17/19, for instance, complains that she does not know either 
who is on the restricted list, or what they debate. For her, the majority of Rebea members 
do not know about the management group, because it is hidden from ordinary members.
Rebea03 acknowledged the presence of a management group because another one, who 
knew about it by chance (an email was forward to him), had criticized the practice of 
excluding ordinary members from the segregated list. Indeed, a leader (RebeaO 1.08) 
agrees that many ordinary members do not know about Rebea’s governance structures. 
For her, it is difficult to inform newcomers about community procedures. Also in Repea, 
leaders admit that ordinary members do not necessarily know about the management 
group (Repea02.10; Repea08.17/18/19; Repeal 1.06/07). Furthermore, in Remtea, the 
citations related to this tactic are made by two ordinary members, who ignore the fact that 
decisions are not made on the general list, by all members.
Other three tactics in this group are related to blurring the rules when they use the word 
consensus in a specific way that does not correspond to its common-sense meaning (see
4 Note that the ambiguity of rules is also related to tactic 4C-1A, but there the objective is to cover the 
process to join the management group, which is more related to the carrier power systems. In this topic, the 
rules are blurred in order to cover the fact that some members have more power than others, with 
consequent results in terms of segregation of decision making.
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also table 5Y, section 5.1). In these communities, some call consensus the agreement o f a 
few members (tactic 3C-1B). More precisely, communities centralize the process of 
defining the consensus (or closing the discussion) in the leadership group (tactic 3C-1C), 
also because they do not base decisions on numbers o f votes, but on the quality of 
arguments (tactic 3C-1D). In sum, the consensual decision is an interpretation provided 
by a few leadership members, which translate the interests of some based on arguments, 
as far as votes are not used to define agreements.
Explaining how the community chooses its representatives, for instance, 
Rebeal3.06/07/08 argues that the community does not structure the choice through 
voting, because it would mean reproducing either representative democracy, with 
elections, or the hierarchical culture of representation. For the respondent, the formation 
of consensus should consider the quality of arguments, not votes. RemteaOl.09, a 
leadership member, relates that in consensus formation, votes are counted in an 
‘imprecise way’ (sic), confirming that in general it is a leadership member who declares 
the final decision. More directly, Remtea06.19/20 defends the fact that the community 
does not count votes to decide issues, as the quality of arguments should be more relevant 
than the quantity of votes.
Complementarily, tactic 3C-2, ignore complaints against centralized structures, or 
questions related to accountability and transparency, supports hierarchical structures in 
an environment in which many members do not agree with the centralization of power5. 
For Rebeal0.03/04/05, the dynamic of the discussion list helps the leadership group to 
ignore the complaints, as the overload of information reduces the relevance of each 
message. Thus new messages induce people to forget about previous complaints.
5 As informed in subsection 5.2.3, some members question the legitimacy of leaders in having more power 
in decision-making processes. Citations: Rebea01.08; Rebea06.16; Rebea07.15; Rebeal4.17; Rebeal6.06; 
Repea08.03/17/18; Repea09.12; Remtea08.14/15; Remteal 1.05/08; Reasul01.08; Reasul05.13; Reasul: 
Reasul09.10; Reasul 10.17.
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Tactics 3C-1 and 3C-2 also support the standard operating procedures (carrier 7A-1), 
which are closely related to the hierarchical schemas (carrier 3A-1).
6.1.4. Regulative relational systems
The four communities recognize the influence of power systems (the influence of 
sponsors) in favouring the centralization of decision making (carrier 4A-1). In this 
investigation, however, the governance systems (carrier 4A-2) only relates to Remtea, as 
the community has a governance structure that is very close to the one of its main 
sponsor, an academic research group (GPEA/UFMT).
Table 6.7
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
4B-1
The sponsor has more 
power to define 
directions.
RebeaO 1.12/13 
Rebea02.14 
Rebea03.19 
Rebea05.09 
Rebea06.18 
Rebea07.18/19 
Rebeal 3.11 
Rebea 14.07/08 
/11/12
RemteaOl.30 
Remteal 1.15 
Reasul05.06
Repea02.12/23 
Repea08.15 
Repea09.07 
Repeal 0.06
RemteaOl.20 
Remtea02.05 
Remtea04.11 
Remtea06.02/29 
Remtea08.07/08 
Remteal 1.15
ReasulO 1.01
Reasul02.05
Reasul05.06
Reasul07.il/12
Reasul09.13
4B-2
Ordinary members are 
not interested in 
managing the 
community.
RebeaOl.09/25
Rebea03.17
Rebea06.07
Rebea07.23
Rebeal 3.08
ReasulO 1.08/16
Reasul05.03
RepeaO 1.05/16
Repea02.02/18
Repea03.08/10/12
Repea04.12/13
Repea07.03
Repea08.03
Repeal 1.05/20
Remtea02.10
Remtea06.01/05/
Remtea08.14
ReasulO 1.08 
Reasul04.08 
Reasul05.03 
Reasul09.04
4B-3
Some members 
concentrate decision­
making processes 
because they are more 
active and committed 
than others.
RebeaOl.04/05 
/17/25 
Rebea02.07 
Rebea03.22 
Rebea05.05 
Rebea06.16/20 
Rebea07.04/12 
/17/20 
Rebeal 0.10 
Rebeal 2.05 
Rebeal 4.20 
RemteaOl.33 
Remteal 1.07
RepeaOl.15/21 
Repea02.03/16 
Repea03.10 
Repea04.12 
Repea06.13 
Repea07.04/06 
Repea08.18 
Repeal 0.02/05/07 
Repeal 1.02/15/19
RemteaOl.04
Remtea02.02/15
Remtea04.13
Remtea05.03
Remtea06.14
Remtea07.11/12
/19
Remtea08.01/12 
Remteal 1.23 
Remteal 3.07 
Remteal4.04
ReasulO 1.05/26 
Reasul02.02/06/07 
Reasul03.02/03 
Reasul04.06 
Reasul07.13/15/16 
Reasul08.06/07 
Reasul09.04/06 
/09/11
Reasul 10.02/10 
Reasull 1.02/04/11 
Reasul 12.07 
Reasul 13.02
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There is an understanding in the four communities that the sponsor has more power to 
define directions (4B-1). An excellent example of this power is the elaboration of the so 
called EA.Net (an Internet television channel which is focused on environment 
education). This channel was negotiated between the federal government and Rebea’s 
executive secretary. Other Rebea members, including those that are in the management 
group, were not informed beforehand about the project (Rebea03.19). The government 
imposed this condition of keeping the conversations restricted to a small group of 
members (Rebea05.07/08).
This argument 4B-1 naturally undermines the idea of creating a network organization as 
it assumes that some members have more influence than others. It could be otherwise. As 
explained by Rebea02.14, the problem is not receiving money from the government, but 
analyzing whether the communities keep their autonomy when deciding how to use the 
funding. Observing their practices, some members fear that the government funding has 
been exchanged for political support6, and that one cannot separate what is public from 
what is private when the government is sponsoring community projects 
(Rebeal4.07/08/12).
The other two arguments -  that ordinary members are not interested in managing the 
community (4B-2), and that some members concentrate decision-making processes 
because they are more active and committed than others (4B-3) -  have the objective of 
legitimising leadership members as those that are interested in managing and those that 
are more active. For Repea02.18, ordinary members are concerned with receiving 
information, not with organizing community events. Reasul 11.02 and Reasul09.09 defend 
the centralization of power to the main leader, because he is more active than others. 
These two arguments (4B-2 and 4B-3), nonetheless, do not contradict the possibility of 
having a network organization, as they only suppose some members prefer omitting 
themselves from participating, and some prefer doing otherwise.
6 Citations: Rebea07.18/19; Repea02.23; Remtea04.11; Reasul05.06.
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Table 6.8
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
4C-1
Create obstacles for ordinary 
members joining the 
management group (and the 
respective segregated 
discussion list).
RebeaO 1.10/17 
/24
Rebea03.15
Rebea04.04/10
Rebea05.06/18
Rebea06.07/09
/10
Rebea07.04/06 
/20/22 
Rebea09.15 
Rebeal0.09/12 
/15
Rebeal 1.10 
Rebeal 3.06 
Rebeal4.16/18 
Rebeal6.05 
Remteal 1.20 
Reasul 10.12
RepeaO 1.06/13 
/15/18/21 
Repea02.03 
Repea02.15/18 
Repea03.08/10 
/12/13
Repea04.08/12
/24
Repea06.06
Repea07.03/06
/09
Repea08.03/04
/07/13/18/23
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Repeal 0.05/07 
Repeal 1.05/06 
/15
RemteaOl.01/04 
/05/06/07/18 
Remtea02.05/10 
/15
Remtea03.05 
Remtea04.01/03 
Remtea05.05/08 
Remtea06.01/10 
/13/17/20 
Remtea08.12/19 
RemtealO.l 1/13 
/14/24 
Remteal 4.11 
Remtea 15.04
Reasul07.15 
Reasul09.12 
Reasul 10.17 
Reasul 12.13 
ReasulO.12
4C-1A
Keep unclear rules about the 
criteria for accepting members 
in the management group.
Rebeal 0.09/12 
/15
Rebea05.13/14 
Rebeal 4.18
Repea03.12 
Repea08.07/ 
/18/23
RemteaOl.04 
Remtea08.19
Reasul07.15 
Reasul09.12 
Reasul 10.17 
ReasulO.12
4C-1B
Keep some debates only 
among your peers in the 
management group.
RebeaO 1.10 
Rebea03.15 
Rebea05.06 
Rebea06.07/09 
Rebea07.20 
Rebea09.15 
Rebeal 1.10 
Rebeal 4.16 
Rebeal 6.05
RepeaOl.13/15
Repea02.15
Repea04.08
Repea06.06
Repea07.03
Repea08.04/07
/24
Repeal 1.05
RemteaOl.07
Remtea02.10
Remtea03.05
Remtea04.03
Remtea05.08
Remtea06.01/02
10/13
Remtea08.12 
RemtealO.l 1/14 
Remteal 4.11 
Remtea 15.04
This tactic is 
present in this 
community as 
ordinary 
members only 
receive a news 
bulletin, being 
excluded from 
decision 
making.
4C-1C
Require members to attend 
face-to-face meetings to 
participate in the management 
group and decision-making 
processes.
[Not cited] RepeaO 1.06 
Repea02.03 
Repea03.10 
Repea08.13 
Repeal 1.06
RemteaOl.06/18
Remtea02.05
Remtea04.01
Remtea05.05
Remtea06.13
Remtea08.19
Remteal 0.13/24
[Not cited]
4C-1D
Undermine the legitimacy of 
ordinary members as potential 
leaders. Such as: (A) accuse 
them of having opportunistic 
behaviour; (B) judge that some 
do not have enough knowledge 
to represent the community or 
publish on the website; (C) 
infer that members are not 
active enough to contribute to 
the management group; and 
(D) argue that some ignore the 
history of the community.
RebeaO 1.17d 
Rebea04.04a 
Rebea05.18a 
Rebea06.10a 
Rebea07.04/06d 
Rebea07.22b 
Rebeal 0.12c 
Rebeal 3.06b 
Rebeal4.18b 
RemteaOl.24a 
Remteal 1.20a 
Reasul 10.12d
RepeaO 1.18/2 lb
RepeaO 1.15c
Repea02.18c
Repea02.03d
Repea03.08/10
/13c
Repea03.12d 
Repea04.24b 
Repea04.12c 
Repea07.09b 
Repea07.06c 
Repeal 0.07b 
Repeal 0.05c 
Repea08.03c 
Repea08.18d 
Repeal 1.15c
RemteaOl.05/24 
/25a
RemteaOl.04 
/06c
RemteaOl.04/06d
Remtea02.15c
Remtea02.05d
Remtea06.20b
Remtea06.17c
Reasul 12.13d
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4C-2
Avoid conflict with and 
criticisms of sponsors and 
people in strategic positions in 
the government, universities 
and important NGOs, in order 
to not close doors for future 
opportunities.
RebeaOl.18/19/ 
20
Rebea02.13/23 
Rebea07.02/03 
/10/19
Rebea08.11/16 
Rebeal 4.06/12 
Rebea 16.19 
Rebea 17.14 
Repea02.23 
Reasul05.06 
Reasul 14.08
RepeaO 1.23/26 
Repea02.12/21 
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Repea06.10 
Repea08.11/27
Remtea02.16/21
Remtea04.04/
05/06/11
Remtea06.28
Remtea07.21
Reasul05.09
/10
Reasul07.05 
/10/11/12 
Reasul 14.08
4C-3
Exclude from debate within 
the management group those 
that do not agree with the 
leadership orientation.
RebeaOl.14/16 
Rebea02.il/12 
Rebea04.03/04 
/07
RebeaO.14/15 
RepeaO 1.25 
Repea02.21
[not cited] [not cited] [not cited]
All tactics in group 4C-1 have the objective of creating obstacles for ordinary members 
joining the management group (and the respective segregated discussion list). The 
obstacles are diverse: from requiring people attend face-to-face meetings to undermining 
‘others’ as leaders. These tactics are also efficient because the leadership group controls 
which members join their stratum.
Few members cited tactic 4C-1A7, keep unclear rules about the criteria for accepting 
members in the management group, but still it brings interesting examples of how blurred 
rules create obstacles to the emergence of new leaders from the general discussion lists. 
Rebeal0.12/15, for instance, criticizes a situation in which it was not clear why the 
management group had not accepted a member who asked to join the segregated 
discussion list. For him, in not stating clearly the rules, people do not have arguments to 
base any complaint upon.
The same respondent relates another case in which a member suggested the formation of 
a group to debate a relevant issue. Immediately, other members organized themselves to
7 Tactic 4C-1A is also related to tactic 3C-1 (subsection 6.1.3), of making governance rules blurred and 
ambiguous; and to tactic 6C-2 (subsection 6.1.6), of restricting the management group to those that share 
the same identity. As identity is an untangible attribute, requiring a member to share the same identity in 
order to join the management group equals to cultivate ambiguous rules.
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remove the discussion from the responsibility of this first member. The group was 
successful in the strategy: the person who suggested the debate was totally excluded from 
it. Again, a new leadership did not emerge, although the person had the intention of being 
more active (Rebeal0.09). A leadership member (Rebea05.13/14) confirms that the 
management group may assume the responsibility for projects that are proposed by other 
members. In practice, it implies blocking the emergence of new leaders.
In Remtea, a core leadership is categorical that it is not any member that can join the 
segregated discussion list, although this respondent does not clarify the criteria for 
accepting a person in this group (RemteaOl.04). Indeed, leadership members suggest that 
those who are related to the academic research group have greater probability of joining 
the management group than others8. In Repea, representatives of the government at 
federal and State levels were included in the management group, to discuss community 
projects (Repea08.07). This respondent, a leader, was not able to explain which criteria 
were used to include these government officials.
Continuing with tactic 4C-1 A, Reasul appears to be the most open management group, as 
anyone can ask to join it. Still, there are ambiguities. For instance, the leadership group 
has to approve any new member and the criteria for being accepted are not clear 
(Reasul 13.12). Furthermore, a member links acceptance in the management group with 
some principles that are shared by the group, implying that the group has rules related to 
its values (Reasul07.15).
Another interesting case related to Reasul’s management group is that a leadership 
member admits that in a specific funding project (not the one related to the FNMA, cited 
in the carrier legislation) only a few management members were invited to participate in 
the discussion (Reasul09.12). The respondent explains that this project was small, thus 
the management members who had organized themselves to ask funding understood that 
the project should involve only those who would receive money, rather than all 
management members. This example is illustrative that within the management groups
8 Citations: Remtea02.21; Remtea04.02; Remtea06.02; Remtea07.01; Remtea08.09.
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some members centralize decisions. Power is not distributed evenly among management 
members, thus the possibility of participating in the management group may not 
necessarily mean participation in decision making, thus keeping blurred the meaning of 
participating in these groups. Indeed Reasul03.02 and Reasull2.12/13 clarify that in the 
management group older members have more legitimacy than younger ones.
Tactic 4C-1B, keep some debates only among your peers in the management group, is 
interesting because the segregation of specific debates means that ordinary members do 
not know about some relevant issues that the community is discussing. As well 
summarized by Rebea03.15 (an ordinary member), participants can only imagine what 
the management group is discussing on the segregated list, as they do not share this 
debate with the general list. In Remtea and Repea, for instance, issues related to funding 
and government meetings are kept on the segregated discussion list, say management 
members9. In Reasul it is clearly defined that ordinary members do not participate in 
management discussions, thus this practice is explicit.
Tactic 4C-1C, require members to attend face-to-face meetings to participate in the 
management group and decision-making processes, is common to Repea and Remtea. In 
both communities, the management groups can easily meet in the respective capitals of 
their States (Sao Paulo and Cuiaba). Indeed, the great majority of their meetings are in 
these cities. In both cases, this tactic excludes participants who live in other cities, 
because they would need to pay the cost of transport and lodging. Most people do not 
have the resources for that. Thus those members who have the resources to attend face-to- 
face meetings are more powerful in the community. It means that the sponsors again have 
indirect power in the community structure, as they sponsor some participants and not 
others. This is the case, for instance, when the federal government organizes a meeting 
and invites some specific representatives from these communities10.
9 Citations: Repea08.04; Remtea02.10; Remtea06.02.
10 Citations: RebeaOl.10; Rebea05.06; Remtea01.30; Remtea08.14.
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Tactic 4C-1D, undermine the legitimacy o f ordinary members as potential leaders, in 
practice, reduces the chances of ordinary members joining the management group. When 
discussing the segregation between leaders and ordinary members, some respondents 
argue, for instance, that ordinary members who have tried to represent the community in 
events or courses displayed an opportunistic behaviour. Other related arguments are that 
ordinary members do not have enough knowledge, or they are not active enough, or they 
do not know the history of the community, thus they cannot try to be community leaders. 
As expressed by Rebea07.04, new members do not know the community history. For 
RemteaOl.24/25 also, leadership members have been together for a long time, are more 
sensible, and do not act in an opportunistic way. These arguments work because 
communities do not have clear rules for renewing leadership, and management groups 
have the last say in accepting new members in their strata.
Tactic 4C-2, avoid conflict with and criticisms o f sponsors and people in strategic 
positions in the government, universities and important NGOs, is somehow obvious, and 
reinforces the legitimacy of powerful people in the community, in relation to decision­
making processes. Some members go a step further, trying to please these more powerful 
people. For instance, for RebeaO 1.18/19, many conflicts do not emerge in the studied 
communities because of the strong presence of academics, who preserves their interests 
in the online discussions. In other words, as suggested by Remtea04.04/05/06, one should 
be prudent and avoid conflict with an academic supervisor on the discussion lists. Also 
Rebea08.il/16 argues that the membership in these environmental-education 
communities may improve the social networks and the opportunities to be employed or to 
do a masters or a Ph.D. in the field. Thus members avoid conflict with powerful social 
structures, concludes the respondent. Remtea02.16/21 goes in the same direction, 
commenting more specifically that many are in this community in order to create social 
ties with the main academic leadership.
Tactic 4C-3, exclude from debate within the management group those that do not agree 
with the leadership orientation, is quite straightforward in power disputes (ostracism), but 
curiously here it only appears in relation to Rebea. In this case, respondents affirm that
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the leadership group has two practices for isolating other management members from 
debates: (i) excluding people from the segregated discussion list without previous 
communication; and (ii) excluding people from face-to-face meetings (the person is no 
longer invited, although he or she formally keeps a position in the management group and 
on the segregated discussion list). The tactic 4C-3 does not mean expulsion from the 
community, only from the leadership group or from certain debates within the 
management group, which is a form of keeping decisions among peers.
6.1.5. Normative relational systems
Two carriers in the category normative relational systems were identified by the four 
communities, both related to authority systems. Members assume that status in society 
(5A-1) and the government influence (5A-2) affects the legitimacy members have in the 
community, thus favouring the centralization of decision making.
Table 6.9
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
5B-1
Some people have more 
authority in the 
environmental education 
field, justifying that they 
have greater legitimacy in 
the community.
RebeaO 1.04 
Rebea05.13/19 
Rebea06.27 
Rebea07.10 
Rebea08.14 
Rebea09.14 
Rebeal3.01 
Rebeal 4.02/04 
/18
Repea07.04/05 
/07/12 
Repea09.09 
RepealO.l 1/12 
Repeal 1.17/19
RemteaOl.04/15 
Remtea02.02/07 
/21/24
Remtea04.06 
Remtea06.15/20 
Remteal 0.05/26 
Remteal 1.22
ReasulO 1.21 
Reasul05.08 
Reasul07.02/07 
/17
Reasul08.10 
Reasul 10.05 
Reasul 15.04
5B-2
Older members have created 
the community (or worked 
more), thus they have more 
legitimacy to make 
decisions.
Rebea05.18/19 
Rebea06.07 
Rebea07.04/09 
/12
Rebeal 1.08/12 
/13
RemteaOl.32
Repea03.12 
Repea04.10 
Repea08.03/05 
/11/19/20 
Repeal 0.06 
RepealO.l 1/12 
Repeal 1.17
RemteaOl.04/10 
Remtea02.02/07 
/15
Remtea05.03 
Remtea06.14 
Remtea07.13 
Remteal 0.26 
Remteal 3.02/07 
Remteal4.04
Reasul03.06 
Reasul06.05 
Reasul07.13 
Reasul 12.09/13
Arguments 5B-1 -  some people have more authority in the environmental education field, 
justifying that they have greater legitimacy in the community — and 5B-2 — older members
168
have created the community (or worked more), thus they have more legitimacy to make 
decisions -  work in the same direction of justifying the centralization of decision making 
in the leadership group. Greater respect is directed to known academics (especially those 
that have influenced the field through their publications). Both arguments undermine the 
network model, as they work against the idea of equal distribution of power among 
members (see table 5X).
Rebea05.13/18 synthesises both arguments, defending the fact that the older members 
who created Rebea have authority to be on the segregated lists because they have 
knowledge about the field. For one main leader, the management group is a ‘historical 
construction’ (sic), which has legitimacy for its greater power in the governance 
structures (Rebea07.04/12). Also for Repea08.19/20, a younger member in the 
community does not have credibility to question the existence of a management group 
that has been working there for a long time. And Reasul07.02/07 recalls the need to 
respect those who have knowledge about the field, suggesting that status outside the 
community should be respected inside the community as well.
Table 6.10
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
5C-1
Organize leadership 
peers to give support 
to each other on the 
general discussion 
list, legitimising 
your common ideas. 
Articulate 
agreements in 
private discussions 
(online and offline) 
(5C-1A).
Form a group of 
peers and supporters 
to back leadership 
group proposals (5C- 
IB).
5C-1A
RebeaO 1.23 
Rebea04.03/04
no
Rebea05.03/18
Rebea07.03
Rebea08.10
Repea06.13
Reasul05.13/14
5C-1B
RebeaO 1.18/19 
Rebea09.14 
Rebeal 0.09 
Reasul 10.12
[not cited] RemteaOl.05/06
/07/24/25
Remtea02.15/19
Remtea06.02/10
/27
Remtea07.18
Remtea08.12/13
RemteaOl.05
Remtea02.07/19
Remtea04.02
Remtea06.07
Remtea07.20
Remtea08.19
Remteal 1.22
In Reasul, the general 
discussion list only 
channels news 
bulletins. Thus this 
tactic is not related to 
this context.
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5C-2
Flame members who 
do not agree with the 
leadership 
orientation.
Rebea03.04/05 
/06/07/08 
Rebea04.04/05 
/09/10 
Rebea07.05 
Rebeal 0.15
Repea04.06 
Repeal 0.10/11 
/12
RemteaOl. 10/13 
/28
Remtea02.13 
Remtea04.10 
Remtea06.14/15 
/16/23
Reasul02.14
Reasul07.03
5C-3
Set the agenda, 
occupying the 
discussion list with 
the themes the 
leadership considers 
relevant.
RebeaO 1.25 
Rebea03.13 
Rebea04.06 
Rebea06.12 
Rebea07.15 
Rebea08.11 
Rebeal 0.07/09 
Rebeal3.20 
Rebeal 4.02/11
RepeaO 1.03
Repea08.06/07
/09
Repeal 1.19
RemteaOl. 10 
Remtea02.21 
Remtea04.08/10 
Remtea06.06/10 
Remteal 0.05
Reasul02.09
Reasul05.08
Reasul07.07
Reasul08.10
5C-4
Ignore the 
contributions and 
opinions of 
members.
Rebea03.04/07 
Rebea04.09 
Rebeal0.09/15 
Rebeal3.13 
Repea02.21
RepeaO 1.25 
Repea08.01/28 
/29
Remtea06.14 Reasul07.07 
Reasul 15.04
5C-5
Keep silent for not 
having legitimate 
knowledge.
Rebea03.03/04 
/06/12 
Rebea06.27 
Rebea07.10 
Rebea08.14 
Rebea09.14 
Rebeal 1.04 
Rebeal 4.04 
Remteal 1.16
Repea08.01 
Repeal 1.20
RemteaOl. 15 
Remtea02.08/09 
Remtea04.04/05 
/06/08/09 
Remtea07.09 
Remtea08.09 
Remteal 0.06 
Remteal 1.16
ReasulO 1.27
Reasul02.09/12
Reasul03.04
Reasul04.03
Reasul05.11
Reasul06.01
Reasul07.02
Reasul 10.05/20
Reasull4.11
Tactic 5C-1, organize leadership peers to give support to each other on the general 
discussion list, helps to reinforce the legitimacy of some groups in segregated decision 
making. This tactic, cited by Rebea’s and Remtea’s members, is really divided in two. 
The first (5C-1A) is related to articulating agreements in private discussions (through the 
segregated discussion list or personal emails) before presenting them to the whole 
community. In this process, leadership members make agreements in private, and then 
present these arrangements as suggestions (not decisions) to the general list, making sure 
the peers (who have participated in the private agreement) will support the proposal 
straightforwardly in front of others (as spontaneous contributions).
This tactic is based on the idea that other members will not organize themselves in time 
to change the previous agreement. Through this procedure, these leadership members try
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to legitimise the decision as being a democratic, collective outcome of the discussion on 
the general list. In simulating an improvised debate, the leadership members try to silence 
other voices through the strength of their legitimacy. Other members would feel less 
prone to oppose their opinions after observing that a suggestion has received support 
from other leadership members, explains Rebea04.03/04. Rebea05.18, a leader, admits 
that making private agreements is a common practice among some leadership peers.
In practice, if the desirable agreement is not confirmed by the collective, the leaders may 
fall back on their authority to decide. Respondents related three situations in which the 
management groups in Remtea and Rebea recalled the discussion from the general lists to 
the segregated lists because ordinary members did not agree with the leadership’s 
suggestions11. In the three cases, the communities should have chosen representatives to 
go to events. Theoretically, the ordinary members would decide, but in practice the 
leadership members had some preferred names, which they had suggested, but the 
general lists did not accept. On two occasions, Remtea’s leadership members simply 
closed the discussion, deciding that the member they indicated would go. On another 
occasion, Rebea was not represented in the event as leaders and ordinary members were 
not able to achieve an agreement.
The second tactic in this group (5C-1B) is related to forming a group o f peers and 
supporters to back leadership group proposals. For instance, an academic in the 
management group can invite his or her students to join the segregated list. This clearly 
occurs in Remtea, in which the management group is mainly composed of students from 
an academic research programme. For RebeaO 1.18/19, it is evident that some academics 
ask their students to become members, which affects the power balance in the 
communities, as the students simply support these academics. In this case, the tactic may 
work in two fronts: backing the leadership within the management group (when the 
supporters join this segregated collectivity) and within the general list.
11 Citations: RemteaOl.05/06/24/25; Remtea02.15; Remtea08.12/13; Rebea01.23; Rebea07.03.
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Tactic 5C-2, flame12 members who do not agree with the leadership orientation, is very
t ^
common on many discussion lists . The idea here is to reduce the legitimacy of members 
who do not agree with the mainstream discourse. As clearly explained by 
Remtea06.14/15 (a leader), if a member say ‘stupidities’ (sic) against the mainstream 
ideology, he or she will be flamed. Rebea04.09 relates that sometimes the criticisms are 
very intense, and a college teacher, for instance, may feel ‘stupid’ (sic) in front of others 
when criticized by an academic. The flaming also may be subtle but offensive, such as 
through making questions that the person in not able to answer (RemteaOl.28), or asking 
his or her educational level: ‘Do you have a masters?’(Rebea04.04/10); “Have you read 
this book?’ (Reasul07.03).
A leader (Rebea07.05) judges that in some circumstances it is necessary to attack 
members to enforce behaviour. In this specific example, this leader supported a flaming 
process of an ordinary member who accused leaders of choosing in private the member 
who should go to an event (it was one of the cases related in tactic 5C-1A). The flaming 
was used in this case to discourage the criticism against leadership behaviour. 
Commenting on the power of flaming, RepealO.l 0/11/12 explains that if nobody defends 
the attacked members, they will feel that the community as a whole is behind the attack. 
The result is that people fear being flamed (Rebea03.04/05/08).
The tactic offlaming (5C-2 in the table above and 6C-3 in table 6.12) in this investigation 
is related to the both carriers: authority systems (5A-1 and 5A-2) and identities (6A-1). 
The citations are listed in the table above, but the same citations are valid for the twin 
tactic 6C-3. Respondents associated the flaming with aggressions against members in two 
situations: when they express either a kind of knowledge, or beliefs and values, which are 
not legitimised by the leadership14. In the first case, legitimate knowledge is questioned; 
in the second case, legitimate identity. The problem is that it is not always clear what is
12 Slang in Internet-mediated communities, which means to insult or criticize members aggressively.
13 This is the same tactic referred as 6C-3 in table 6.12.
14 Ordinary members may also flame, but here the focus is on the tactic of flaming for the reason of 
reproducing authority systems and identities.
172
being attacked. For instance, Rebea03.04/05 stated that some people are flamed because 
of their ‘divergent opinions’ and ‘lack of understanding about issues’ (sic). 
Rebea04.04/09/10 relates the flaming to divergences in ‘opinions’ and ‘type of 
knowledge’ (the empirical knowledge of social activists versus the academic knowledge). 
For this reason, I kept the citations of flaming together, as the tactic is the same, and it is 
used in different circumstances, sometimes in blurred ways.
Tactic 5C-3, set the agenda, occupying the discussion list with the themes the leadership 
considers relevant, helps the leadership members to legitimise themselves as being those 
who conduct the relevant debates. It is also a way of keeping the debates centred on 
specific themes. Sometimes this tactic consists of changing the topic in debates, when 
previous ones are not convenient for the leadership group. As argued by Reasul05.08, 
some people are empowered because they are always manifesting themselves on the 
discussion list. Again this legitimacy favours the centralization of decision making.
Tactic 5C-4, ignore the contributions and opinions o f members, is applied mainly against 
ordinary members who do not have status in the field or do not agree with the mainstream 
ideas. Talking about her experience, respondent Repea08.28/29 explains she used to send 
messages, but that nobody answered, which reduced her motivation to contribute. She 
understands that this is a way of saying that one is not important in comparison to other 
members, mainly the academics.
Tactic 5C-5, keep silent for not having legitimate knowledge, is adopted by members who 
do not feel legitimate or comfortable with giving their opinion publicly. Respondents also 
associate this tactic with the fear of making mistakes. In keeping silent, members 
somehow reinforce the legitimacy of some leadership members, which often participate 
in the discussions. As explained by Remtea04.04/05/06, if a main leadership member 
gives an opinion, the debate finishes, as other members, even within the management 
group, would avoid arguing with a legitimate voice. Also Rebea03.12 reports that so 
many people do not want to manifest themselves on the discussion lists, concluding that 
many members may be afraid of expressing their opinion as the discussions are very
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academic. For this respondent (Rebea03.03/04/06), the discussion list is not a space of 
dialogue, but a space in which the academics talk, and the others listen.
6.1.6. Cultural-cognitive relational systems
Communities’ leadership members share similar history, values and ideas with other 
leaderships in the government and universities. In the adopted framework, this situation is 
related to identities (carrier 6A-1). This common identity leverages the influence of 
power systems in the community, as well as segregates non-peers from decision making 
processes.
Table 6.11
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
6B-1
People are the same inside and 
outside the community: they carry 
their identities (as well as the 
conflicts inherent to their identities).
RebeaOl.Ol
Rebea02.12
Repea01.26 
Repea04.03 
Repeal 1.21
Remtea01.13 
Remtea02.13/25 
Remtea04.02 
Remtea06.06 
Remtea07.01/21
Reasul05.09 
Reasul07.03 
Reasul08.10 
Reasul 12.17
Argument 6B-1 is the simple recognition that people keep their identities in different 
environments: people are the same inside and outside the community. It ponders the 
statement that everybody can express themselves in a network organization (as suggested 
by some members, see table 5X), reintroducing the commonsense idea that society works 
in simultaneous layers. Thus members cannot avoid their identity, especially because 
these communities are not anonymous and people know each other and work in the same 
field. The same argument may be related to jobs and roles (carrier 8A-1).
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Table 6.12
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
6C-1
Create ambiguous categories 
of membership, reinforcing 
the identity of leadership 
members in relation to 
ordinary ones.
RebeaOl.08/27 
Rebea05.14 
Rebea06.16/17 
/20/26 
Rebea09.15 
Rebeal6.05 
Remtea01.27 
Remteal 1.07
Repea01.21 
Repea02.04 
Repea03.0110 
Repea04.12/24 
Repea08.03/19 
Repeal 0.07
RemteaO 1.04/05 
Remtea02.09/11 
/13/15
Remtea03.04/05
Remtea04.02
Remtea06.02
/06/07/08/13
Remtea07.01
Remtea08.06/18
Remteal 0.06
Remteal3.01
/03/04/05/06/09
Remteal4.04/08
/09
Reasul01.08/12
/13
Reasul02.03 
Reasul04.05 
Reasul07.01/15 
Reasul08.06/07 
Reasul09.04/17 
Reasul 10.12 
Reasul 11.08 
Reasul 15.05
6C-2
Restrict the management 
group to those that share the 
same identity.
Rebea03.22 
Rebea05.14 
Rebea06.08/ 
16//20/26 
Rebeal4.16/17 
Remtea01/32 
Remteal 1.07 
Reasul 10.11
Repea01.21
Repea02.03
Repea03.01/10
Repea04.03/12
/24
Repea08.03/07 
/19
Repeal 0.07
RemteaO 1.04/05
Remtea02.09/
15/20
Remtea03.04/05 
Remtea06.07 
Remtea08.19 
Remteal 0.19 
Remteal4.04
Reasul07.15
Reasul08.05
/06/08/10/
/11/12 
Reasull2.14
6C-3
Flame members (see 5C-2).
6C-4
Expel members who do not 
agree with the mainstream 
identity.
[not cited] [not cited] RemteaO 1.10/13 
Remtea02.12/13 
Remtea04.03 
Remtea06.13 
Remtea07.05/06 
Remtea08.04 
Remteal4.10 
Remteal 5.02/04
[not cited]
6C-5
Keep silent for disagreeing 
with the mainstream 
identity.
Rebea08.13/14 
Rebea09.14 
Rebeal7.08 
Reasul 14.11
Repea02.21 
Repea08.19 
Repeal 0.09/11
RemteaO 1.15/16 
Remtea03.04/05 
Remtea04.06/08 
/09
Remtea07.09/21
Reasul01.27 
Reasul05.07/11 
Reasul 14.11
Tactic 6C-1, create ambiguous categories o f membership, reinforcing the identity of 
leadership members in relation to ordinary ones, helps leaders to restrict access to the 
management group. This differentiation of membership has appeared in some answers 
when the respondent was explaining the existence of a management group and the related 
segregated discussion list.
For instance, leadership members argue that participants who do not have a sense of 
belonging and do not promote the principles of a network organization are not really
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‘members’ (Rebea06.16/17). These people, nonetheless, have been accepted as members 
on the discussion lists and they have not been asked to prove their sense of belonging and 
their commitment to the network principles to become members.
In this attempt to create ambiguous membership categories, some respondents argue that 
being a participant on the general discussion list does not mean being a community 
member15. This argument undermines the membership status of all those on the general 
discussion lists, without clarifying the meaning of being a member. Another example 
comes from the different definitions of membership by Reasul01.13 and Reasul02.03. 
Although both are core leaders in the community, the first says that members are only 
those that are in the management group, and the second argues that members are anyone, 
including those that only receive news bulletins. If one does not know who is a member, 
one cannot complain that members are excluded from decision making. This tactic thus is 
also associated with tactics in group 3C-1, of blurring governance rules as a way of 
covering the presence of hierarchical schemas.
Tactic 6C-2, restrict the management group to those that share the same identity, is also 
common in the four communities. For instance, leaders argue they restrict the group to 
those that are committed (the management group decides who is in this category)16. 
Commenting on the segregation of decision-making processes, Rebea06.20 reports that 
people in the leadership group share the same principles, and that she is not sure whether 
the ordinary members share these values. For Repea04.03, leaders need to keep the 
segregation of discussion lists because they do not know how to manage the diversity of 
interests, which has been created by the increasing number of members in the 
community.
15 Citations: Rebea05.14; Rebea06.20; Repea02.04; Remtea02.11; Remtea08.06/18; Remteal3.01/06/09; 
Reasul01.08; Reasul07.01; Reasul09.17; Reasul 10.12.
16 As cited in subsection 6.1.4, tactic 6C-2 is related to tactic 4C-1A of keeping unclear rules about the 
criteria fo r accepting members in the management group.
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Another interesting example is given by Reasul08.10/11. Relating to a case of a member 
who offered to help the management group, the respondent (a leader) was concerned that 
this participant does not follow the community mainstream concept of environmental 
education. This leader says that this member created a zone of discomfort, because he is 
offering to help, but he does not follow the mainstream philosophy. As the management 
group needed his help, leaders tried to change the way this member conceptualizes the 
field. In sum, the leadership members have make an effort to frame the way the new 
contributor will collaborate, in order to preserve the mainstream identity.
Tactic 6C-4, expel members who do not agree with the mainstream identity, occurred 
only in Remtea (at the time of the interviews), and it is an extreme example on how the 
community leadership could not accept strong opposition to their own identity on the 
general list. In this specific case, the problem of identity caused the expulsion, not other 
reasons (such as misbehaviour). Many members confirm that this member was expelled 
because he professes a different ideology (against the preservation of the environment, in 
accordance with the mainstream interpretation of the event), which disturbed the 
leadership members deeply to the point that they expelled the ‘outsider’17.
Tactic 6C-5, keep silent for disagreeing with the mainstream identity, affects members 
who do not feel the sense of belonging to the mainstream group (even within the 
management group, as there are divergences among leaders). Members exclude 
themselves from participating, avoiding being flamed or ostracised for not being aligned 
with the mainstream identity. As explained by Rebea08.13, ordinary members do not 
participate because they know they cannot really join the group which controls the 
discussion list. The tactic offlaming (6C-3) can also leverage this kind of silence. There 
are other indirect ways, such as keeping questioning non-academic people as to why they 
do not do a masters or a Ph.D., complains Repea02.21. In reinforcing the identity of the 
mainstream group, others feel inadequate about expressing themselves. The language 
style, for instance, excludes some from debates in Remtea, as the majority of the
17 Citations: RemteaOl.lO, Remtea02.12, Remtea04.03, Remtea07.06, Remtea08.04, Remteal4.10, 
Remteal 5.04.
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1 $2leadership group are people from the academic environment, conclude respondents . 
There are similar complaints in Reasul as well (Reasul05.11).
6.1.7. Regulative routines
In the category of regulative routines, members of all communities identify the practice 
of centralizing decision-making processes in the leadership group, which in this 
investigation is related to standard operating procedures (carrier 7A-1) of hierarchical 
organizations (drawing upon Simon, 1997 [1945]).
Table 6.13
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
7B-1
The management group should 
make decisions.
Rebea02.08 
Rebea04.10 
Rebea06.09/13 
Rebea07.20 
Rebea08.07/11 
Rebea09.15/16 
Rebeal4.18 
Reasul 10.11
Repea04.09
Repea05.05
Repea06.13
Repea07.06
Repea08.04
RepealO.Ol
Repeal 1.04/10
Rebea08.07
RemteaO 1.07
Remtea02.09/10
/13/19
Remtea04.03 
Remtea08.04/12 
Remteal 0.14
Reasul04.10 
Reasul08.05 
Reasul 15.05
Discussing the segregation of decision making, respondents argue that the management 
group should make decisions (7B-1). Sometimes they do not offer further explanation of 
their argument19. Other times they say that the segregation brings greater managerial 
efficiency for the community20, with arguments, for instance, that management members 
are better prepared than others (Reasul 15.05; Rebeal4.18), and that management 
members know norms and procedures in discussing projects (Repea04.09). In a similar 
direction, respondents emphasise that management members know the previous 
agreements related to the community (Rebea02.08; Rebea06.09/13). Finally, others
18 Citations: Remtea03.04/05; Remtea04.08/09; Remtea07.09.
19 Citations: Rebea06.09; Repea08.04; Remtea04.03; Remtea08.04/12; Remteal0.14; Reasul08.05.
20 Citations: Rebea06.09/13; Rebea07.20; Rebea08.07/ll; Rebea09.16; Rebeal4.18; Repea04.09; 
Repea05.05; Repea06.13; Repea07.06; RepealO.Ol; Repeal 1.04/10; Reasull5.05.
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defend the segregated structure as a way of protecting ordinary members from 
disturbances related to polemical issues (Remtea02.10; Rebea04.10; Rebea09.15).
Table 6.14
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
7C-1
Keep a segregated 
discussion list for 
leadership members.
RebeaO 1.04/08
Rebea02.04
Rebea03.15/22
Rebea04.03/04
Rebea05.06
Rebea06.07/09/16
Rebea07.07
Rebea08.02/10
Rebea09.15
Rebea 13.08
Rebeal 4.02/18
Rebea 16.05
Remteal 1.04
Reasul01.08
RepeaOl.05/06/13
Repea02.02/10/15
Repea03.09
Repea04.07
Repea06.03
Repea07.02
Repea08.04
Repeal 1.05
RemteaO 1.04
Remtea02.04
Remtea04.03
Remtea06.02
Remtea07.18
Remtea08.02/04
Remteal 5.04
Reasul01.09/15 
Reasul02.03 
Reasul04.07/08 
Reasul08.05 
Reasul 10.07 
Reasul 15.05
7C-2
Keep control over 
community 
gatekeepers 
(moderators and 
facilitators).
RebeaO 1.07/08/21 
Rebea05.01/02 
Rebea06.28 
Rebea08.02 
Rebeal 4.21
RepeaOl.05/09/10 
Repea02.06 
Repea03.03/07 
Repea04.05 
Repeal 0.02
Remtea02.04 
Remtea04.03 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.04 
Remteal 0.08/19 
Remteal 4.07
Reasul01.14 
Reasul02.04 
Reasul07.04/05 
Reasul08.05
7C-3
Keep control over
community
representatives.
RebeaO 1.07/23 
Rebea03.19 
Rebea05.06/12 
Rebea06.07/11/13 
Rebea07.03/07 
Rebea09.02/11 
Rebeal 0.04/08 
Rebeal3.06 
Rebeal4.16 
RemteaO 1.24/33 
Remtea08.14 
Remteal 1.19
RepeaOl. 13/14 
Repea04.10 
Repea06.03/08 
Repeal 0.04/05 
Repeal 1.17
RemteaO 1.05/29
Remtea02.01/10
Remtea04.12/13
Remtea07.17
Remtea08.12/14/18
Remteal 0.18/20
Remteal4.04
Reasul01.23 
Reasul03.06 
Reasul04.09/10 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul06.04 
Reasul07.18 
Reasul 12.04 
Reasul 15.05
The tactics related to the standard operating procedures have the objective of reinforcing 
the segregation of decision-making processes. Tactic 7C-1, keep a segregated discussion 
list for leadership members, is a natural consequence of having segregated decision­
making processes, as the management group needs a specific communication channel.
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Tactic 7C-2, keep control over community gatekeepers, means that leadership members 
should sanction moderators and facilitators. These gatekeepers are not chosen by ordinary 
members. Furthermore, in the studied communities, moderators and facilitators are also 
part of the management group. Moderators enforce the netiquette (issues that may be 
discussed, and the kind of behaviour that is acceptable in Internet-mediated discussion) 
and solve conflicts. Facilitators motivate debate.
Furthermore, through tactic 7C-3, keep control over community representatives, the 
management group dominates the community interface with society, as leadership 
members choose who represents the collectivity. Usually, it is the executive secretary (or 
coordinator), or someone close to the core leadership group, who assumes this interface. 
As explained by Rebea 14.16, the leaders choose one member to represent the community 
among their peers, not including the whole community. In Remtea, for instance, the 
previous executive secretary, a core leadership member, chose the new one, 
recommendation that was accepted by other management members (RemteaO 1.29).
One example of the strength of the referred carrier and the associated tactics is an episode 
with Rebea, related to its community on Orkut21 (Google’s online social network). The 
community Rebea on Orkut was created in November 2004 by a person who was not 
formally a community member (at that time, although she was invited afterwards, when 
the ‘official’ Rebea discovered the existence of such an ‘independent’ branch on Orkut). 
This person had listened to a seminar, in which Rebea leaders proposed the ideals of a 
network organization, and, inspired by this speech, she created a community called Rebea 
in Orkut. She understood that she had enough sense of belonging to take the initiative of 
diffusing Rebea through other Internet-mediated spaces, although she was not formally a 
member.
Soon after Rebea’s management members starting to interact with this other community 
branch, the original social structure of Orkut was changed (see more on Orkut case in 
subsection 6.1.10). When Rebea’s executive secretary contacted Orkut moderators, she
21 Citations: Rebea01.07; Rebea05.02; Rebea06.11; Rebea07.25; Rebeal 1.10.
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suggested demanding previous approval of membership (copying the model on the 
discussion lists). This is a step in the centralization of decision making, as originally the 
community on Orkut was open to anyone without approval. The moderators on Orkut 
thus started to discuss the process and reasons for such a change in their open forums, in 
which all members may participate.
However, immediately after beginning this conversation, Rebea leaders transferred the 
debate to their private emails, including only a few Orkut moderators. In changing the 
channel, the majority of Orkut members were no longer able to follow the debate (nor 
were other Rebea members on the general or segregated discussion lists). Indeed, they did 
not participate in the final decision, which was to filter new members, as suggested by 
Rebea’s executive secretary.
This is an interesting case because the social structure of Rebea on Orkut was open, 
supposing the participation of all members in the debate, but this structure was 
substituted by the standard procedure of limiting decision-making processes to the 
leadership group, when the discussions migrated to private emails. Furthermore, the 
presence of a gatekeeper to decide who may be a member on Orkut is also an instance of 
centralization in decision making, as some members have the special status of 
gatekeepers, and other members are not consulted about the acceptance or rejection of 
new members.
6.1.8. Normative routines
Jobs and roles (carrier 8A-1) imply members behave in the community following the 
scripts related to their positions in society, which is an expected procedure considering 
that members are not anonymous in these communities. In function of jobs and roles, 
members may accept in the informal relations the same subordination they accept in the 
formal interactions, thus reinforcing the possibility of having centralized decision 
making.
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Table 6.15
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
8B-1
People fear losing their jobs or 
closing the door to future 
professional opportunities.
RebeaO 1.26 
Rebea03.25 
Rebeal 1.26
RepeaOl.03
/23/26
Repea02.20
Remtea02.21 
Remtea07.10/20 
Remtea08.15/16
Reasul07.10 
Reasul 13.08 
Reasul 14.12
8B-2
People have commitment with 
their current jobs.
Rebea02.12 
Rebea03.25 
Rebeal 3.02
RepeaOl .24/26 
Repea02.16 
Repeal 1.21
Remtea08.15/16 
Remteal 1.10
Reasul07.05
The arguments in this group try to explain that people cannot practice their opinions 
freely in the communities. In similar fashion of argument 6B-1 {people are the same 
inside and outside the community), the arguments 8B-1, that people fear losing their jobs 
or closing the door to future professional opportunities, and 8B-2, that people have 
commitment with their current jobs, recall the commonsense idea that people in Internet- 
mediated environments repeat their offline scripts, at least in this specific context in 
which members are not anonymous.
The most straightforward argument is that people fear losing their jobs (8B-1). For 
Rebeal 1.26, people constrain their arguments when in discussion with bosses and other 
people that they have professional interests, cultivating subordination. Or as explained by 
Rebea03.25, if one belongs to an institution, one should say what it is convenient to say. 
Others identify that some are indeed committed to their jobs (8B-2), thus it is a matter of 
identity and not simple coercion. For instance, government officials participate in the 
studied communities to distribute information and talk about their work (RepeaOl.03).
Table 6.16
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
8C-1
Keep in the community a 
posture which is adequate to 
the roles and jobs one has in 
society.
RebeaO 1.01/26 
Rebea02.12 
Rebea03.25 
Rebeal 3.02/04 
/05
Remteal 1.10
RepeaOl .02/03 
122/24
Repea02.16/20 
Repeal 1.21
Remtea02.21 
Remtea04.05 
Remtea07.10/20 
Remtea08.15/16 
Remteal 1.10 
Remtea 12.03
Reasul07.10 
Reasul 13.08 
Reasul 14.12
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Tactic 8C-1, keep in the community a posture which is adequate to the roles and jobs one 
has in society, is an obvious defence mechanism. For instance, in community 
interactions, members remain subordinated to their bosses, or to people who could be 
future bosses or employers.. Remtea08.15/16 gives the example that a student has more 
freedom of expression in the community than a government official. Sometimes, the 
convenience of keeping an adequate posture appears as silence, i.e. members avoid 
exposing their opinion in sensitive themes (Reasul 14.12).
6.1.9. Cultural-cognitive routines
Scripts (carrier 9A-1) imply that some titles such as executive secretary, coordinator, 
moderator and facilitator influence how members understand the role of those who 
occupy these positions in the community. The use of such titles reinforces the idea that 
some members are legitimate as leaders and decision-makers.
Table 6.17
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
9B-1
If a member has a role, this 
means something; otherwise 
there is no reason to give 
titles.
RebeaO 1.04 
Rebea02.09 
Rebeal 4.04 
Rebeal 1.14
RepeaOl. 13 
Repea08.04/11 
14/16
Repea09.06
Remtea02.15 
Remtea06.11 
Remtea04.07 
Remtea07.15 
Remtea08.05 
Remteal 0.08 
Remteal 3.04
R easulll.ll 
Reasul 13.01/05
Argument 9B-1 derives directly from the taken-for-granted character of scripts: if  a 
member has a role, this means something; otherwise there is no reason to give titles. This 
is simple and powerful, because in spite of saying that all members are equal, the 
community has distributed titles, which means that in practice members are not equal. 
The argument does not undermine the idea of a network organization. It only recognizes a 
given fact.
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Table 6.18
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
9C-1
Centralize the representation 
of the community in the 
executive secretary (or 
coordinator).
RebeaO 1.07
Rebea03.19
Rebea05.06
Rebea06.07/13
Rebea07.07
Rebea09.02
Rebeal3.13
Rebeal4.16
Remteal 1.19
RepeaOl.13/14
Repea03.12
Repea04.10
Repea05.03
Repea06.08
Repea07.07
Repea08.il/14
Repeal 0.04
Repeal 1.07/17
RemteaO 1.06 
Remtea02.05 
Remtea04.12 
Remtea06.27 
Remtea07.17 
Remtea 10.18 
Remteal4.03
Reasul01.24 
Reasul02.05 
Reasul03.06 
Reasul04.10 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul06.04 
Reasul07.18 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 12.04 
Reasul 13.02
9C-2
Reinforce respect for the 
role of executive secretary 
by blocking ordinary 
members from representing 
the community or taking 
decisions.
Rebea02.11 
Rebea03.22 
/23/24 
Rebea06.07 
Rebeal 4.16/18
RepeaOl.21 
Repea03.12 
Repea04.08
RemteaO 1.05 
/06/07
Remtea02.15
Remtea04.13
Remtea05.04
Remtea06.17
Remtea07.13/14
Remtea08.12
Remteal 3.02/03
[Not available]
9C-3
Respect the role of the 
executive secretary (or 
coordinator) and moderators.
RebeaOl.04/08
Rebea03.22
/23/24
Rebea05.01/02 
Rebea06.12 
Rebea09.02 
Rebeal 1.06 
/09/11 
Rebeal3.19 
Rebeal 4.20/21 
Rebeal 6.13 
Remteal 1.20
RepeaOl.09/10 
Repea02.06 
Repea03.03/06 
Repea04.05/17 
Repea06.08 
Repea08.08/09 
/14/22/30 
Repeal 0.04
Remtea02.06
07/12/15/24
Remtea03.03
Remtea04.06/14
Remtea06.il/18
Remtea07.11/15
Remtea08.05/13
Remteal 0.03/08
/09
Remteal 1.20 
Remteal3.13 
Remteal4.02/07
Reasul01.05
/09/26
Reasul02.02/07
/12
Reasul03.03 
Reasul04.07 
Reasul07.01 
/04/05 
Reasul09.09 
Reasul 10.10 
Reasul 11.11 
Reasul 12.07/09 
Reasull 3.01/02 
/05/11
The tactics in this category are related to how the management group and ordinary 
members act to legitimise those who are in positions such as an executive secretary and a 
moderator. Tactic 9C-1, centralize the representation o f the community in the executive 
secretary (or coordinator), reinforces the feeling that the scripts ‘executive secretary’ and 
‘coordinator’ mean something (thus it is also possible to link this tactic with societal and 
members ’ expectations, carriers 2A-1 and 2A-2).
Tactic 9C-2, reinforce respect for the role o f executive secretary by blocking ordinary 
members from representing the community or taking decisions, is more coercive.
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Rebea02.11, a former leadership member, relates that once she represented the 
community on her own decision, which created discomfort with the executive secretary, 
who questioned the respondent’s behaviour as not respecting her role. RemteaO 1.05, a 
leadership member, argues for instance against permitting a person who ‘nobody knows’ 
(sic) to represent the community.
Tactic 9C-3, respect the role o f the executive secretary (or coordinator) and moderators, 
cannot be ignored. In general, members respect the role of the executive secretary and 
moderators. Indeed, members legitimise the executive secretary, either when they keep a 
subordinated attitude in relation to his or her orientations (Rebea06.12; 
Rebeal 1.06/09/11), or when they simply fail to do otherwise22. As argued by 
Remteal 1.20, members can react against being represented by the executive secretary, 
representing the community without asking permission from anybody. But when one 
reports the representation to the executive secretary, one is legitimising her role as the 
community representative, completes the respondent.
The respondent Rebea03.22/23/24 (ordinary member), for instance, asked the executive 
secretary’s permission to start a new activity with other community members. She admits 
that considering the principles of a network organization, she should have asked the 
general list (all members), not the executive secretary. Furthermore, the executive 
secretary gave suggestions on how to manage the activity, and the respondent followed 
these suggestions straightforwardly, as her understanding was that they were in fact 
orders to be followed. Also when Rebea’s executive secretary approached the Rebea’s 
moderator on Orkut (see case in subsection 6.1.7), the moderator immediately offered to 
delegate all her powers to the executive secretary (although this has not been demanded). 
The moderator feared that something had been disrespected as the executive secretary 
had not been previously consulted about the community on Orkut (Rebea06.12; 
Rebeal 1.06).
22 Citations: Remtea02.06; Remtea07.11; Remteal0.08; Reasul01.05; Reasul02.07; Reasul03.03; 
Reasul09.09; and Reasul 10.10.
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6.1.10. Regulative artefacts
In this thesis, two objects complying with specifications are identified as carriers (10A-1) 
of centralized decision-making processes: websites and discussion lists. These tools have 
technical features which permit some members to appropriate the control of these 
channels, favouring centralization of decision making.
Table 6.19
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
10B-1
Members do not know how to use 
Internet tools, thus the difficulty of 
appropriating alternatives.
RebeaOl.05/07 
Rebea06.03 
Rebea07.10/11 
/24
Repea02.19
Repea04.26
Repea08.26
RemteaO 1.08 
Remtea06.19
Reasul01.18
Reasul02.01
Reasul05.16
When questioned why the community is not using other Internet applications, such as 
forums, Wiki, blogs and web-polls, respondents argue that members do not know how to 
use Internet tools, thus the difficulty o f appropriating alternatives (10B-1). For 
RebeaO 1.05/07, for instance, the discussion lists are not convenient for doing complex 
work, but it is not possible to adopt other tools because people lack digital literacy. 
Rebea06.03 adds that there is resistance to using Internet tools, such as forums, chats and 
web-polls. Rebea07.il/24 and Reasul01.18 relate that the communities tried forums, but 
members did not adhere to them. Repea02.19 also reports that the community tried to use 
chat-rooms, but they had fewer members in this online meeting than in face-to-face ones.
Curiously, nonetheless, in November 2004, Rebea was literally forced to adopt a new 
tool, the Orkut (see case in subsection 6.1.7). On that occasion, a person created a 
community on Orkut, in the name of Rebea. This Orkut community attracted many 
participants, most of whom were not members of Rebea’s discussion list (Rebea07.24). 
After this23, Rebea’s executive secretary has contacted the person who had created the 
community on Orkut, in order to formalize the link between both ‘Rebeas’ (the traditional
23 Respondents were not able to specify when the traditional Rebea contacted the Rebea community on 
Orkut. The first message from Rebea’s executive secretary on Orkut was posted in January 2005.
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one and the new one on Orkut). This case shows that there was a previous facility for 
Internet users to join Orkut, and that this facility was not appropriated by Rebea’s 
leadership before it became a given fact (at a certain moment, Rebea had more members 
on Orkut than on the general discussion list, says Rebea06.11).
It appears that argument 10B-1 has a level of rhetoric, even considering that in practice 
many people face e-literacy challenges. Observe for instance the reasoning of 
RemteaO 1.08, explaining why the community does not use web-polls to choose who goes 
to a course in the name of the collectivity, instead of the formation of consensus (as 
defined in tactics 3C-1B, 3C-1C and 3C-1D, subsection 6.1.3). The leader 
straightforwardly remembered that members do not use web-polls because they do not 
want to openly reveal their vote. I put two arguments to her during the interview. Firstly, 
anonymity is possible as web-polls can protect the identity of the voter. Secondly, the 
current process on the discussion lists is absolutely not anonymous, which effectively 
exposes one’s vote.
Questioned about her contradictory explanation, considering these two arguments, the 
respondent changed the answer, concluding that thus it is not necessary to use the 
suggested tool, as the current practice of consensus offers the same outcomes. Their 
practice of consensus, nonetheless, is not related to counting votes (see subsection 6.1.3), 
a feature that is embedded in web-polls. More directly, questioned also about the web- 
polls, Remtea06.19 (a leadership member) says first that members do not know how to 
use the tool, and second that the management group is not in favour of this application 
because they do not want to quantify votes.
The question about the appropriation of other tools aims to understand the reasons why 
the community has not added communication channels which could foster less 
centralized decision-making structures. It is not claimed here that the simple adoption of 
such alternatives would decentralize the decision-making processes. As discussed in 
subsection 5.2.11, the conventions about how to use the tool are as important as the tool 
itself. However, some tools are user friendly and designed to foster collaborative work as
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well as participation, as far as people can manifest themselves directly without any kind 
of moderation. For instance, web-polls would permit members to manifest their opinions 
anonymously through votes, without the moderation of a person who interprets the 
consensus. Blogs could give greater autonomy to members, who would also be 
accountable for the content that they publish. The point here is not to be exhaustive of the 
possibilities, but to explore why other tools, that are available for free on the Internet, 
have not been included in communities’ communication channels.
Table 6.20
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
10C-1
Avoid Internet tools (other 
than the discussion list and 
the website*) that would 
foster transparency, 
participation and less 
centralized decision-making 
processes.
* Exception for Rebea: Orkut
RebeaO1.07/20/21 
Rebea02.15 
Rebea06.03 
Rebea07.10/11 
/20/24 
Rebeal 1.04 
Rebeal 4.13/24 
Rebeal 6.18 
Rebeal 7.12/13
RepeaOl. 16/18/19 
Repea02.06/07/08 
Repea07.08 
Repea09.15/16
Remtea02.22 
RemteaO 1.08 
Remtea06.19
ReasulO 1.18
Tactic 10C-1, avoid Internet tools (other than the discussion list and the website) that 
would foster transparency, participation and less centralized decision-making processes, 
means that management groups give preference to channels that permit them to keep 
greater control on the community communication. For instance, Repea09.15/16 
recognizes that there are more collaborative Internet tools (Wiki, forums, e-leaming 
systems, web-polls, aggregated blogs etc.) which permit groups to create their own 
spaces, without the coordination of a group, which could empower ordinary members in 
relation to the leadership members. Indeed, some community leaders are knowledgeable 
about Internet tools. Furthermore, many members are concerned that other tools should 
be adopted by the communities24 (mainly in Rebea), but the adoption has not yet gained 
momentum.
24 Citations: Rebea01.20; Rebea02.05/15; Rebea03.19; Rebea05.07; Rebea06.03/19; Rebea07.10; 
Rebeal4.24; Rebeal6.09; Rebeal7.04/09; RepeaOl.16; Repea02.08; Repea08.26; Repea09.15/16; 
Remtea07.20; ReasulO 1.19/28.
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One exception in relation to this tactic is the adoption of Orkut by Rebea. As explained 
above (and in subsection 6.1.7), this adoption was not an initiative from Rebea’s 
leadership. Also, during the interviews, few members cited the case of Orkut, and most of 
them were not aware of the details either of how the Orkut had been customized (the 
rules of moderation and membership, for instance), or about the kind of content and 
functionalities that the space offers. In sum, the majority of respondents were not familiar 
with the tool at the time of the interviews (between April and June 2006). Thus this 
research cannot go further in the analysis of this tool in the context of its objectives. In 
addition, there was not any indication that this application has changed decision-making 
processes in Rebea. Indeed, it is the other way around, as Rebea’s leaders changed the 
more open decision-making processes on Orkut (as discussed in subsection 6.1.7).
6.1.11. Normative artefacts
Considering objects meeting conventions and standards (carrier 11A-1), this thesis 
analysed both tools: websites and discussion lists, as they are customized in a 
standardized way in order to keep the control of these channels by leadership groups.
Table 6.21
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
11B-1
It is necessary to 
control the quality of 
content on websites 
and discussion lists.
RebeaO 1.02/05/22 
Rebeal4.23 
Rebea05.01/02 
Rebea08.12 
Rebeal 4.21 
Rebeal 6.13/18
RepeaOl.09/17/18 
Repea02.06/08/09 
Repea03.02/03/14 
Repea07.08 
Repea08.25 
Rebeal 1.14
RemteaO 1.10 
Remtea04.03/13 
Remteal 0.02/16 
Remtea 13.14
Reasul02.04/15 
Reasul03.10 
Reasul04.05 
Reasul09.05 
Reasull 0.07/19 
Reasul 13.01
11B-2
Members do not 
know how to use 
such tools in a more 
flexible way.
RebeaOl.05/21/22 
Rebea03.24 
Rebea06.03 
Rebea07.10
RepeaOl.16/17/18 
/20
Repea02.07/09 
Repea03.04/07 
Repea04.19 
Repea08.07/12
Remtea02.22/26
Remtea09.04
Remteal3.14
ReasulOl.10/19 
Reasul02.01/04/15 
Reasul05.10 
Reasul09.02 
Reasull 0.07
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The arguments in this group try to legitimise the control of the Internet channels in the 
hands of the leadership group. Respondents understand that it is necessary to control the 
quality o f content on websites and discussion lists (11B-1), which includes censuring 
people who assume an offensive attitude on general lists. Repea07.08 argues the 
collective cannot be responsible for inadequate content on the website (implying that the 
leadership group would not publish inadequate content). Repea02.09 clarifies that when 
the site was designed, consultants oriented them to adopt the standard of demanding 
validation from the executive secretary to avoid inadequate content on the site.
Members of Reasul for instance recall that there was a crisis on the general list because of 
an Internet virus (Reasul02.04; Reasul03.10; Reasull0.07). In order to avoid this kind of 
disturbance, the list has been moderated since. It is the only list in the studied 
communities in which the messages are moderated. The others have moderation of the 
list, i.e. the moderators may interfere afterwards, but members have freedom of 
expression and can communicate to others directly. In Reasul, the customization, in 
practice, has transformed its general list into a channel for news bulletins, as members 
can only participate through the moderator.
Argument 11B-1 undermines the notion of a network organization in which everybody 
has the same right of expression. In validating the gatekeepers for the website, content 
may be biased to favour specific interests. In practice, the community could manage the 
issues of quality and behaviour through other structures, without centralizing these 
controlling procedures in the leadership group (as discussed in subsection 6.1.10). 
However, in maintaining moderators with special power over the discussion list, 
members can be censured or expelled (as explained in tactic 6C-4).
Furthermore, respondents argue that members do not know how to use such tools in a 
more flexible way (1 IB-2). This argument is cited mainly to explain why the community 
does not open the publishing of content on the website to more members. RepeaOl.20, for 
instance, defends the fact that the leadership group has not distributed passwords to other
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members because this would demand a lot of training, and management members do not 
have time for that task.
In relation to this argument, it is necessary to point out that there are members who 
understand that the standardized customization is imposed by the software, as they do not 
understand the flexibility of the tool25. For the respondent Repea03.07, for instance, 
someone configured the discussion list at the beginning, and he does not know if other 
configurations would be possible. In these cases, the standardized way is taken for 
granted as the only way, as the respondent does not grasp the flexibility embedded in the 
tools.
Table 6.22
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
11C-1
Avoid customizing websites 
and discussion lists in a 
more flexible way.
RebeaO 1.20/21 
Rebea06.03 
Rebea07.11/20 
Rebeal1.04 
Rebeal 4.13/24
RepeaOl. 16/18
Repea02.06/07
Repea03.07
Repea04.19
Repea07.08
Repea08.25
Repea09.12/16
Repeal 1.13
RemteaO 1.10 
Remtea02.24 
Remtea04.03/13
ReasulO 1.09 
Reasul02.01/15 
Reasul05.02 
Reasul09.02/05 
Reasul 10.07/18 
Reasull 4.03
Tactic 11C-1, avoid customizing websites and discussion lists in a more flexible way, 
means in practice that leadership groups do not empower ordinary members in their 
communities in relation to Internet-mediated interactive channels. In hierarchical 
organizations, with management groups, one can assume that leadership members would 
keep control over these channels. The studied communities keep following the same 
model, as alternative customizations are not considered, although the tools permit a 
greater level of flexibility. The carrier is thus the standardized, conventional 
customization of tools (originally), and the tactic is the inertia26 of keeping active the 
instruments of control through the standardized customization (see in subsection 7.1.11 
the differences between cases in relation to customization).
25 Citations: Rebea03.24; Repea02.09; Repea03.04; Repea04.19; ReasulOl.lO.
26 At any moment, one can customize the tools differently.
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Although it is not the focus of this subsection to discuss Rebea community on Orkut, it is 
important to highlight also how the tool features have been customized to favour 
centralization of decision making. As discussed in subsection 6.1.7, the community 
started on Orkut in an open format, allowing any person to be a member. After the 
coordination with Rebea leadership, however, the community on Orkut was closed, and 
membership has become subject to approval. Moderators may now exclude members. 
Thus, again, the flexibility of the tool has been used to promote centralization of decision 
making.
6.1.12. Cultural-cognitive artefacts
Members of the four communities argue that Internet tools are less efficient than face-to- 
face interaction in communication processes. Considering the adopted framework, this 
perception is classified as objects possessing symbolic value (carrier 12A-1). In a 
nutshell, this carrier undermines the general list as a space for making decisions, which 
indirectly reinforces the centralization of decision making, as ordinary members have less 
access to face-to-face meetings, and none access to segregated discussion lists.
Table 6.23
Arguments Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
12B-1
Face-to-face meetings are 
more relevant for the 
community than the 
discussion lists.
Rebea03.02 
Rebea06.01/02 
/03/19 
Rebea07.24 
Rebea08.05 
Rebeal 0.05 
Rebeal 3.15/18 
Rebeal 6.04 
RemteaO 1.2 5
Repea02.02/04/19 
Repea08.12
RemteaO 1.06/17 
Remtea02.11 
Remtea04.06 
Remtea05.02 
Remtea06.13 
Remtea07.16 
Remtea08.06 
Remteal 0.15 
Remteal 3.12
ReasulOl. 18/27 
Reasul02.20 
Reasul03.05 
Reasul04.03/11 
Reasul06.04 
Reasul08.02 
Reasul09.17 
Reasul 10.21
12B-2
Restricting the 
communication to virtual 
channels would exclude 
people who do not have 
access to the Internet.
Rebea02.02
Rebea04.03
Rebea06.03
Repea07.10 Remtea08.07 
Remteal 0.02 
Remteal 3.09
Reasul07.01 
Reasul 10.15 
Reasul 10.24
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Argument 12B-1 is a reformulation of the same symbolic value of the respective carrier: 
face-to-face meetings are more relevant for the community than the discussion lists. It 
happens in this case because the carrier itself is an argument, formulated as value. The 
idea here is to emphasise the relevance of face-to-face meetings, even though they are not 
frequent and most of the interactions are through the Internet. Comparing the Internet 
interaction with the face-to-face meetings, Rebea06.01/02 concludes that in quantitative 
terms, communication is mainly through the Internet, but in qualitative terms, the level of 
commitment is higher in face-to-face meetings. For Rebea08.05, Rebeal0.05, 
Remtea06.13 and Remteal3.12, in the virtual space, information overload demotivates 
people from deepening the debate. Furthermore, respondents highlight that people only 
commit themselves to the communities after creating emotional links in face-to-face 
meetings27.
Argument 12B-2, restricting the communication to virtual channels would exclude people 
who do not have access to the Internet, links the symbolic value with the idea of digital 
exclusion. In other words, it would not be fair to restrict the communication channels 
only to the Internet as many people (in Brazil) do not have access to this network. This 
argument would be valid if more people were engaged in the face-to-face meetings, but it 
is the other way around, at least when considering that the studied communities have 
members dispersed across large areas.
As the Internet interaction is the cheapest communication channel, the demand for face- 
to-face meetings excludes more people from decision making, as many cannot afford the 
costs of transportation and lodging. As related by Rebea02.02, her community only 
integrated the Internet in 1999, because there was a fear that the Internet was elitist, 
excluding many people. However, in the event the telephone and the fax were no longer 
sufficient to keep the communication exchanges, thus the need to add the virtual channels 
was evident.
27 Citations: Rebea06.03; Remtea01.17; Remtea04.06; Remtea05.02; Remtea07.16-; Repea02.04; 
Reasul02.20; Reasul03.05; Reasul04.03/ll; Reasul06.04; Reasul08.02; Reasul09.17.
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Table 6.24
Tactics Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul
12C-1
Make relevant decisions in 
face-to-face meetings.
Rebea03.02 
Rebea06.01/18 
Rebea08.02/03 
/08/10 
Rebeal 6.15 
Repea06.13
RepeaOl.06 
Repea02.02/04 
/10/19 
Repea06.13 
Repea08.13/24 
Repeal 1.05/06
RemteaO 1.04/17 
Remtea02.11 
Remtea04.06 
Remtea06.13 
Remtea08.06
ReasulO 1.18 
/20/27 
Reasull 1.05
The tactic associated with carrier 12A-1 is the action of making relevant decisions in 
face-to-face meetings (12C-1). The choice of the executive secretary in Rebea, for 
instance, is articulated in the Internet, but its validation is in face-to-face meetings . In 
Repea, members only qualify for the management group if they go to face-to-face 
meetings29, and relevant decisions are preferentially made in offline interaction. In 
Remtea, the official rule is that members only influence the decisions if they participate 
in face-to-face interaction, also in the sense of being actively engaged as activists of the 
community as a social movement30. These are also the minimum requirements if a person 
wants to join Remtea’s management group (see further citations in tactic 4C-1C in 
subsection 6.1.4). In Reasul, at least during the funded project, the community favoured 
making decisions in face-to-face meetings, because the government was sponsoring 
members (Reasull 1.05) (see further discussion on Reasul case in subsection 7.1.12).
Tactic 12C-1 thus reinforces the symbolic value attributed to the Internet tools: as they 
are not efficient communication channels, the community should make decisions in face- 
to-face meetings. Consequently, those that attend the face-to-face meetings may become 
legitimate leadership members, thus having more power in decision-making processes.
The examples above, nonetheless, are in practice localized and represent a small 
proportion of decisions in these communities, as a general rule (although Remtea has 
special conditions as explained below). In table 5Y, many examples are cited in which
28 Citations: Rebea08.02/03/08; Rebeal6.15; Repea06.13.
29 Citations: RepeaOl.06; Repea02.02; Repeal 1.05.
30 Citations: RemteaO 1.04/17; Remtea02.11; Remtea04.06; Remtea06.13; Remtea08.06.
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members admit the existence of a segregated list as the main channel for decision 
making.
Rebea, for instance, formally has an official face-to-face meeting only every two years. 
After a national event in 1997, the community were supposed to meet again in 1999, but 
this face-to-face conference was delayed to 2004 (Rebea06.01). The community did not 
have any formal offline meeting during these seven years (although members met 
together at different moments for other reasons than this formal national meeting). 
Meanwhile, during these seven years the decisions were concentrated on the segregated 
discussion list. In Repea, at the time of the interviews, face-to-face meetings were 
organized every two months, mainly in Sao Paulo (Repea08.13/24). In Reasul, the 
community can no longer support these meetings, after the end of the funded project. 
Thus, to date, the majority of interactions among Reasul members are on the segregated 
discussion list, according to one of the main community leaders (ReasulO1.18/20/26).
The situation in Remtea is different because the majority of management members work 
together in the same building, thus naturally they do not have great obstacles to talking 
with each other daily without using the Internet. Even in this condition, Remtea keeps a 
segregated list for the management group and makes decisions through this channel as 
well, as discussed in many parts of this chapter (see citations on these practices in tables 
5Y and 6.14).
In conclusion, tactic 12C-1 also has a rhetorical element. Some decisions are indeed made 
only in face-to-face meetings, but often relevant decisions are made on the segregated 
discussion lists. Thus the tactic creates an appearance that relevant decisions should be 
made in face-to-face meetings, legitimising the decisions made in these meetings and for 
members that attend these events, although in practice the segregated discussion lists 
keep their relevance as a channel for decision making.
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6.2. Concluding remarks on findings II
This chapter explores how the analytical constructs, arguments and tactics, may be 
associated to Scott’s (2001) categories on institutional carriers. As detailed in each 
category, carriers are associated with arguments, which aim to justify the influence of 
social structures in community contexts, and tactics, which reproduce (and change) 
centralized decision-making structures in specific situations.
This study links carriers with related arguments and tactics, indicating how the action of 
community members represents a crucial vehicle for embedding carriers in specific 
situations, thus emphasising the role of agency in the diffusion of institutions, as 
proposed by structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984). The findings suggest that Scott’s 
framework on carriers may benefit from this broader perception of other elements that are 
present in the reproduction of institutions’ a theme discussed in chapter 8.
Starting from the presented findings and analysis (parts I and II), the next chapter 
contrasts the four cases studies, exploring their differences and similarities.
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7. Cross-case analysis: Comparing communities
The two previous chapters present the main findings and analysis of this thesis 
considering the influence of institutional carriers in the diffusion of segregated decision­
making processes in the studied Internet-mediated communities, and how community 
members actively engage in the situated reproduction of institutionalised social structures 
through the elaboration of arguments and tactics. This chapter introduces a 
complementary analysis, discussing the similarities and differences among the four case 
studies. The main objective of this cross-case analysis is to suggest possible associations 
between these differences and the context in these communities, where the empirical 
evidence supports such links.
As discussed below, the cases are very similar in most elements of each category. This 
result may be related to the fact that the chosen communities are homogenous in many 
respects. They all have clear boundaries, a common main interest, similar activities in 
Brazil, dependence on formal organizations and established decision-making processes. 
On the other hand, they differ in relation to main sponsors, the fact of having or not 
having received government funding and the level of dependence in relation to Internet 
channels (see subsections 1.4.2, 4.2.1 and 8.3.1 about communities’ similarities and 
differences).
Much of the evidence presented below is also discussed in the previous chapters. There, 
the anecdotes from the interviews mainly serve the function of supporting the findings 
and analysis of each element of the categories -  carriers, arguments and tactics. They thus 
help to understand how this research has constructed the categories, as interpretations 
emerge from interviews related to the four cases (Walsham, 1995a: 78-79). In this 
chapter, differently, data is organized to emphasise the comparison between cases, 
drawing upon the interpretation established in both previous chapters.
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Section 7.1 discusses the cross-case analysis for each category1 and section 7.2 
summarizes the main conclusions of this cross-case analysis, calling for attention to the 
comparison of similarities and differences as a whole for the four case studies. Thus in 
the first section the focus is on each category and its elements (horizontal analysis), and 
in the second section the emphasis is on the cases as a whole (vertical analysis). These 
cross-case comparisons are also used in chapter 8, when theory is brought to analyse the 
main findings of this investigation.
The emphasis given in the cross-study analysis of each category depends on the effective 
differences between cases in that category. When the cases differ substantially, this 
demands more analysis to construct arguments that have not been developed before, in 
order to contextualize the diversity. When the cases are very similar, the main arguments 
of the categories have already been presented in previous chapters, thus it is not necessary 
to develop the same reasoning again.
The fact that some categories are more discussed than others does not imply any 
conclusion about their relevance in the studied phenomenon. This thesis does not develop 
any reasoning about the relative significance of each category and its elements in the 
diffusion of institutions. This research follows Scott’s (2001) suggestion of understanding 
the whole set of categories as complementing each other. When differences related to 
cases appear, they are contextualized qualitatively, as far as there is empirical evidence 
for that.
As this chapter reworks previous findings, naturally there is a level of repetition in the 
construction of explanations. I prefer this format, with the risk of being reiterative, than 
taking for granted that the reader will automatically relate the analysis to the previous 
chapters. Thus some repetition is used when it is necessary to avoid fragmentation of 
reasoning.
1 Recalling that in this research categories are the combination of institutional carriers, arguments and 
tactics, which is different from how Scott (2001) uses the term as only related to institutional carriers.
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A last warning is necessary about comments on frequency of citations (as presented in the 
tables in chapters 5 and 6). As explained in the introduction of chapter 5, my concern 
about including the indication of citations is related to consistency of findings and 
interpretations (following Trauth, 1997, and Stake, 1994, 2000, among other scholars). I 
am not making any claim that difference in number of citations necessarily means 
something. As explained by Silverman (2000:184), counting in qualitative research 
should be used only when there is a theoretical rationale behind it, otherwise it only gives 
a spurious validity. However, looked at from another perspective, in some cases the 
empirical evidence suggests that the differences in the number of citations could be 
meaningful, permitting one or more interpretations based on the context in which the 
phenomenon was observed. In other circumstances, it is not possible to interpret whether 
the differences are relevant, as far as the collected data reveals, also considering the 
objectives of the present investigation.
Thus the occasional comments on frequency of citations in this chapter should be 
considered from the point of view of qualitative research which constructs inferences 
from the empirical data, in an attempt to understand the parts in relation to the whole 
(drawing upon the concept of hermeneutical circle, as introduced in subsection 4.1.1). An 
example may clarify this reasoning.
In table 6.20, tactic 10C-1 -  avoid Internet tools (other than the discussion list and the 
website) that would foster transparency, participation and less centralized decision­
making processes -  is cited by eight Rebea members, and by one Reasul member only. 
Does it mean that Rebea avoids appropriating other Internet tools and Reasul does not 
avoid? No, it does not mean that. Both communities avoid the inclusion of Internet tools 
other than websites and discussion lists. Indeed, Rebea has taken one small step further 
than Reasul, in the use of Orkut (as explained in subsections 6.1.7 and 6.1.10). In such a 
situation, the empirical evidence does not support the idea that the differences in number 
of citations mean something in relation to the tactic itself, although the differences may 
result from the fact that Rebea members appear to be concerned about the appropriation 
of Internet tools. When empirical evidence suggests it, such links are spelled out, also
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when more than one interpretation emerges from data. Otherwise, I do not comment on 
citation frequency.
7.1. Cross-case analysis by category
This section presents the cross-case analysis, comparing the differences and similarities 
between the four communities, in relation to each category and its elements (carriers, 
arguments and tactics). The analysis in this chapter keeps close adherence to the tables in 
the two previous chapters, but it also adds some other citations from interviews, as well 
as inferences from the interpretation of the collected data.
7.1.1. Regulative symbolic systems
The influence of the legislation (carrier 1A-1) is recognized by members of the three 
communities (Rebea, Repea and Reasul) which had received government funding. The 
kind of influence, nonetheless, is diverse in each community. In Reasul, its governance 
structure has been influenced by the legislation since its creation in April 2002, as the 
community was created because the federal government offered this funding 
(ReasulOl.01/02; Reasul02.07). Reasul started with a clear segregation between the 
management group and other members, and the respective discussion lists, initiating a 
process of decentralization of decision making only after the end of the funded project.
Rebea and Repea, differently, have been active at least since 19922, and were influenced 
by the legislation later on, when they applied for the government funding (at the 
beginning of 2000s). On that occasion, Rebea created the role of executive secretary, and
2 In this year, Brazilian civil society and social movements were mobilized to prepare the discussions and 
meetings for the ECO 92 (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil).
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Repea started to differentiate between nodes3 (before, all nodes had the same status in the 
community). The three cases thus suggest that the legislation empowered some members 
in relation to others in decision-making processes.
In relation to arguments, members of the three communities had the same reasoning: that 
the community needs to comply with legislation to receive government funding (IB-1). 
The three communities also adopt the same tactics of making the community’s 
governance structure similar to the governance structure o f the funded project (1C-1), 
and concentrating power and visibility in the anchor organization (and its 
representatives) (1C-2).
In the case of Repea and Reasul, the anchor organizations have continued to be the main 
references (respectively the NGO 5 Elementos and the university Univali) after the end of 
the funded project. In Rebea, tactic 1C-2 was present during the funded project, but the 
anchor organization4 was changed later, from Ecoar to Ecomarapendi5 (Rebea01.06/13). 
The new anchor organization has the same role as the previous one, thus the segregated 
decision-making processes continue as before, although with new actors. Perhaps because 
of this change in leadership, Rebea members relate less often the legislation to the current 
concentration of power in Ecomarapendi, differently from members of Repea and Reasul.
3 A node is an organized group which represents Repea in a specific locality (such as a region or city). A 
member can be called a node as far as he or she proposes to do such work alone.
4 The communities call anchor organizations not only those that represent them in contracts with the 
government in terms of specific funding (FNMA), but also the organization that currently is responsible for 
representing the community’s contracts in general. Thus the respective anchor organizations are (by June 
2006): Ecomarapendi (NGO) for Rebea; 5 Elementos (NGO) for Repea; Universidade Federal de Mato 
Grosso (university) for Remtea; and Univali (university) for Reasul.
5 Both non-governmental organizations.
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7.1.2. Normative symbolic systems
Respondents of the four communities affirm the need to have formal representatives and 
leaderships to attend to societal and members' expectations (carriers 2A-1 and 2A-2). In 
Reasul (see subsection 7.1.1), nonetheless, the community has had a management group 
and formal representatives since its creation under the influence of the legislation (carrier 
1A-1). This may have affected Reasul members’ perception of the need to have formal 
representatives for reasons of social pressure, differently of Rebea’s members, for 
instance.
The three related arguments (2B-1, 2B-2 and 2B-3) are also present in the four 
communities. They link the leadership group with activities such as voicing political 
demands, resolving conflicts and taking initiatives.
In relation to argument 2B-2, it is necessary to have a group to resolve conflicts and 
reduce opportunistic behaviour among members, Reasul respondents have reasons to be 
less concerned about conflicts because ordinary members cannot communicate through 
the general discussion list without the validation of a moderator. The perception of 
conflict is filtered by the moderator, at least on the general list. In the other communities, 
members express themselves without moderation, and occasional control is done later. 
Differently of Reasul, Remtea members had the experience of expelling a member in a 
very antagonistic situation (see subsection 6.1.6), which may explain the fact that in this 
community many respondents link the leadership members with the activity of resolving 
conflicts.
Referring to tactics, the four communities conform to social expectations, keeping 
gatekeepers (moderators, facilitators) and formal representatives (2C-1). There are, 
nonetheless, some particularities about Repea and Remtea. First, Repea formally gave up 
of having an executive secretary after the funded project ended (June 2004). Informally, 
nonetheless, the community maintains the previous executive secretary and another 
member from the anchor organization (5 Elementos) in the same roles in terms of
202
representing the community, moderating discussion lists, leading decisions and 
fundraising. For Repea02.il/12, Repea03.09 and Repea06.04, people report to these 
leaders because an alternative structure has not been created. This doubt about formal and 
informal roles, nonetheless, may have affected how Repea members perceive tactic 2C-1, 
as some members prefer the interpretation that the community does not have an executive 
secretary.
Second, in Remtea the main leader (an academic) represents the community and 
centralizes the decisions, although she does not have the formal title of ‘executive 
secretary’, which is shared by three other members. Indeed, the community previously 
had only one member in this role, but at the beginning of 2006 the new executive 
secretary invited other two members to share the same activities. At the time of the 
interviews (April/June 2006), they did not have enough experience to report how this 
model would work in practice. Nevertheless, members say that independently of formal 
titles, the main leader would keep her legitimacy in the community as its main 
representative6.
7.1.3. Cultural-cognitive symbolic systems
Respondents of the four communities recognize the influence of hierarchical schemas 
(carrier 3A-1) in their social structures, which implies differentiation of power among 
members. In relation to arguments, the ideas that it is difficult to manage the community 
without following a hierarchical model (3B-1), and that there are cognitive obstacles to 
creating a network organization in a hierarchical society (3B-2) are also cited in the four 
communities.
6 Remtea’s main leader is recognized as an important academic in the field, thus her social status (see 
carrier authority systems -  status, in subsection 5.2.5) seams to prevail over the script of ‘executive 
secretary’ (see carriers scripts in subsection 5.2.9). It is a peculiar case, which does not occur in the other 
studied communities.
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In relation to the associated tactics, members of the four communities cite the practice of 
making governance rules blurred and ambiguous (3C-1). There are differences, 
nonetheless, in relation to specific tactics in this group, which may be related to 
contextual factors.
The tactic of not informing ordinary members about the existence o f a leadership group, 
and the segregation o f discussion lists (3C-1A), for instance, is present in Rebea, Repea 
and Remtea. In Remtea, nonetheless, the two citations related to this tactic are from 
ordinary members who did not know about the segregated discussion list. It suggests that 
perhaps the management members in this community could have interests in not exposing 
tactic 3C-1A to the researcher. As discussed in subsection 4.3.1, there are few results in 
this investigation that may be biased by the fact that the majority of respondents in some 
communities are from the management groups. In this case, the fact that two ordinary 
members have expressed clearly their unawareness about the segregated list indicates that 
the tacit is present also in Remtea. Tactic 3C-1A could not be present in Reasul, as 
ordinary members clearly are informed that they do not participate in community 
decisions, and their discussion list is not related to decision making.
The tactics of calling consensus the agreement o f a few members (3C-1B), and of not 
basing decisions on numbers o f votes, but on the quality o f arguments (3C-1D) are 
present in all four communities. The tactic of centralizing the process o f defining the 
consensus (or closing the discussion) in the leadership group (3C-1C), nonetheless, is 
more emphasised by Remtea members. Indeed, in this community, this activity of 
defining consensus is centralized in the main leader (the cited academic), who has a very 
strong presence in all community activities and decisions. These tactics are valid for both 
discussion lists, as also among management members there are different degrees of 
legitimacy in decision-making processes.
The tactic of ignoring complaints against centralized structures, or questions related to 
accountability and transparency (3C-2) is present in the four communities, but Rebea 
members appear more concerned with the theme. Indeed, Rebea members, including
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some within the management group, often complain against segregated decision-making 
structures7. One reason could be that Rebea has members all around the country, who 
belong to other similar Internet-mediated communities. The heterogeneity of the 
management group could open space to more power disputes. For instance, four of 
Remtea’s leadership members8 complain about Rebea’s centralized structures, although 
they support the same segregation of decision making in Remtea. Questioned about this 
divergence, none of them was able to explain the different criteria to judge Rebea’s and 
Remtea’s governance structures. The distribution of interviewees between management 
and ordinary members does not appear to be related to this greater number of citations in 
Rebea, as the majority of them came from management members9.
7.1.4. Regulative relational systems
The influence o f sponsors in the community governance structures, through power 
systems (carrier 4A-1) is recognized by members of the four communities. The 
differences among cases are related to the institutional status of sponsors (government, 
university or NGO), as they have diverse instruments to influence communities. The 
government has more channels to carry such an influence, from offering direct and 
indirect funding to inviting to meetings, contracting services and supporting publications. 
The governance systems (carrier 4A-2), differently, are present only in Remtea. This 
came because almost all members of Remtea’s management group are also members of a
7 Citations: Rebea01.08; Rebea06.16; Rebea07.15; Rebeal4.17; Rebeal6.06; Repea08.03; Remtea08.14; 
Remtea11.05/08; Reasul01.08; Reasul05.13. Recall that people have multiple-membership, thus they are 
members of Repea, Remtea and Reasul at the same time they are members of Rebea.
8 Citations: Remtea01.23; Remtea02.18; Remteal 1.05/08; Remteal4.03. As stated before, people have 
multiple-memberships. In the cited cases, these Remtea members are also associated to Rebea.
9 From twelve citations, eight came from management members (Rebea01.07/10/15; Rebea09.17; 
Rebeal6.11; Remtea01.23; Remtea02.18; Remteal 1.05/08; Remteal4.03; Reasul01.08) and four from 
ordinary members (Rebea03.15/16; Rebea08.10; Rebeal0.05; Reasul05.03/13).
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research group (GPEA/UFMT10). Thus the governance structure of the research group 
prevails as the governance structure of the community.
In relation to arguments, the four communities cited them in a similar fashion, agreeing 
that the sponsor has more power to define directions (4B-1), ordinary members are not 
interested in managing the community (4B-2), and some members concentrate decision­
making processes because they are more active and committed than others (4B-3). In 
relation to tactics, all communities create obstacles for ordinary members joining the 
management group (4C-1), such as keeping unclear rules about the criteria fo r  accepting 
members in the management group (4C-1A), and keeping some debates only among your 
peers in the management group (4C-1B). There are, nonetheless, differences in relation to 
the other sub-tactics associated with this group.
The practice of requiring members to attend face-to-face meetings to participate in the 
management group (4C-1C) is pervasive only in Repea and Remtea. Some contextual 
aspects may explain this picture. Firstly, Rebea has members across the whole country. 
Thus it would be difficult for any sub-group to impose such a rule on other management 
members11. Secondly, the Reasul management group has people from three States. Again 
the costs of travelling would be overwhelming12. Thirdly, the management groups of 
Repea and Remtea are composed mainly of members who may meet without excessive 
costs in Sao Paulo and Cuiba (respectively), capitals of their States (Sao Paulo and Mato 
Grosso). The management groups in these two communities thus may use this 
requirement as a form of creating a barrier for the participation of people from other 
cities. For instance, in the monthly face-to-face meetings, Remtea has an average of 30
10 Grupo Pesquisador em Educa^ao Ambiental, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso.
11 Still Rebea members strongly emphasise the relevance of face-to-face meetings (see carrier 12A-1), 
although in practice the vast majority of community communication goes through the Internet.
12 During the funded project, Reasul management members were sponsored to attend face-to-face meetings. 
At that time, the management group was very restricted (only 5 institutions were represented) 
(Reasul01.09). Since the end of the funded project, the management group has accepted more members (at 
the time of the interviews, 29 institutions were represented) (Reasul01.09), and the demand for face-to-face 
meetings has no longer been made.
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members, and the majority of these members are from the management group (which has 
25 participants) (RemteaO 1.17).
The tactic of undermining the legitimacy o f ordinary members as potential leaders (AC­
ID) is present in the four communities, but it is cited only once by Reasul members, 
which in this case may mean something. In Reasul, ordinary members are clearly 
excluded from decisions13 and their participation on the discussion list is moderated. In 
this context, ordinary members either do not try to legitimise themselves as leaders, thus 
it is not necessary to apply such a tactic, or their manifestations are ignored (filtered). The 
empirical evidence is not clear about the reason, but it suggests that Reasul leaders do not 
have the same concern about undermining the legitimacy of ordinary members, as they 
apparently do not face the same level of conflict with them14.
The tactic of avoiding conflict with and criticisms o f sponsors (4C-2) is present in the 
four communities. Rebea members pay special attention on this practice, perhaps because 
the federal government has many channels of influence upon its members (support of 
face-to-face meetings, EA.Net television channel, meetings with the government, 
courses, jobs and publications). Thus more members could be clear that they strategically 
avoid conflict with the government. Furthermore, tactic 4C-2 may be cited more often by 
Rebea members considering the empirical evidence related to tactic 4C-3, of excluding 
from debate within the management group those who do not agree with the leadership
13 As commented in subsection 6.1.3, in relation to tactic 3C-1 A, that is not applicable to Reasul as ordinary 
members clearly are informed that they do not participate in decision making.
14 See two other complementary references on this theme. In relation to argument 2B-2, subsection 7.1.2, 
Reasul respondents appear less concerned about conflict among members when discussing the role of 
gatekeepers and representatives. In relation to tactic 9C-2, subsection 7.1.9, respondents do not relate cases 
in each Reasul leaders have blocked ordinary members from representing the community. It does not mean, 
nonetheless, that ordinary members have represented the community (there are no citations in this 
direction). The emphasis in the analysis is that respondents have not related this kind of conflict, either 
because ordinary members have not challenged Reasul leadership, or because Reasul respondents have not 
informed such a conflict. See more details in the referred subsections.
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orientation (4C-3), which is cited only by Rebea members. Most citations15 of tactic 4C-3 
referred mainly (but not only) to the recent exclusion of one main leader from 
discussions, after her opposition to the federal government.
Combining both tactics (4C-2 and 4C-3), it appears that Rebea members have great 
concern about criticizing the federal government, and are aware that criticisms could 
result in punishment, perhaps because of this specific event in which a core management 
members was recently excluded from the leadership group. The citations related to both 
tactics do not appear to be skewed because there are more ordinary members among 
Rebea respondents than in the other communities, which have more management 
members. Indeed, Rebea’s management members appear concerned with these tactics 
because they are also affected by them.
For instance, in relation to tactic 4C-2, ten members cited the practice related to Rebea16, 
and five of them are from the leadership group. In relation to tactic 4C-3, six members 
cited the practice, and four of them are from the leadership group. The ordinary members 
who cited as well tactic 4C-3 are one former leader, who was excluded from the 
management group without further justification17, and one member that was in the 
community for eight years (at the time of the interviews), having great knowledge about 
the politics related to power dispute among management members.
7.1.5. Normative relational systems
In relation to authority systems, the idea that status (reputation and legitimacy) in society 
is translated into power within the communities (carrier 5A-1), and that the government 
influence affects the perception of legitimacy in these communities (carrier 5A-2) are
15 Citations: Rebea01.14/16; Rebea04.03/04/07; Rebeal3.14/15; Repea01.25; Repea02.21.
16 Repea02, Reasul05 and Reasul 14 are also Rebea members.
17 This exclusion does not refer to the recent exclusion cited by other members. The case of this former 
leader was cited only by the own respondent.
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Irecognized by members of the four communities. The cases are also similar in relation to 
arguments 5B-1, some people have more authority in the environmental education field, 
justifying that they have greater legitimacy in the community, Mid 5B-2, older members 
have created the community (or worked more), thus they have more legitimacy to make 
decisions.
In this category, some differences among the cases emerge in the analysis of tactics. The 
practice of organizing leadership peers to give support to each other on the general 
discussion list (5C-1) is pervasive only in Rebea and Remtea. In Reasul, ordinary 
members do not participate in decisions at all, and the general discussion list is 
moderated. Thus it makes sense that community leaders do not feel the need of a parallel 
agreement to legitimise their suggestions in front of ordinary members. In Repea, 
nonetheless, it is not possible to associate the omission of this practice with contextual 
aspects, considering the empirical evidence.
Here, one could speculate that this omission is a research bias caused by the fact that the 
majority of Repea respondents are management members. However, the same practice is 
cited by Remtea interviewees, which also have more management members among its 
respondents. Furthermore, Repea’s management members openly related other sensitive 
practices, such as of not informing ordinary members about the existence o f a leadership 
group, and the segregation o f discussion lists (3C-1A). Thus it is not clear, considering 
the whole research, whether this omission is a biased result. As discussed in subsection 
4.3.4 (interview guide), the questions proposed to interviewees were very open, requiring 
people to talk about their governance practices and decision making processes. Thus 
respondents have spontaneously recalled the processes they consider important, and 
perhaps this omission means only this: the practice is not relevant in this community.
Respondents from the four communities recognize the tactic offlaming members who do 
not agree with the leadership orientation (5C-2), although in Reasul this tactic may be 
less relevant as ordinary members are moderated, thus occasional verbal attacks become 
public only on the segregated discussion list. The tactic of setting the agenda, occupying
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the discussion list with the themes the leadership considers relevant (5C-3) is also present 
in the four communities. The strong influence of the federal government in Rebea 
(discussed in subsection 7.1.4) may explain the fact that Rebea members emphasise the 
external influences in their debates. It is interesting to notice that both leaders and
1 Q
ordinary members recognize this practice in Rebea .
The last two tactics of ignoring the contributions and opinions o f members (5C-4) and 
keep silent for not having legitimate knowledge (5C-5) are cited in the four communities. 
The empirical evidence is not clear whether the few citations in Repea related to tactic 
5C-5 is meaningful. However, this tactic of keeping silent for reasons of not having 
legitimate knowledge may also be linked with the carrier identity (5A-1). As displayed in 
table 5.6 (subsection 5.2.6) (see discussion in subsection 7.1.6), Repea members appear 
less prone to relate their identity to other leaders in the government and university. It may 
be that the strong identity of some members with the academic environment reinforces 
the fear of making mistakes publicly, fostering silence (tactic 5C-5). As Repea members 
do not identify themselves often with the academic environment, they may be less 
concerned about keeping silent. These are suppositions derived from the empirical data, 
but it is not clear whether they really explain the observations.
7.1.6. Cultural-cognitive relational systems
The four communities recognize that many members cultivate similar identities with 
government officials and academic professionals (carrier 6A-1). The identity with both 
these groups, nonetheless, is less cited in Repea. It is worth noting that the two main 
leaders in this community are members of the NGO 5 Elementos, Repea’s anchor 
organization. This aspect alone does not explain this difference in identity, as the anchor 
organization in Rebea is also an NGO (Ecomarapendi). In Rebea, however, respondents 
identify strong links between the community and the federal government, because of
18 Among nine citations related to tactic 5C-3 in Rebea, four are from management members: RebeaOl; 
Rebea06; Rebea07; Rebeal3.
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current projects and the fact that some community leaders have personal ties with 
government officials, a situation that is not highlighted by Repea members. The identity 
of Remtea and Reasul with the academic community is straightforward. In both 
communities the main leaders are academics, and universities are their anchor 
organizations. In Remtea, the whole management group is closely related to an academic 
research group (GPEA/UFMT).
Argument 6B-1 is a commonsense statement, cited by members of the four communities: 
people are the same inside and outside the community. In relation to tactics, the four 
communities have similar behaviour in creating ambiguous categories o f membership 
(6C-1), restricting the management group to those that share the same identity (6C-2), 
and having members keeping silent for disagreeing with the mainstream identity (6C-5).
Tactic 6C-4, expel members who do not agree with the mainstream identity, however, is 
cited in this investigation only by Remtea respondents. The community expelled a 
member, as the result of a crisis of identity, as the dissonant voice expressed opinions 
which irritated the leadership group. As cited before, Remtea has a cohesive management 
group, with strong identification with a research group and a leftist party, a context which 
favours the development of a closer conception of acceptable identity, as revealed by 
interviewees. It appears that it is not by chance that the need of differentiating between 
membership categories is cited often by Remtea members19.
7.1.7. Regulative routines
In the category regulative routines, all elements are present in the four communities. 
Members identify standard operating procedures (carrier 7A-1), which in this 
investigation is related to the influence of processes which impose the segregation of
19 Citations: RemteaO1.04/05/27/32; Remtea02.09/11/13/15/20; Remtea03.04/05; Remtea04.02; 
Remtea06.02/06/07/08/13; Remtea07.01; Remtea08.06/19; Remteal 0.06/19; Remteal 1.07;
Remteal3.01/03/04/05/06/09; Remteal4.04/08/09.
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decision making to management groups. The associated argument takes for granted that 
the management group should make decisions, and relates the segregated structure to 
competence and effectiveness (7B-1). Tactics are the same in the four communities: keep 
a segregated discussion list for leadership members (common members are not allowed 
on the management discussion list) (7C-1); keep control over community gatekeepers 
(7C-2); and keep control over community representatives (7C-3).
7.1.8. Normative routines
In the category normative routines, jobs and roles (carrier 8A-1), and the correspondent 
arguments and tactics are all present in the four communities. As the communities are not 
anonymous, the jobs and roles members have in society naturally influence their online 
interactions, favouring the reproduction of power relations. Arguments 8B-1, that people 
fear losing their jobs or closing the door to future professional opportunities, and 8B-2, 
that people have commitment with their current jobs, express the influence of the carrier. 
The consequence is that members keep in the community a posture which is adequate to 
the roles and jobs one has in society (tactic 8C-1).
7.1.9. Cultural-cognitive routines
The influence of scripts (carrier 9A-1) and the identification of the associated argument 
9B-1, i f  a member has a role, this means something; otherwise there is no reason to give 
titles, are cited by members of the four communities. In relation to tactics, the four 
collectivities centralize the representation o f the community in the executive secretary (or 
coordinator) (9C-1), and respect the role o f the executive secretary (or coordinator) and 
moderators (9C-3). In Repea, the role of executive secretary still is respected20, although 
formally its leadership members have not held this title since June 2004.
20 Citations: Repea06.08; Repea08.08/09/14/22/30; Repeal 0.04.
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The tactic of reinforcing respect for the role o f executive secretary by blocking ordinary 
members from representing the community or taking decisions (9C-2), nonetheless, is 
cited only by members of Rebea, Repea and Remtea21. The absence of citations in Reasul 
may be related to the fact that ordinary members are clearly excluded from the 
management group. Having clear governance rules may reduce conflicts caused by 
ambiguities, also because ordinary members may fell less motivated to challenge the 
leadership group. There could be other reasons as well.
As discussed in subsection 7.1.4, considering the citations related to both tactics 9C-2 and 
4C-1D {undermine the legitimacy o f ordinary members as potential leaders), and the 
argument 2B-2 {it is necessary to have a group to resolve conflicts and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour among members), Reasul respondents appear to be less 
concerned about conflicts in general and disputes between leadership and ordinary 
members than the other communities. It may be, nonetheless, that this impression 
emerges from the fact that the majority of respondents in this community are from the 
management group. It is necessary to highlight, nonetheless, that these tactics (9C-2 and 
4C-1D) and argument (2B-2) appear in Repea and Remtea, although also in both 
communities there are more management members among the respondents. These tactics 
and argument are also present in Rebea, which has a balanced number of interviewees 
among management and ordinary members. Thus the empirical evidence is not 
conclusive whether Reasul faces less conflict indeed, or the data is biased because the 
kind of interviewees in this community, or the perception of conflict is glossed in this 
community because the general discussion list is moderated, thus occasional conflicts 
with ordinary members may have been filtered by leaders.
7.1.10. Regulative artefacts
In relation to objects complying with specifications (carrier 10A-1), the four communities 
are influenced by the technical features of the same artefacts: discussion lists and the
21 Although Remtea members cite this tactic eight times, all citations refer to two specific cases which were 
in discussion at the time of the interviews.
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websites. Respondents of the four communities also agree that members do not know how 
to use Internet tools, thus the difficulty o f appropriating alternatives (argument 10B-1).
In relation to tactics, the four communities avoid Internet tools (other than the discussion 
list and the website) that would foster transparency, participation and less centralized 
decision-making processes (10C-1), with the exception of Rebea, which has recognized 
the incorporation of Orkut. As discussed previously (subsections 6.1.7 and 6.1.10), the 
appropriation of this tool was not initiated by Rebea’s management group.
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, although tactic 10C-1 is cited many times 
by Rebea respondents and only once by Reasul members, the fact is that none of the 
communities’ leaders have been more proactive in the introduction of other Internet tools. 
Rebea22 members, nonetheless, are clearly more concerned than Reasul23 members about 
the adoption of Internet tools (see subsection 6.1.10). Perhaps Rebea members cite more 
issues related to the adoption (and non-adoption) of tools because of this concern, 
independently of their actual practice. It is not clear from the empirical data why Rebea 
members are more concerned about the theme.
7.1.11. Normative artefacts
In relation to objects meeting conventions and standards (carrier 11A-1), both tools 
(websites and discussion lists) are customized in similar ways by the four communities, 
i.e. the leadership groups control these channels. In relation to arguments, that it is 
necessary to control the quality o f content on websites and discussion lists (11B-1), and 
that members do not know how to use such tools in a more flexible way (1 IB-2), both are 
common in the four communities.
22 Citations: Rebea01.20; Rebea02.05/15; Rebea03.19; Rebea05.07; Rebea06.03/19; Rebea07.10; 
Rebeal4.24; Rebeal6.09; Rebeal7.04/09.
23 Only ReasulO 1.19/28 expresses such concerns.
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In relation to tactic 11C-1, the leadership groups in the four communities avoid 
customizing websites and discussion lists in a more flexible way. Reasul, nonetheless, has 
some particularities that call for attention24. In relation to its website, during the funded 
project control was very strict: only the main leaders had the password to publish content. 
Since the project ended, the community has changed the software and has opened the 
publishing tool to a greater number of management members. Ordinary members (from 
the general discussion list) cannot publish, and the main leadership member keeps the 
power of moderation on the website, being able to exclude content that does not match 
the established criteria. The other three communities have kept the same model since the 
creation of their websites, i.e. very strict control of the publishing tool (few leadership 
members have authorization to publish or to validate content).
Furthermore, on Reasul’s general discussion list, ordinary members cannot communicate 
with others directly25. Members can only send messages to a few leadership members, 
who moderate the interaction within the community. In this group of four communities, 
only Reasul adopts the moderation of messages on the general list. The management 
group adopted the moderation after an attempt at opening the list for discussion. On the 
occasion, the group was attacked by an Internet virus, which caused great distress among 
the members. The list has been moderated since. Reasul’s management group also has a 
segregated list (as all the other studied communities). This list was very restricted during 
the funded project in terms of number of members (only five organizations were 
represented). After the project, leadership members invited more people to the 
management group (at the time of the interviews, the management group had members 
from 29 organizations)26.
24 Citations: ReasulOl.lO; Reasul02.01/15; Reasul04.05.
25 Citations: ReasulOl.09/13; Reasul02.10; Reasul03.10; Reasul04.08; Reasul05.02; Reasul09.02; 
Reasul 10.06/07.
26 Citations: ReasulOl.09; Reasul07.12; Reasull2.12.
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7.1.12. Cultural-cognitive artefacts
In this investigation, objects possessing symbolic value (carrier 12A-1) have been 
identified in the four communities, drawing upon the fact that members cultivate the idea 
that Internet tools are less efficient than face-to-face communication, although the virtual
77channels are extremely important in their interactions .
In relation to arguments, the four communities adopted the same explanations, somehow 
repeating the same value that face-to-face meetings are more relevant fo r  the community 
than the discussion lists (12B-1), or emphasising that restricting the communication to 
virtual channels would exclude people who do not have access to the Internet (12B-2). It 
is interesting that Rebea members have the same justification, although the community 
has very irregular general face-to-face meetings, and depends almost entirely on Internet- 
mediated interaction.
In relation to tactics, members of the four communities emphasise their practice of 
making relevant decisions in face-to-face meetings (12C-1). The available data, 
nonetheless, indicates that only in Remtea is this apparent tactic close to their practice, as 
the management group often has face-to-face interaction (in monthly formal meetings and 
daily informal conversations). In other communities, some decisions are restricted to 
face-to-face meetings, but this tactic is more a rhetorical device to justify the fact that 
decisions are not made on the general discussion lists than a relevant practice.
In Reasul, this tactic was pervasive when the community was sponsored by the 
government, as it was then possible to pay for the travelling of leadership members (five 
organizations which formed the management group). After the funded project, face-to- 
face meetings have lost relevance, as the community does not have the money to sponsor 
management members. Still, two members believe that relevant decisions should be made 
in these meetings.
27 Even in Remtea, which has an intense offline life in Cuiaba, more than 50% of its communication is 
through the Internet (Remtea08.07).
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7.2. Differences and similarities in the cross-case analysis
This chapter advances the analysis of the similarities and differences between the four 
case-studies investigated by this thesis. The cross-analysis between case studies leads to 
two main conclusions: (i) the influence of institutional carriers is pervasive, and the four 
cases have a high degree of similarity in their process of the institutionalisation of 
segregated decision-making processes; and (ii) still some differences among the cases are 
noticeable, reinforcing the idea that institutionalisation should be studied in its context, as 
the particularities of each community affect how institutions are diffused.
From the comparison between the cases, empirical evidence suggests the relevance of 
some contextual aspects, such as: (i) the level of dependence in relation to the main 
sponsor; (ii) the power sponsors have of applying sanctions mechanisms (reward or 
punishment); (iii) the perceived legitimacy of leaders; and (iv) the presence of occasional 
events which triggered solutions that are peculiar to the kind of situation (such as the 
cases which led to the moderation of Reasul’s discussion list, the expulsion of a Remtea 
member and the exclusion of a Rebea member from the decision making).
Focusing on similarities, the four communities recognize that societal and members’ 
expectations demand them to have leaders in specific roles (carriers 2A-1 and 2), and that 
power systems {influence o f sponsors, carrier 4A-1) and authority systems (status in 
society and government influence, carriers 5A-1 and 5A-2) affect their social structures, 
undermining the idea of equal status between all members. The four communities also 
recognize the influence of hierarchical schemas (carrier 3A-1), and standard operating 
procedures (in this investigation, the segregation of decision-making processes, carrier 
7A-1), which undermine the ideal of constructing a network organization.
In relation to Internet tools, all communities adopt similar Internet tools (objects 
complying with specifications, carrier 10A-1) and customization of websites and 
discussion lists {objects meeting conventions and standards, carrier 11A-1), and have 
similar symbolic perceptions of such artefacts {objects possessing symbolic value, carrier
217
12A-1). Communities also relate that the identities (carrier 6A-1) and jobs and roles 
(carrier 8A-1) members have in society influence their behaviour in Internet-mediated 
interactions, and that the titles some members carry (such as ‘executive secretary’) affect 
their status in decision making processes {scripts, carrier 9A-1).
Still focusing on similarities, the four communities cultivate arguments and tactics to 
legitimise their leadership groups (see also discussion in subsection 8.1.2). For instance, 
members argue that it is necessary to have a group to resolve conflicts (argument 2B-2), 
also associating managerial efficiency28 with the segregation of decision-making process 
(argument 7B-1). Some argue that members become leaders because of their interest, 
commitment and contribution to the community (arguments 4B-3 and 5B-2), and because 
of their legitimate authority in the field of environmental education (argument 5B-1). The 
organization of peers to give public support to the management proposals on the general 
list (tactic 5C-129) and the requirement of attending face-to-face meetings to have a say in 
decision making (tactic 4C-1C30) also try to legitimise the governance structures in front 
of ordinary members.
Complementarity, communities develop tactics to undermine the legitimacy of ordinary 
members as leaders, again aiming to empower the management group. In this direction, 
for instance, ordinary members are accused of having either opportunistic behaviour, or 
less knowledge than is necessary to be leaders (tactic 4C-1D). The flaming of members 
(tactic 5C-2) and the fact that leaders ignore contributions of some members (tacit 5C-4) 
also work in the direction of reducing the legitimacy of some in relation to others. The 
creation of two membership categories (tactic 6C-1), in order to isolate ordinary members
28 As explained in subsection 6.1.7, the argument 7B-1 is cited in two contexts. Some members took for 
granted that management members should make decisions, without further explanation. Other members 
(the majority of citations) associated the argument with the idea of managerial efficiency. See specific 
citations in subsection 6.1.7.
29 This tactic is cited only by Rebea and Remtea members.
30 This tactic is only cited by members of Repea and Remtea as explained in subsections 6.1.4 and 7.1.4, 
considering the context in which the respective management groups have contextual facility to meet in 
specific localities, thus being able to impose such a rule over the other members.
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from the decision-making processes, is another technique with similar objectives. Thus 
the question of trying to reassure the legitimacy of social structures is clearly an issue in 
these four communities, through diverse arguments and tactics.
The tactic of flaming members (5C-2) can also be understood as an enforcement 
mechanism by means of punishment. Indeed another common aspect present in the four 
cases is the development of tactics which enforce behaviour, i.e. which use techniques to 
make members to accept the role of the management group, and to respect their ideas and 
identity as being representative of the community as a whole. For instance, in Rebea the 
management group has excluded at least one member from decision-making processes, 
because of her opposition to the main sponsor (federal government) (tactic 4C-3). In 
addition, Remtea expelled a member for reasons of non-compliance with the mainstream 
identity (tactic 6C-4). The appropriation of Internet tools through the four communities 
also works as an enforcement mechanism, but by means of limiting the channels and 
forms of communication (tactics 10C-1 and 11C-1), rather than punishment (see 
discussion on enforcement mechanisms in subsections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2).
Focusing on the differences, complementarity, the legislation (carrier 1A-1) affects all 
communities but Remtea, as it has not received government funding. The legislation has 
especially influenced Reasul’s governance structure, which was created because of this 
funding. Remtea, differently, is the only community affected by governance systems 
(carrier 4A-2), because of the level of intertwining between both the community and of a 
research group (GPEA/UFMT) in relation to their activities and membership.
Another interesting difference can be noticed in relation to members who assume formal 
roles such as being executive secretary. The four communities confirm a high level of 
respect for such roles (tactic 9C-3). However, Remtea has a particular situation in which 
members (and society) identify as the main community leader, an academic who does not 
have the role of executive secretary. Repea also has a particular characteristic in relation 
to formal roles. The community has given up on having an executive secretary since June
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2004, but the member who formally occupied this role previously is still respected in the 
same way (subsection 7.1.2).
In relation to the customization of Internet tools, Reasul is different from other cases. On 
the one hand, it is the only community which moderates the general discussion list 
(subsection 6.1.11 and 7.1.11). On the other hand, it is the community that permits more 
leadership members to publish on the website (ordinary members are not allowed to 
publish, just as in the other communities). Also related to Internet tools, the four 
communities emphasise making relevant decisions in face-of-face meetings (tactic 12C- 
1), but in Remtea this tactic is closer to their effective practice, considering that the 
majority of the management group works in the same building. In Reasul, face-to-face 
meetings have become less relevant after the funded project due to lack of money 
(subsection 7.1.12).
The data analysis also highlights that communities share different anecdotes about 
themselves, and cultivate different set of arguments. Thus some facts and reasons are 
cited more often in one community than another not necessarily because the final social 
structures are diverse, but because community members construct their identity 
differently. For instance, many Remtea interviewees recognize the tactic of blocking 
ordinary members from representing the community (tactic 9C-2), citing two episodes in 
which ordinary members strongly challenged the community practice of centralizing the 
choice of representatives with the management group. The memory of these cases, for 
whatever reason -  perhaps the fact that usually members respect the main leadership 
without questioning procedures -  is strong in the community, affecting their citations of 
the case.
7.3. Concluding remarks
Starting from the findings and analysis developed in chapters 5, 6 and 7, the next chapter 
answers the proposed research question on how institutional carriers influence the 
governance structures of Internet-mediated communities, fostering the segregation of
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decision-making processes. The suggestion of adding other analytical constructs 
(argument and tactics) to the categories of carriers, and the cross-case analysis confirm 
the relevance of considering agency and contextual elements when studying the process 
of institutionalisation, as it is discussed in chapter 8.
Following this empirical contribution, the next chapter opens a theoretical discussion on 
how the proposed analytical constructs (arguments and tactics) may contribute to a better 
understanding of the process of institutionalisation. Drawing upon structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1979, 1984), the chapter suggests expanding Scott’s (2001) framework in the 
direction of emphasising agency (arguments and tactics) as well as structure (carriers) in 
studies related to the process of institutionalisation.
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8. Concluding discussion: Understanding the diffusion of social 
structures through carriers in Internet-mediated communities
The present investigation started from an interest in the governance structures of the 
collectivities which emerge from Internet-mediated interactions in contemporary 
societies. Previous research showed that such virtual communities have developed 
diverse decision-making processes, from participatory democratic models to more 
hierarchical ones (Jones, 1995; Steinmueller, 2002; Graham, 1999; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 
2003; Sharma, Sugumaran and Rajagopaian, 2002; Ljungberg, 2000; Juris, 2005; Pickard, 
2006). This observed diversity of social structures poses the question of how to 
understand the development of different forms of organizing collective action in an 
environment in which face-to-face, geographically bounded interactions are less relevant.
In order to explore this theme, a pilot study (subsection 1.2.1) was conducted in 2004 and 
2005, with a group of Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated communities. 
In this investigation, members emphasised the process of making decisions as being at 
the centre of their governance structures. Curiously, the interviews disclosed a situation 
in which the communities have two parallel models of governance. Their ideal model of 
governance was an abstract idea about how decisions should be made in the community, 
following network forms of organization. In this ideal model, all members have the same 
power in decision-making processes. In contrast, their actual model of governance -  the 
one the communities, in practice, reproduce -  was based on segregated decision-making 
processes, an instance of centralization similar to hierarchical organization, as described 
by Simon (1997 [1945]). In other words, in spite of their members’ stated intent to create 
horizontal, network governance structures, in practice only some members in these 
communities have an effective say in decision-making.
In trying to understand how the segregated decision-making processes have spread 
through the studied communities, the empirical data was analysed through the lens of 
new institutionalism. The conclusion from this pilot study was that the studied
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phenomenon resembled a process of institutionalisation of emergent governance 
structures. As proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]), institutional structures 
diffuse through organizational fields, inducing individual entities to become similar, 
isomorphic, in relation to others. The level of interaction and interdependence between 
entities works to forge such similarities, through coercive, normative and mimetic 
mechanisms (discussed in subsection 3.2.2). Indeed, interviewees recognized that 
legislation, power systems, hierarchical models, social expectations and Internet tools 
were influencing their communities to behave differently from their intentions of creating 
network decision-making processes.
Considering the pilot study and the scholarly literature, this dissertation investigates the 
diffusion of segregated decision-making processes in a group of four Brazilian 
environmental-education Internet-mediated communities (Rebea, Repea, Remtea and 
Reasul), applying the theoretical lens of new institutionalism. As explained in chapter 3, 
new institutionalism proposes that social actors are influenced by resilient social 
structures, in such a way that their behaviour reproduces these structures to some degree. 
This research thus investigates how institutionalised structures influence actors in these 
communities in relation to the diffusion of segregated decision-making processes. This 
investigation is conducted through the lens of institutional carriers, understood as 
mechanisms and elements, such as rules, norms and cognitive schemas, which are 
repositories of social structures (Weber, 2002 [1930]; 1978 [1956]; Berger, Berger and 
Kellner, 1973; Jepperson, 1991; Meyer, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, 1991b 
[1983]; Scott, 1994a, 2001; Scott and Meyer, 1994).
In this direction, this research adopts Scott’s (2001) framework on 12 categories of 
institutional carriers (see table 3.2) and proposes to answer the following research 
question (introduced in subsection 1.4.4):
223
How do institutional carriers influence the establishment o f governance 
structures in Internet-mediated communities that lead to segregated 
decision-making processes (an instance o f centralization) that contrast 
with the official rhetoric o f the communities for non-hierarchical, 
network-like modes o f operating?
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the detailed findings and analysis of this thesis, which enable 
an answer to this research question. The findings describe: the role of institutional 
carriers in the diffusion of segregated decision-making processes in the studied Internet- 
mediated communities; the role of agency to support such carriers in different situations 
(through arguments and tactics); and the relevance of context in the diffusion of 
institutions through the observed carriers, considering the differences between the four 
communities through a cross-case analysis.
This concluding chapter proposes answers to the research question in a systematic 
fashion, bringing together the findings and analysis discussed previously with the 
theoretical framework on new institutionalism. The first section below presents the 
empirical contributions of this research. It explains the role of institutional carriers in the 
diffusion of institutionalised social structures through the studied Internet-mediated 
communities. It also explores how agency and context can help to understand the 
influence of carriers, through the lens of new institutionalism, as social structures only 
exist when people reproduce them in their environment.
The second section introduces the theoretical contributions of this thesis, proposing that 
Scott’s (2001) framework on institutional carriers may be improved through the addition 
of arguments and tactics to his categories. It claims that these additions provide an 
illuminating tool to balance the perception of social structure and agency in studies of 
institutionalisation.
The third section discusses research limitations. It first introduces a full 
conceptualization of the studied communities, in order to make clear the limits of this
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investigation in terms of an empirical object. The section then points out other 
limitations of the presented study and how this research has worked to overcome such 
shortcomings.
The final section presents some concluding remarks on the main contributions of this 
research and future research that may be suggested by this investigation.
8.1. Empirical contribution: The influence of institutional carriers
This investigation suggests that, through many channels, institutional carriers do 
influence social actors’ behaviour in the establishment of governance structures that lead 
to segregated decision-making processes in the four studied Internet-mediated 
communities. Scott’s (2001) framework has been useful in the present study, as it covers 
a wide spectrum of possible carriers, which has permitted a level of flexibility in the 
analysis of the diffusion of social structures through different contexts.
In light of the dependence of the studied communities on Internet-mediated 
communication channels, this research supports the contention that it is essential to 
recognize that Information and Communication Technologies are carriers of 
institutionalised social structures and themselves become institutions in specific contexts 
(Avgerou, 2002: 30-34; Venkatesh, 2003: 344; Silva and Backhouse, 1997: 390; 
Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). This endorses Scott’s inclusion of artefacts as possible 
repositories of social structures in his framework.
The role of carriers in the diffusion of institutional forms is discussed in the first 
subsection below. The second subsection discusses agency and considers how social 
actors develop arguments and tactics when influenced by carriers in specific contexts. 
The third subsection explains that carriers, arguments and tactics interact with each other, 
creating a more complex picture than would be observed through analysing these
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elements individually. The last subsection evaluates the adequacy of using of Scott’s 
(2001) framework in this study.
8.1.1. The role of structure
Recalling Berger and Luckmann’s (1967 [1966]: 74-79) discussion on the creation and 
diffusion of social structures through social interaction (as discussed in section 3.2.1), 
some typified actions become habitualized. When such actions are repeated through 
time, gaining historicity, they become objectified institutions. At this stage, 
institutionalised social structures are “experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a 
reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (ibid: 76). In other 
words, institutions are experienced as natural facts that exist independently of human 
action (ibid: 76-78). As a result, institutional features influence behaviour, because they 
are taken for granted as objective reality1.
In order to understand this influence, some authors propose to observe the role of 
institutional carriers in the diffusion of social structures. As suggested by Scott (2001), 
institutional carriers are repositories of institutionalised social structures, carrying them 
from setting to setting (see discussion in subsections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). The influence they 
exert, nonetheless, is also related to contextual factors (Scott, 2003. 2005).
The empirical evidence discussed in previous chapters confirms that institutional carriers 
influence actors’ behaviour, fostering the reproduction of segregated decision-making 
processes in the four environmental-education Internet-mediated communities. As the 
table 8.1 below summarizes, the 12 categories of carriers proposed by Scott’s (2001) 
framework are present in all the four communities, with a few, indicated, exceptions. The 
table thus confirms the relevance of considering regulative, normative and cultural-
1 Institutions also influence behaviour through the constitution of roles, i.e. through the internalisation of 
social structures. This argument is explored in subsection 8.1.2, as it is related to understanding agency 
through an institutional perspective.
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cognitive systems in the processes of the diffusion of social structures through 
institutional carriers.
Table 8.1 -  Institutional carriers2: Brazilian Internet-mediated communities
Carriers Pillars
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive
Symbolic systems Legislation *[1A-1] Societal [2A-1] 
and members’ 
expectations [2A-2]
Hierarchical 
schemas [3A-1]
Relational systems Power systems -  
influence of sponsors 
[4A-1]
Governance 
systems ** [4A-2]
Authority systems -  
status [5A-1] 
and governmental 
influence [5A-2]
Identities [6A-1]
Routines Standard operating 
procedures [7A-1]
Jobs and roles 
[8A-11
Scripts [9A-1]
Artefacts Objects complying 
with specifications -  
websites and 
discussion lists 
110A-11
Objects meeting 
conventions and 
standards -  websites 
and discussion lists 
I11A-11
Objects possessing 
symbolic value -  
Internet tools 
[12A-1]
* Only observed in Rebea, Repea and Reasul. ** Only observed in Remtea.
Each of these carriers, as presented in chapter 5, is recognized by community members as 
being a mechanism or element that influences their behaviour towards reproducing 
segregated decision-making processes. Institutional features are embedded in carriers 
(Scott 2001: 77), which work as repositories of related social structures. Thus, although 
community members insist on the intention of creating network forms of organizing, they 
admit that segregated structures are pervasive due to the influence they receive from the
2 Recall that, in this thesis, carriers are numbered from 1A to 12A, each one related to a category in Scott’s 
(2001) framework. The last numbers added to each category of carrier are related to the specific carrier in 
the category. Thus in the category 2A (normative symbolic systems), the carrier 2A-1 refers to societal 
expectations, and the carrier 2A-2 refers to members’ expectations. Sequentially (in tables below), the 
arguments are numbered from IB to 12B, and the tactics, from 1C to 12C, again respecting the 12 
categories. The numbers associated with these roots again indicate the specific arguments and tactics in 
each category (for instance, 2B-1 and 2C-1 refer respectively to the first argument and the first tactic 
related to carriers in the category 2A).
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many carriers in their contexts. The next paragraphs summarize the way this influence is 
exerted, as it differs in line with the characteristics of each carrier.
Considering carriers related to symbolic systems, firstly, the legislation (1A-1) permits 
these communities to receive government funding for specific projects, but it also 
requires communities to be represented by an anchor organization, which is empowered 
relative to other members, favouring the segregation of decision making in the funded 
projects3. Secondly, wider society and community members jointly cultivate expectations 
(2A-1 and 2A-2) that the communities need to be represented by members who have 
formal roles, such as that of executive secretary. The differentiation between roles 
empowers gatekeepers and spokespeople in relation to ordinary members, legitimating 
the identified leaders as decision-makers. Thirdly, hierarchical schemas (3A-1) exert 
their influence through taken-for-granted models4. Based on their cultural-cognitive 
framework, members reproduce the hierarchical models they are used to, accepting that 
some have more power than others, which affects their relative position in decision­
making structures.
Focusing on carriers associated with relational systems, interviewees recognize that 
power systems, through the influence o f sponsors, affect community governance 
structures (4A-1); members linked with government, universities and NGOs have more 
power in decision-making processes in respect of the Internet-mediated collectivities. 
Furthermore, in the case of Remtea, community members and activities are deeply
3 As introduced in chapter 5, legislation affects, by legal means, the funded projects, not the community 
governance structure as a whole. Although in practice the same structure is reproduced at broader levels 
(see tactic 1C-1, subsection 6.1.1), this reproduction is not a legal imposition.
4 The process of institutionalisation implies that actors internalise social structures, through socialization, 
which then become mental models, framing the way people encounter the world (Berger and Luckmannn 
1967 [1966]: 78-79). The model is a cognitive framework of how things are done. It limits the creation of 
alternatives, as the past experience guides what is expected from the future (Douglas, 1987: 47-48). This 
understanding of institutions at the cognitive level is applicable also to the other carriers in the cultural- 
cognitive pillar (identities, scripts and objects possessing symbolic value) (see subsection 3.2.1 on how 
institutions are internalised).
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intertwined with an academic research group (GPEA/UFMT) and the governance systems 
of the academic group deeply influence the community (4A-2), as the boundaries 
between both structures are not defined. Authority systems also influence community 
governance structures, reproducing the status members have in society (5A-1). In this 
category, the government influence also affects the legitimacy of some members when 
recognizing them as community representatives (5A-2). In both cases, status empowers 
some members in decision-making processes. Finally, the identity people have in society 
(6A-1) influences the way they behave in online interactions. Thus their close identity 
with other leadership groups in the government and universities, for instance, reinforces 
the segregation of decision making, as community leaders form a group which is closer to 
these other leadership groups than to the ordinary members of the community.
In considering carriers related to routines, firstly, standard operating procedures (7A-1), 
in this investigation, bring to the community the segregated decision-making processes, 
which are pervasive in hierarchical organizations (Simon, 1997 [1945]). Indeed, this 
research starts by exploring this routine (chapter 1), considering the empirical evidence 
that communities embed segregation in their governance structures. Secondly, jobs and 
roles (8A-1) influence the community because members are not anonymous, thus to some 
degree they reproduce in online interactions the same relations they have in offline 
collectivities. This mechanism favours the segregation of decision making because 
members avoid opposing powerful people in their social networks, such as their bosses or 
their academic supervisors (in the case of students). Thirdly, scripts (9A-1) also reinforce 
the legitimacy of some members in making decisions, as members associate roles with 
activities, such as linking the executive secretary with the activity of representing the 
community, elaborating projects and controlling the contents of websites.
Finally, considering artefacts as carriers, in the current cases these are the adopted 
Internet tools, mainly the websites and discussion lists, which are the main 
communication channels in these communities. Firstly, considering objects complying 
with specification (10A-1), websites and discussion lists have technical features which 
permit, but do not require, some members to exert control over others, favouring
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segregation of decision making. Thus these objects carry the possibility of segregation -  
such as limiting access to publishing on the website and to entering discussion lists, 
restricting these to management members. Secondly, in analysing objects meeting 
conventions and standards (11A-1), the focus is on the same artefacts, but, now, in 
relation to how they are customized by communities. Although the technical features 
permit a range of forms of appropriation (some more democratic than others), the default 
customization of the artefacts favours the segregation of decision making. Thirdly, 
objects possessing symbolic value (12A-1) indicate that artefacts transmit values into the 
community. The belief that Internet communication channels are less efficient than face- 
to-face interactions undermines the legitimacy of general discussion lists as a space for 
decision making, which in practice excludes ordinary members from the process, while 
decisions are made mainly on the segregated discussion lists5.
Both categories of carriers that are not present in all the four communities are from the 
regulative pillar. In the case of the legislation (1A-1), Remtea is not influenced by this 
carrier because the community has never accepted direct government funding. In the case 
of governance systems (4A-2), only Remtea has received this influence, because the 
community boundaries are ill-defined in relation to the related academic research group.
As explained by Scott, regulative systems conform to rules -  legal or quasi-legal 
requirements -  and their influence is sanctioned by coercive mechanisms (2001: 60; 
2005: 465). Thus as Remtea did not accept government funding, it is not subject to the 
influence of the legislation and its coercive mechanisms6.
5 There is an inherent contradiction in this carrier. Logically, this symbolic value should undermine the 
legitimacy of both the general and the segregated discussion lists. However, as explained in subsection 
5.2.12, interviewees use this symbolic value only to undermine the legitimacy of the general discussion list 
as a channel of decision making. The same reasoning is not applied in relation to segregated discussion 
lists. Thus I keep the meaning brought by the interviewees, although it is logically inconsistent.
6 Observe that in this investigation the carrier legislation is related to specific government funding (FNMA 
-  Fundo Nacional do Meio Ambiente), as cited in subsection 5.2.1. It may occur that other aspects of legal 
regulations affect these communities, but these have not been cited by interviewees.
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As the boundaries between Remtea and the related academic group are unclear, 
community members copy the power structures they suppose to be prevalent in the higher 
prestige and more powerful partner organisations. The governance system of the 
academic research group is supported by rules defining who takes decisions and who is 
subordinated. Although it is said that both structures are independent, in practice, as 
revealed by the interviewees, Remtea management members do not differentiate between 
their formal work in the academic research group and their voluntary work in the 
community, thus they act in accordance with their perception of how things are legally 
sanctioned and strive for homogeneity, not differentiation, of processes.
Sanction mechanisms and legitimacy associated with carriers
The cited carriers can also be understood in terms of their capacity of being mechanisms 
of sanction (enforcement) and legitimation in the institutionalisation of segregated 
decision-making processes through the studied communities.
As discussed in section 3.1, the diffusion of social structures depends on the presence of 
sanction and reward mechanisms7, imposed by actors who have power to control such 
methods (Jepperson, 1991: 145; Knight and Ensminger, 1998: 106; Scott, 1998: 316-317; 
Nee, 1998b: 9-10). The carrier legislation (1A-1), for instance, is related to both reward 
mechanisms (through access to funding) and punishment ones (through legal regulation 
of the anchor organization, which accepts accountability for the received money). Also 
power and governance systems (4A-1 and 4A-2) bring both sanctions mechanisms, as 
sponsors reward acceptable behaviour through direct and indirect benefits (for instance 
by funding projects, meetings and publications) or may punish behaviour by cutting or 
denying opportunities in situations of non-compliance. Considering the carriers jobs and 
roles (8A-1), people could be punished or rewarded in their offline interactions for their 
behaviour in the online space (argument 8B-1 expresses this fear, in subsection 6.1.8).
7 For Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 73), sanction mechanisms are necessary only when the 
institutionalisation is not complete. Otherwise, institutions are taken-for-granted cognitively as an objective 
(a non-human) facticity, making the imposition of control mechanisms unnecessary (ibid: 106).
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In addition, the artefacts work as enforcement mechanisms in the current context by 
means of framing the opportunities of action, rather than through imposing rewards or 
punishments. As discussed in subsection 5.2.10, even considering the flexibility of the 
technology used, this malleability is not infinite. Thus some material features of artefacts 
(related in this study to the carrier 10A-1) may constrain action physically or by means of 
framing the cognitive understanding of possibilities (Doherty, Coombs and Loan-Clarke, 
2006; Orlikowski, 2000; Kallinikos, 2002). The level of enforcement is greater when 
communities adopt a standardized customization that is congruent with segregated 
decision-making processes (related in this study to the carrier 11A-1). Thus when 
community leaders limit the publishing feature on the website to a few members, other 
members are forced to comply, as they cannot publish without knowing the correct 
password.
Complementarity, the reproduction of patterned behaviour depends on legitimacy: the 
assumption that actions are desirable, appropriate, justifiable and meaningful within a 
social system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995: 574, 576; Scott, 2005: 465; 
2001: 59-60; Berger and Luckmann 1967 [1966]: 79, 82) (see section 3.1). Furthermore, 
by conforming to institutions, social actors can be rewarded with increased legitimacy 
within their social networks (Meyer, 1992: 263, 269; Avgerou, 2000: 236; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 352, 354; Powell, 1991: 190).
Indeed, the studied carriers are linked with mechanisms of legitimacy. For instance, 
authority systems (5A-1 and 5A-2) legitimate the segregated structures normatively 
(Scott, 2005: 465), associating them with the legitimacy community leaders have in 
society. Thus if members have legitimacy in society as authorities, they have legitimacy 
in the community as leaders as well. Similarly, but in the opposite direction, when 
communities conform to societal expectations (2A-1), nominating formal representatives 
such as executive secretaries and coordinators, society legitimises these collectivities. In 
this case, the legitimacy society gives in recognition of compliant behaviour may 
become, in turn, a reward mechanism, as legitimacy may be translated into benefits such
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as funding. Communities tend to conform to expectations in order to have legitimacy, a 
phenomenon observed in other forms of organization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b 
[1983]: 68-69).
Alternatively, legitimacy in cultural-cognitive carriers is related to the degree they are 
recognizable and comprehensible (Scott, 2005: 465). The example of hierarchical 
schemas (3A-1) illustrates this. Respondents take for granted the legitimacy of some 
community members having more power in decision making, in spite of the declaration 
that all members have the same power in their communities. It is interesting to observe 
here that the difficulty of imagining alternatives -  creating new models -  confers 
legitimacy on how things are done presently (Scott, 2005: 465; Berger and Luckmann, 
1967 [1966]: 71). Furthermore, mimetic mechanisms, whereby actors copy successful 
behaviour to obtain legitimacy in society, may help to understand the phenomenon 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991b [1983]: 67). As hierarchical schemas are broadly 
legitimated in society, these models in turn legitimate these communities, as mimicking 
them may render rewards to the collectivities, since they depend on credibility to obtain 
funding. Also scripts (9A-1) provide legitimacy to some members in relation to their 
superior roles in decision-making processes.
8.1.2. The role of agency
The empirical evidence, presented in chapters 5 and 6, suggests that the diffusion of 
segregated decision-making processes emerges from how agents interpret and act to 
reproduce related social structures in specific situations. Carriers diffuse elements of 
institutionalised features, but they only exert influence upon the emergent structures as 
far as social actors reproduce them. The mere presence of carriers does not explain the 
diffusion of institutions. It is thus interesting to reinforce some concepts related to 
agency, in accordance with the adopted theoretical framework.
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As explained in chapter 3, the interaction between agency and social structure is complex 
and multidirectional. Formulating structuration theory, Giddens (1979: 64, 70; 1984: 17, 
25, 374) argues that actors constitute social structures through interaction, but they are 
themselves constituted by these social structures. Similarly, new-institutionalist scholars 
emphasise both aspects of agency: that institutions constitute roles and forms of 
‘actorhood’ (see subsection 3.2.1); and that agents should choose among conflicting 
institutions in specific contexts (see subsection 3.3.2).
Thus on the one hand, when internalised through socialization, institutional features 
become embodied in individuals as social roles and appropriate conduct (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 78-79; Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994: 9-10; Scott, 1994b: 67; 
Strang and Meyer, 1994: 104-111; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 710). When 
associated with enforcement mechanisms, the internalised social structures favour the 
reproduction of patterned behaviour, bringing predictability to social life (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 83, 91; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 710-712; Meyer, 
1992: 263; Douglas, 1987: 4, 8,45; Scott, 1994b: 66).
On the other hand, agents decide the appropriate behaviour in an environment of 
conflicting institutional features, in which they make choices in face of what they learn 
through interaction with the world (Giddens, 1984: 14-15; 1995: 235; Meyer, 1992: 264; 
Bhaskar, 1998: 218; Manicas: 1998: 320; Scott, 2001: 76). Thus the reproduction of 
institutionalised social structures cannot be taken for granted, as people may change their 
behaviour (Scott, 2001: 50; 1992b: 161-174; 1994b: 75-76; Avgerou, 2000: 234-235; 
2002: 37; Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 99, 103; Powell, 1991: 195, 199) (see 
section 3.3).
Even starting from the idea of internalised social structures, Berger and Luckmann (1967 
[1966]: 78-79) argue that this process is continuous, as there is a permanent dialectical 
dialogue between humans and the social world. Thus the constitution of actors as roles 
should be understood in this dynamic fashion, as agents change their understandings and 
actions (ibid). Peters and Pierre (1998: 567) suggest that in the short term institutions are
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perceived as structures, but that in the long term social structures are flexible. Also 
Douglas (1987: 45-48) maintains that although cognitive processes depend on institutions 
that are internalised as taken-for-granted understandings, it does not mean that they are 
always followed.
.This investigation draws upon this perception that institutions are dynamic, agreeing with 
Scott (2001: 39, 48, 72-77) that it is necessary to emphasise the more active role of 
agency in the diffusion of institutions, as stated by Giddens* structuration theory. This 
dissertation thus agrees with Scott (2005: 467), that “while recognizing that actors are 
institutionally constructed, it is essential to affirm their (varying) potential for 
reconstructing the rules, norms, and beliefs that guide -  but do not determine -  their 
actions.” Indeed, the empirical evidence, presented in previous chapters, shows that the 
embedding of the carried social structures in the studied settings demands agency. Still, 
this agency produces both the simple reproduction of institutional features and the change 
of social structures.
In this study, agency is analysed twice: (i) through the creation of arguments which 
justify the anomalies between the ideal model of network governance and the actual 
model of segregated decision-making processes; and (ii) through the creation of tactics, 
which might sometimes be the simple repetition of the model suggested by the carrier 
(which still depends on agency), but in other situations is something which derives and 
deviates from the original social structures, while adapting to the situation. These 
elements are discussed below, as well as the perspective the empirical evidence suggests: 
that contextual factors are associated with some of the differences observed between the 
four cases.
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Arguments: how agents justify their behaviour
Table 8.2 -  Institutional carriers: summary o f related arguments
Legislation
The community needs to 
comply with legislation in 
order to receive government 
funding [IB-1].
Expectations
The community should have
a formal interface with
society [2B-1];
and a group to resolve
conflicts [2B-2]
and to take initiatives
[2B-3].
Hierarchical schema
It is difficult both to manage 
the community without 
following a hierarchical 
model [3B-1]; 
and to create a network 
organization in a 
hierarchical society [3B-2].
Power and governance 
systems
In decision making, the 
sponsor has more power 
[4B-1];
as well as the more active 
members [4B-3]; 
ordinary members are not 
interested in managing the 
community [4B-2].
Authority systems
Some people have 
legitimacy to make 
decisions because they are 
either authorities in the field 
[5B-1];
or older members in the 
community [5B-2].
Identities
People carry their identities 
to virtual interactions 
[6B-1].
Standard operating 
procedures
The management group 
should make decisions 
[7B-1].
Jobs and roles
People fear losing their jobs 
[8B-1];
and are committed to their 
current occupations [8B-2].
Scripts
Having a formal role has 
meaning for community 
members [9B-1].
Objects complying with 
specifications
People do not have 
knowledge of how to 
appropriate other Internet 
tools [10B-1].
Objects meeting conventions 
and standards
Conventional customization 
is adopted to control the 
quality of content on 
websites and discussion lists 
[11B-1];
also because people do not 
know how to use these tools 
in a flexible way [11B-2].
Objects possessing symbolic 
value
Face-to-face meetings are 
more relevant than virtual 
discussions [12B-1]; 
and communities should not 
exclude from 
communication those who 
do not have access to the 
Internet [12B-2].
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the construction of an institutionalised social order is 
grounded in shared social meaning. Scott (1994b: 57-59) explains that an action is social
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behaviour as far as it is supported by shared meanings, which emerge from the human 
interaction. This shared meaning is internalised by socialization, in such a way that the 
collective understanding also becomes the individual comprehension of the world to 
some degree (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 149-150). Thus people embody both 
their individual perspectives and a reasonable consensus on social structures (Meyer, 
1992: 264), in such a way that agents are continually interpreting meaning, either for 
conforming to or for modifying rules (Scott, 1994b: 60).
The observation of arguments (summarized above in table 8.2, from tables in chapter 6), 
in this thesis, emphasises the relevance of shared meaning in the enactment of social 
structures. As discussed in chapter 6 in relation to arguments, agency works to justify 
incoherencies, reinforcing and legitimising the institutionalised segregation of decision 
making in this investigation.
Many of these justifications repeat taken-for-granted beliefs -  such as that the sponsor 
has more power to define directions (4B-1), and people fear losing their jobs (8B-1) if 
they oppose their bosses on the discussion lists. Other arguments recall that management 
groups contribute to the communities, as it is difficult to manage the community without 
following a hierarchical model (3B-1); and that leaders are legitimate as decision-makers 
because of their capacity and contributions to the communities (summarizing arguments 
4B-3, 5B-1 and 5B-2). Other arguments allege that ordinary members are not interested 
in managing the community (4B-2), and that they do not have knowledge of how to use 
and customize Internet tools (summarizing arguments 10B-1 and 11B-1). The important 
point is that agents take the initiative in embedding the segregation of decision-making 
processes on the basis of shared meaning, in order to justify and legitimise the 
reproduction of social structures which are not consistent with their ideal model of 
network organization.
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Tactics: how agents enact social structures in their situation
Table 8.3 — Institutional carriers: summary o f related tactics *
Legislation
Make the community’s 
governance structure similar to 
the governance structure of the 
funded project. [1C-1] 
Concentrate power and 
visibility in the anchor 
organization. flC-2]
Expectations
Conform to social 
expectations: keep gatekeepers 
(moderators, facilitators) and 
formal representatives, 
legitimising their roles. [2C-1]
Hierarchical schema
Make governance rules 
blurred, thus members do not 
know how things are decided, 
or who chooses community 
representatives. [3C-1]
Ignore complaints against 
centralized structures. [3C-2]
Power and governance 
systems
Create obstacles for ordinary 
members joining the 
management group. [4C-1] 
Avoid conflict with and 
criticism of sponsors and 
people in strategic positions in 
the government, universities 
and important NGOs. [4C-2] 
Exclude from debate within 
the management group those 
that do not agree with the 
leadership orientation. [4C-3]
Authority systems
Organize your peers in 
segregated discussions to give 
support to each other on the 
general discussion list. [5C-1] 
Flame members. [5C-2]
Set the agenda. [5C-3]
Ignore the contributions and 
opinions of members.
[5C-4]
Keep silent for not having 
legitimate knowledge. [5C-5]
Identities
Create ambiguous categories 
of membership. [6C-1]
Restrict the management group 
to those that share the same 
identity. [6C-2]
Flame members. [6C-3]
Expel members who do not 
agree with the mainstream. 
[6C-4]
Keep silent for disagreeing 
with the mainstream. [6C-5]
Standard operating procedures
Keep a segregated discussion 
list for leadership members. 
[7C-1]
Keep control over community 
gatekeepers (moderators and 
facilitators). [7C-2]
Keep control over community 
representatives. [7C-3]
Jobs and roles
Keep in the community a 
posture which is adequate to 
the roles and jobs one has in 
society. [8C-1]
Scripts
Centralize the representation 
of the community in the 
executive secretary. [9C-1J 
Block ordinary members from 
representing the community or 
taking decisions. [9C-2] 
Respect roles such as of the 
executive secretary. [9C-3]
Objects complying with 
specifications
Avoid Internet tools (other 
than the discussion list and the 
website**) that would foster 
less centralized decision­
making processes.
[10C-1]
** Except Rebea: Orkut
Objects meeting conventions 
and standards
Avoid customizing websites 
and discussion lists in a more 
flexible way. [11C-1]
Objects possessing symbolic 
value ,
Make relevant decisions in 
face-to-face meetings. [12C-1]
* Only main tactics are summarized in this table. Sub-tactics are in original tables in chapter 6.
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Focusing on tactics (summarized in the table 8.3), the presence of agency is related to 
both the reproduction and the change of social structures. Tactic 7C-1, for instance, 
reproduces the related carrier: keep a segregated discussion list fo r  leadership members, 
which translates the idea of having segregated decision-making processes into the virtual 
environment. If management members do not want others participating in decisions, they 
should create a virtual space with restricted access. It is also the case of tactics 8C-1 (keep 
in the community a posture which is adequate to the roles and jobs one has in society), 
and 1C-2 (concentrate power and visibility in the anchor organization), as both 
reproduce the carried social structures.
Considering this tactic 1C-2, the funding legislation empowers the anchor organization 
and agents repeat this empowerment without questioning the structure (subsection 5.2.1 
discusses how it could be otherwise, as communities are constrained in relation their 
interface with the government, but not in their model of decision making). However at 
the time of the data collection, the communities were no longer subject to this legislation 
(all projects had finished before the interviews)8. Still, members recreated the same 
structure. Furthermore, tactic 1C-1 -  make the community’s governance structure similar 
to the governance structure o f the funded project -  also results from agency that goes 
further than the mere reproduction of structures carried by the legislation. The legislation 
enforces a structure in specific projects, but not the extension of this structure beyond the 
projects to other community activities.
In other cases, the tactic is a new social structure, which supports the institutionalised one 
in the specific situation. Tactic 3C-1 -  make governance rules blurred and ambiguous -  
for instance, permits disguising the hierarchical structure (members having different 
degrees of power) as being something else, thus potentially reducing resistance against 
the actual structure through increasing ambiguity. Another example is tactic 4C-1B (see 
table 6.8 in chapter 6 for this detail) -  keep some debates only among peers in the 
management group, which reduces transparency in online interactions. This action
8 The projects, nonetheless, had been in development during the pilot study.
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undermines occasional resistance against the reproduction of power structures derived 
from the power systems -  influence o f sponsors (carrier 4A-1). Also tactic 4C-1C (see 
table 6.8 in chapter 6), require members to attend face-to-face meetings to participate in 
the management group, creates obstacles to ordinary members’ participation in the 
governance structure, indirectly supporting the reproduction of segregated decision­
making processes.
Following the same reasoning, the tactics which enact enforcement mechanisms are 
social structures developed in a particular situation, in order to foster (or reduce the 
opposition to) the reproduction of segregated institutionalised structures. These 
mechanisms do not reproduce the segregated structures, but they enforce them mainly by 
means of punishment9. As explored in the literature, enforcement mechanisms are 
imposed by actors who have power in relation to the elaboration and change of 
institutions (Knight and Ensminger, 1998: 106; Scott, 1998: 316-317; Stinchcombe, 
1968: 112, 186; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 30-31; Nee, 1998b: 9-10; Nee and Ingram, 
1998: 25). As stressed by Scott (2005: 467), in the process of institutionalisation, it is 
necessary to specify the actors who hold the beliefs and enforce the norms.
Tactic 4C-3, exclude from debate within the management group those that do not agree 
with the leadership orientation, for instance, undermines the resistance to sponsors’ 
influence {power systems, carrier 4A-1). This tactic sends a message to members that 
opposing the sponsor in online interactions may have disadvantageous consequences. In 
addition, the tactic of flaming members who question the legitimate speech or group 
identity (from the viewpoint of management members) (5C-2 and 6C-3) is a social 
structure that may constrain members’ free expression against leaders. Also tactic 6C-4, 
expel members who do not agree with the mainstream identity, used only in Remtea, is a
9 The exception in the examples cited in this sequence is tactic 10C-1, which fosters segregation of 
decision-making by denying access to other solutions related to the appropriation of Internet tools. This 
study has also observed enforcement mechanisms by means of rewards, such as the actual and potential 
benefits sponsors offer directly and indirectly to members as channels for influencing community 
governance structures (see subsections 5.2.4 and 8.2.1).
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strong enforcement mechanism to proscribe opposition to the management group. 
Further, this tactic enforces the leadership agenda, as the management group has 
mechanisms to block divergent opinions. Lastly, the tactics o f avoiding Internet tools 
(other than the discussion list and the website) that would foster transparency, 
participation, and less centralized decision-making processes (10C-1), and avoiding 
customizing websites and discussion lists in a more flexible way (11C-1) are subtle ways 
of enforcing behaviour through framing how artefacts are appropriated.
Context: how agents react to specific contextual factors
The literature on new institutionalism proposes that social structures diffuse differently 
through settings, in accordance with their contexts (Weber, 2002 [1930]: 5-12; 32-33; 
Jepperson, 1991: 146; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b [1983]: 74-76; Scott, 1991 [1987]: 
174-181; 1992b: 161-174; 2003: 884-886). Scott (2005: 467-468) contends that a variety 
of patterned interactions emerge from situations in which people are exposed to 
ambiguities. Avgerou (2000: 235), studying the institutionalisation of technological 
innovation, argues that it is necessary fo understand the cultural systems in which 
organizations are embedded, as institutional forces stem from each level: international, 
national, sectoral and local.
Indeed, some contrasts between the four cases, as presented in chapter 7, suggest that 
arguments and tactics emerge in specific situations. For instance, tactic 3C-2 {ignore 
complaints against centralized structures) is cited many times by Rebea members, a 
community that has faced some opposition to its governance structure (see subsection 
6.1.3). In other words, members are more sensitised to noticing such a tactic in an 
environment in which many complain, than in a space in which few express disagreement 
with the governance structure.
Similarly, tactic 4C-3 {exclude from debate within the management group those that do 
not agree with the leadership orientation) is also only observed in Rebea. Most of the
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citations10 related to this tactic refer to a specific case of a previous core leadership 
member who had been excluded from debates and decision making after opposing the 
federal government (the community’s main sponsor) publicly through the discussion lists. 
Members became aware of such a tactic only because of such a specific situation. It 
appears from other declarations, that this tactic had been used before, but members 
forcefully expressed their recognition of the norm through remarking upon the most cited 
case. It is of note that it was not a formalized punishment, as the exclusion was done 
through informal means (ostracism).
A specific case is also behind the emergence of tactic 6C-4 {expel members who do not 
agree with the mainstream identity). The interviews show that this tactic was adopted 
only once by Remtea, in a specific case of a member whose behaviour was considered 
intolerable by leadership members. Thus the tactic had not been thought of beforehand, 
but emerged from a specific situation and has not been used again in relation to other 
members. It may happen, nonetheless, that communities expel other members in the 
future, if circumstances are conducive to the emergence of such a structure in a more 
systematic fashion.
Drawing upon new-institutionalist authors, these tactics of excluding members from 
management groups and expelling members from the community do not emerge from 
scratch, but from a shared historicity in which they make sense (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967 [1966]: 72; Lanzara, 1998: 26-27). Furthermore, they emerge from an asymmetry of 
power between members, favouring those who control the enforcement mechanisms 
(Knight and Ensminger, 1998: 106-108; North, 1998: 249). In the studied cases, these 
new patterns reinforce the institutionalised procedure of segregating decision making. 
However, they may be enacted also in other circumstances which are not related to the 
segregation of decision making, as far as they are legitimised by these communities as 
desirable or appropriate (Suchman, 1995: 574; Scott, 2005: 465). From current evidence,
10 Citations: RebeaO’l. 14/16; Rebea04.03/04/07; Rebeal3.14/15; Repea01.25; Repea02.21. As explained in 
chapter 5, Repea interviewees also refer to the same case in relation to Rebea, as some Repea members are 
also Rebea members.
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it is not possible to conclude whether these new patterned behaviours, such as expelling 
members, will be legitimise in the long term.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that many of the emerged tactics are practices 
which are particularly related to the reproduction or embedding of segregated decision­
making structures in the context of Internet-mediated interactions. For instance, the 
creation of segregated discussion lists (tactic 7C-1), which reproduces the segregation of 
decision-making processes (carrier 7A-1), and the organization of leadership peers 
through segregated lists (or private mails) (tactic 5C-1), which reinforces within the 
communities the legitimate authority some members have in society (carriers 5A-1 and 
5A-2), are practices that depend on the technical features of the adopted Internet tools 
(carrier 10A-1), and the way they are customized (carrier 11A-1). In the same fashion, the 
exclusion of management members from segregated lists (tactic 4C-3), related to the 
reinforcement of power systems (carrier 4A-1), and the expelling of a member from the 
general list (tactic 6C-4), related to the reinforcement of mainstream identity (carrier 6A- 
1), are possible because the tools have technical features and are customized in such a 
way to permit management members to control who participates in these lists.
Indeed, the possibility of controlling gatekeepers (tactic 7C-2) also depends on Internet- 
mediated channels allowing some to be gatekeepers, thus listing others as ordinary 
members. In a more subtle manner, but still relevant, other practices draw upon the non­
physical presence of Internet-mediated interactions to ignore members’ contributions and 
complaints (tactics 5C-4 and 3C-2), and to set the agenda (tactic 5-3). As respondents 
highlighted (discussed in chapter 6), it is relatively easy in the electronic communication 
to ignore members’ manifestations, and to change the themes in debate proposing new 
themes. Lastly, the way these communities organize themselves in the virtual 
environment is particularly prone to establish the ‘legitimate’ channels of 
communication. Thus the tactics of avoiding specific Internet tools and flexible forms of 
customizing them (10C-1 and 11C-1) are practices which control communication 
channels in this particular context in which Internet-mediated communication is the main 
mean of interaction.
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8.1.3. Interactions between carriers, arguments and tactics
The empirical evidence of the four case-studies suggests that carriers are deeply 
interrelated to each other. As analysed by Scott (2003: 890-891), this happens because 
similar structures influence the process of institutionalisation in different ways, thus they 
can be analysed from regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive perspectives. 
Furthermore, different structures support each other in diverse situations, thus each 
assumes characteristics that make sense when considered in relation to the others. This 
condition is inherent in the adopted framework on carriers (Scott, 2001), as it proposes to 
separate regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements of institutionalised 
structures.
In this investigation, this is the case, for instance, of regulative and normative artefacts 
(carriers 10A-1 and 11A-1), as discussed above. The same artefact can be understood by 
its technical features (the inscribed code itself) or by the standardized way these features 
are customized. Both carriers are thus closely intertwined and interviewees often talk 
about artefacts in an ambiguous way, without differentiating the material features from 
the customization itself (also because some people do not have enough knowledge to 
understand the difference).
When a standardized customization is institutionalised, it becomes difficult to perceive 
alternatives, as it acquires a taken-for-granted status of how things are (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 71). Here again it is helpful to recall that institutions are 
supported simultaneously by regulative, normative and cognitive systems (Scott, 2005: 
465; 2001: 51-52). Thus even when the focus is on one aspect, the others are also acting 
in the background (as discussed in section 3.1).
A similar situation is found in relation to hierarchical schemas (carrier 3A-1) and 
standard operating procedures (carrier 7A-1), which are closely related to each other. 
Hierarchical schemas have a taken-for-granted meaning, which appears in the interviews 
as a conception that it is natural that some people have more power in decision-making
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processes11. The way these different degrees of power are manifested in routines is 
through the segregation of decision-making processes, which in the online interactions is 
done through the segregated discussion lists.
Other example of interaction between carriers is the link between jobs and roles (carrier 
8A-1) and identities (carrier 6A-1). When discussing identities, members think closely 
about their association with government officials and academics, as they are at the same 
time, and inescapably, community members and government officials and/or academics. 
In explaining their governance structures and behaviour, members talk about their roles in
19the government and universities as also being their identities .
Sometimes multiple roles are contrasted, when the member is able to understand her 
beliefs and values (identity) as being different from the expression of opinion she would 
make for the sake of her job or role in society. Reasull3.08, for instance, identifies her 
position in the community as being a representative of a government office, thus she 
recognizes the action of avoiding expressing her own opinion. Other times the 
differentiation is not clear and for some members there is no difference at all between 
their identities and their role in society, at least in their discourse. This emerges from 
interviewees such as RemteaOl, whose existence in the community is a continuation of 
her multiple-identity as an environmentalist, an academic and a member of a political 
party. In other words, in her discourse, she does not differentiate between her roles in 
these different spheres of her life.
The examples go further, for instance, relating societal expectations of having community 
representatives (carrier 2A-1) to the idea of scripts (carrier 9A-1) (taken-for-granted 
assumptions people attribute to roles). The twin reasonings that (i) society demands that 
the community has a formal representative and that (ii) an executive secretary has
11 As explained in subsection 5.2.3, the term hierarchical schema recalls many other complex concepts, but 
in this thesis it is used with this limited meaning, in the light of the objectives of this study and the meaning 
interviewees have attributed to it.
12 Roles in society may also be understood as identity (March, 1994: 68).
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specific activities, such as representing the community, are very close. The difference 
comes from the way the statements are constructed. Whether the expectation derives from 
society, or from the script, both are related to a situation in which an executive secretary 
has the role of representing the community.
Although not exhaustive, the examples above help to understand why some definitions of 
carriers are very close, demanding effort to perceive the nuances in the meaning 
interviewees intend to convey, through the lens of the adopted framework. Thus the 
similarities between carriers are an inherent condition of this research following Scott’s 
(2001) categorization, which differentiates social structures in their regulative, normative 
and cognitive proprieties. Indeed, Scott’s categorization has been very helpful in 
exploring these nuances and intersections. Without this categorization, which stimulates 
the perception.of the different aspects of carriers, it would be very difficult to develop 
such a complex picture, as presented in this thesis.
In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that, as well as carriers being interrelated, 
arguments and tactics also have similarities which cross the different categories. For 
instance, arguments 2B-2 and 2B-3 recall the role of the leadership group in resolving 
conflicts and taking initiatives, which have similarities with argument 7B-1, that the
•  13 ■management group should make decisions for reasons of efficiency ; and also with 
argument 3B-1 that it is difficult to manage the community without a hierarchical model. 
All these arguments try to justify the fact that the communities have differentiation 
between leadership and ordinary members.
Another similarity comes from the arguments that some members concentrate decision­
making processes because they are more active and committed than others (4B-3) and
13 As discussed in subsection 6.1.7, argument 7B-1 many times is associated with the idea that the 
management group brings efficiency to the community (citations: Rebea06.09/13; Rebea07.20; 
Rebea08.11; Rebea09.16; Rebeal4.18; Repea04.09; Repea05.05; Repea06.13; Repea07.06; Rebea08.07; 
RepealO.Ol; Repeal 1.04/10; Reasul 15.05.). Note, nonetheless, that the argument sometimes is associated 
with other reasoning.
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older members have created the community (or worked more), thus they have more 
legitimacy to make decisions (5B-2). Both arguments link the power and legitimacy to 
make decisions with the amount of work given to the community. Argument 6B-1 
recognizes the relevance of identity, positing that people are the same inside and outside 
the community, which is close to arguments that jobs and roles influence members’ 
behaviour because people fear losing their jobs (8B-1), and people have commitment with 
their current jobs (8B-2). Finally, both arguments related to artefacts are very similar: 
that members do not know how to use Internet tools, thus the difficulty o f appropriating 
alternatives (10B-1); and that members do not know how to use such tools in a more 
flexible way (1 IB-1).
Focusing on tactics, some of the community leaders cultivate ambiguities to disguise the 
actual structures, such as keeping blurred rules about: (i) governance structures (3C-1); 
(ii) criteria for selecting management members (4C-1A); (iii) decision-making processes 
on general lists (5C-1); and (iv) categories of membership (6C-1). Tactic 4C-1C, require 
members to attend face-to-face meetings to participate in the management group, also 
has some proximity with tactic 12C-1, make relevant decisions in face-to-face meetings 
(which is associated with the idea of undermining the general discussion list as a space 
for decision making). In addition, there is convergence between the tactics of keeping 
silent for not having legitimate knowledge (5C-5), and keep silent fo r disagreeing with 
the mainstream identity (6C-5); and between the tactics of avoiding Internet tools (other 
than the discussion list and the website) that would foster transparency, participation and 
less centralized decision-making processes (10C-1), and of avoid customizing websites 
and discussion lists in a more flexible way (11C-1).
Again, Scott’s (2001) framework helps to identify the nuances between similar arguments 
and tactics, to relate them to specific carriers, as developed in detail in chapter 6. Based 
on these cited interrelations, this investigation can substantiate the claim that the 
similarities between carriers, arguments and tactics are inherent to the proposed 
framework, as similar justifications and structures present nuances in relation to the kind
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of carrier they are associated with, in accordance with their regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive aspects.
8.1.4. Valuation of Scott’s framework
The previous discussion justifies the claim that Scott’s (2001) framework is helpful in 
understanding the diffusion of institutions through Internet-mediated communities. The 
framework supports this study by identifying carriers of social structures, following 
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos’s (2000: 699-702) suggestion of observing the role of durable 
social artefacts in the diffusion of institutionalised features. In other words, the adopted 
categorization offers a level of granularity, which permits a micro-level approach of the 
process of institutionalisation, instead of an abstract macro-level one (Czamiawska- 
Joerges, 1992: 56).
The focus on carriers permits the division of a general, abstract notion of an institution. In 
this investigation, the institutionalised procedure of segregating decision-making 
processes has been analysed through the 12 categories of carriers, thus exploring many 
different aspects related to the reproduction of such a structure. This choice was helpful 
in operationalizing this research, in the sense of permitting the elaboration of processes 
that would allow the observation of the processes of institutionalisation in the chosen 
settings (Babbie, 1998: 139).
Subsection 3.2.3, introduced the many authored discussion of the role of institutional 
carriers in the process of institutionalisation without a systematic classification. For 
instance, Weber (2002 [1930]) points out the relevance of religious groups, organizations, 
businesspersons, workers and middle classes. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b [1983]: 67- 
74) discuss legislation, curricula, technical requirements, accounting practices, 
performance evaluation and telecommunications and transport infrastructures. Meyer 
(1994: 36-44) focuses on ideologies, world-level organizations, nation-states and science 
(or knowledge). In these examples the role of carriers emerges clearly from the empirical
248
evidence, but these studies do not offer a pragmatic approach to studying the role of 
institutional carriers in other settings.
However, Scott’s (2001) framework offers a systematic classification into 12 categories, 
which facilitates the conceptualization of institutionalised features across regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars, distributed through symbolic systems, relational 
systems, routines and artefacts. Although this framework is a bounded system of 
categorization, it maintains flexibility, because of its variety of categories, as exemplified 
in this thesis. In the present investigation, this flexibility is explored when contrasting the 
categories with the empirical evidence.
Indeed, this researcher has adjusted the categories to the empirical situation, in order to 
understand which specific carriers are influencing actors in the reproduction of the 
studied structures. In contrasting the framework with the collected data, some carriers 
have emerged straightforwardly, such as the legislation Jobs and roles and scripts. Other 
carriers, however, have not been observed at all (such as values, regimes and obedience 
to duty14). And some carriers have demanded more effort to interpret their meaning in the 
specific cases, such as the group artefacts.
As explained in subsection 5.2.10, objects complying with specifications (10A-1) have 
been equated, in this study, with their inscribed, technical features favouring segregated 
decision making. The same artefacts, nonetheless, may be used in different ways in other 
settings, as their features may be customized to a range of possibilities. Thus the 
standardized, institutionalised way tools are customized constitutes a second category of 
carrier, objects meeting conventions and standards (11A-1), embedded in the same 
artefacts. Finally, the study recognizes a third category of objects possessing symbolic 
value (12A-1), which in the case of this study undermines Internet tools as a channel of 
communication, as members consider that in communication, Internet tools are less 
efficient than face-to-face interaction.
14 Quoting from Scott’s examples, presented in subsection 3.2.4. Other many examples could be cited in 
respect of other authors.
249
This study thus supports the argument that it is only by closely observing the context that 
the researcher may conclude which are the prevalent resilient social structures 
(Jepperson, 1991: 146; Avgerou and Madon, 2004: 175). Indeed, context is highly 
relevant to the way institutional carriers diffuse social structures (Scott, 2003, 2005; 
Weber, 2002 [1930]; Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973) (see subsection 3.2.4). Scott’s 
framework is thus flexible and complex enough to permit a broad categorization of 
carriers in context. At the same time, it has helped this researcher in exploring how 
agency (arguments and tactics) interacts with carriers in the specific contexts of study. 
The alignment of arguments and tactics with carriers, within the same categories, has 
facilitated the organization of findings and the elaboration of analysis, making clear the 
distinction between the roles of social structures and agency in the diffusion of 
institutions.
The strength of the chosen framework does not mean, however, that this investigation has 
not faced problems in reading the empirical phenomena through this lens. Any 
classification is a controversial way of reading the world, as the complexity of reality 
always implies that something is captured and something lost in categorizing (Bowker 
and Star 1999: 10-12). In this study, the best example of the difficulty of straightforward 
application of the framework was in the categories related to artefacts, as explained above 
(and in subsection 5.2.10).
Recalling this aspect, Scott (2001) suggested that some artefacts should be considered by 
their regulative aspects -  by their mandated specifications. The studied communities, 
however, were not subjected to any restriction in adopting tools within a regulative, legal 
framework. Indeed, in practice, the communities could choose their tools or even create 
tools with any kind of specification. Thus the classification was too rigid to be applied in 
its entirety to the empirical cases studied here.
In order to disentangle this problem, this research has interpreted Scott’s general 
perception on regulative artefacts, informed by academic studies that have explored the
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relationship between technology and social structures, as well as the contrast between 
technological artefacts, norms and technology-in-use (Avgerou, 2002; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Kallinikos, 2002; Doherty, Coombs and Loan-Clarke, 2006; Faraj, Kwon and Watts, 
2004; Souza et al., 2004; De Cindio, Gentile and Redolfi, 2003; Orlikowski and Barley, 
2001). From this contrast, the adopted differentiation between artefacts as technical 
features and artefacts as institutionalised customization emerges, as explained above. For 
this researcher, the possibility of doing such an adaptation reveals more about the 
flexibility and robustness of Scott’s framework than about its weaknesses.
8.2. Theoretical contribution: Introducing agency to Scott’s framework
Chapter 3 introduced the concept that the process of institutionalisation suggests both that 
social structures influence actors’ behaviour, rather than imposing themselves upon 
actors, and that agency is associated with the reproduction as well as the change of 
institutions (Scott, 2001, 1998; Jepperson, 1991; Powell, 1991; Avgerou, 2002). When 
focusing on institutional carriers, the emphasis falls upon the inertial aspects of social 
structures, as they constrain behaviour, providing stability and order. Complementarily, 
institutions also empower activities, fostering changes. The outcomes of these contrasting 
forces are ambiguous, especially through time (Scott, 2005: 467-468; March and Olsen, 
1989: 65; Peters and Pierre, 1998: 567; North, 1998: 249).
Considering the need to balance structure and agency, scholars point out the proximity of 
new institutionalism to Giddens’ structuration theory (Scott, 2001: 67, 75; J. Scott, 1995: 
214; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Klijn, 2001). For Giddens (1979: 70; 1984: 25, 374), 
actors constitute social structures through interaction and they are themselves constituted 
by the social structures. Agency and social structures constitute each other through 
interaction, thus social structures foster the emergence of behaviour patterns, although 
there is always space for differences in interpretations which change social structures 
(Giddens, 1979: 64-66; 1984: 14-15; Scott, 1998: 17-18). This concept is close to Berger
251
and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1967: 70) conception of social order as being an ongoing human 
production: as a product of human activity.
In this mutual-dependency between social structures and agency, the context must be 
considered in order to have a better understanding on the process of institutionalisation. 
As introduced in subsection 3.3.2, institutions need to be interpreted if they are to be 
applied in ambiguous situations, thus new social structures emerge from the processes 
which are dynamic and context-dependent (March, 1994: 61, 68, 78-79; March and 
Olsen, 1989: 24, 58-65; Mantzavinos, 2001: 90-94; Weber, 2002 [1930]: 5-12; 32-33; 
Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973: 92). For Scott (2005: 466-467, 471), different logics 
compete in institutional environments, which in practice means that actors have the 
potential for reconstructing rules, norms and beliefs -  thus institutions not only reveal the 
nature of the reproduction and collapse of social structures, but also the creation of new 
ones.
This study is inspired by this idea of balancing the emphasis on social structures and 
agency in the understanding of processes of institutionalisation. As discussed in 
subsections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, the empirical evidence suggests that social structures 
influence behaviour, through institutional carriers, and that agency reproduces social 
patterns as well as creates new ones, in order to embed segregated decision-making 
processes in specific situations. The role of agency in this empirical investigation is 
explored through two constructs: arguments and tactics.
Arguments are important in embedding the carried social structures in the situation of the 
studied communities, especially in the case of reproducing structures that are inconsistent 
with an ideal model of network organizations. The arguments interpret the carrier as a 
way of legitimising the reproduced social structure of segregating decision-making 
processes within these communities (as discussed in section 7.2). This process of 
legitimisation of institutions is inherent in the diffusion and change of social structures 
(Scott, 2005: 467-468; Mantzavinos, 2001: 95; Lanzara, 1998: 20; Jepperson and Meyer, 
1991: 226-229; March, 1994: 69-70). Furthermore, arguments recall that there are
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sanctioning mechanisms associated to social structures, such as the potential of receiving 
government funding (IB-1), or the risk of losing their jobs (8B-1) if online behaviour is 
not compatible with members’ roles in society.
The role of tactics can be better understood as describing how people act in a situation in 
the presence of social structures. The conflict between institutions and power structures 
implies that institutions need to be interpreted in any given situation, as they are not 
reproduced automatically or without ambiguity (March and Simon, 1993 [1958]: 12; 
Scott, 2005: 466; 1994b: 76; Meyer, 1992: 263; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 29-31; 
Avgerou, 2002: 39-44; Jepperson and Meyer, 1991: 226; North: 1990: 68, 101; 
Stinchcombe, 1968: 112, 186). As described above, the tactics work in this direction, of 
reproducing or adapting (changing) the carried social structures in the affected situation.
The theoretical lens of new institutionalism and structuration theory, and the empirical 
evidence present in this investigation justify claims that the understanding of processes of 
institutionalisation may be improved through frameworks which include both the 
structural proprieties of institutions and agency. More specifically, following the analysis 
adopted in this study, I suggest adding other elements to Scott’s (2001) framework on 
carriers, i.e. arguments and tactics, which complement the understanding on how agency 
draws upon social structures.
Indeed, the present study applies the suggested framework of categories, which associate 
carriers with arguments and tactics, separating the elements that carry structures from the 
justification of procedures and the observed patterned actions. Arguments and tactics 
have thus specific participation in the diffusion of institutions, similar to Barley and 
Tolbert’s (1997: 105) proposition of separating actors’ interpretation of their behaviour 
from their observed pattern of interaction. These constructs also respect the chosen 
framework on institutional carries. As proposed by Scott (2003: 884-885; 2005: 468), the 
diffusion of institutionalised features depends on the way actors interpret ideas and 
negotiate activities in their situations
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Strang and Meyer (1994: 100-109) and March and Olsen (1989: 40-42) argue that, behind 
the diffusion of institutions, there is the fundamental work of constructing meaning, 
making sense of a world of uncertainties and ambiguities, which should be considered in 
related studies. Indeed, in observing the arguments as interpretations, it becomes easier to 
understand the cultural-cognitive framework of the actors in relation to the specific 
institution (Meyer, 1992: 264). Scott (2005: 471) strongly suggests that institutional 
arguments help to understand the emergence of new models of organizing.
Tactics, complementarity, permit the exploration in practice of the dynamic aspects of the 
diffusion of institutions, following how carriers influence the patterns of interaction of 
different actors. In emphasising the role of agency in the situated translation of carried 
social structures, it is possible to observe how new social structures emerge from 
institutional features and which contextual forces and actors are related to these changes 
(Lanzara, 1998; Ingram, 1998: 258, 262; Powell, 1991: 199; Jepperson and Meyer, 1991: 
226-229; Scott, 1994b: 75-76).
Naturally, tactics are patterns of interaction at different levels of institutionalisation. 
Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]: 71-79) indicate that the enactment of new social 
patterns (extemalization) is the first step in the process of institutionalisation. The full 
institutionalisation, nonetheless, depends on whether these patterns gain historicity 
(objectivation) and whether they are ‘retrojected’ into consciousness through 
socialization (internalisation). Thus only over time one can conclude whether a patterned 
interaction has become fully institutionalised.
The proposed framework thus understands the reproduction of institutions as a dynamic 
process, agreeing with Giddens (1979, 1984) that structures only exist in as much as 
people reproduce them. Scott (2005: 471) suggests, in relation to the conflictive forces in 
social life, that institutions demand permanent effort and energy even to prevent their 
decline or destruction. Thus even when institutions are reproduced fully, there is a 
dynamic process of active agency behind the repetition of patterned interactions. Thus the 
focus on tactics, as applied in this empirical investigation, permits to investigate situated
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agency differentiating how social actors, in the interaction with social structures, engage 
in processes of reproducing, changing and deconstructing institutionalised organizational 
forms.
Furthermore, the proposed framework maintains the capacity for following the process of 
institutionalisation at the micro-level (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 83; 
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000: 699; see also Czamiawska-Joerges, 1992: 56), but 
with a greater analytical power. To be sure, carriers are repositories of institutions in the 
form of specific rules, norms and cognitive structures (Scott, 2001). However, before 
being reproduced in a given situation, the carried social structures are still “memory 
traces” in one’s mind, related to “how things are to be done” (Giddens, 1979: 64; see also 
1984: 17, 25, 377). It is thus informative to follow the effective emergent structure to 
understand the degree to which the carried institutional feature is reproduced in the 
situation.
In addition, the proposed framework necessarily embeds the role of context. As discussed 
through this thesis, agency interacts with social structures in specific situations. The 
interpretation of social structures thus depends on the shared conception of reality in 
context (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]: 15). As argued by Suchman (1987: 179), 
context is endogenous to action; not only making action possible but also the coherence 
of action cannot be explained by institutions alone, but by the interaction of actors in a 
situation. Thus when explaining arguments and tactics in particular settings, under the 
influence of carriers, actors also reveal the relevant contextual aspects from their point of 
view. At some level, these contextual elements bring macro-elements to the analysis as 
well, as far as they are relevant in explaining institutions in a given situation.
Lastly, tactics may be understood as carriers-in-practice15, as a lens to observe the 
enactment of the respective social structures. This perspective draws upon Orlikowski’s
(2000) proposition of adopting a practice lens to investigate how technology is used, in 
order to map the enacted social structures with their emergent proprieties. In this work,
15 This term has been suggested by Dr. Edgar Whitley, in discussion related to this thesis.
255
inspired by structuration theory, Orlikowski concludes that technological structures 
emerge from people’s situated interaction with specific pieces of technology -  thus 
technological structures are not “embodied in technologies simply waiting to be 
appropriated” (ibid: 407).
In this thesis, the same reasoning of focusing on emergent structures enacted in practice is 
used not only in relation to artefacts, but also to the other categories of carriers. Thus, 
artefacts, rules, norms, cognitive schemas, jobs, scripts and other carriers are repositories 
of social structures, but it is in practice that actors decide how to interpret them in a given 
situation, considering all the conflicting institutional features, power structures and 
contingencies in the specific context. This focus on carriers-in-practice offers a necessary 
balance between social structures and agency, as nothing is taken for granted but the 
actual patterned behaviour.
8.3. Research limitations
This investigation started from solid ground, following as it did a pilot study, a theoretical 
framework and an extensive literature review on virtual communities and research design 
and methods. Still some obstacles may have interfered with its results. Thus below I will 
examine the strengths and the weaknesses of this research (complementing the discussion 
on methodology, presented in chapter 4) and believe this will allow the reader to evaluate 
the whole research through these lenses.
The interpretive orientation and the qualitative approach, through semi-structured, in- 
depth interviews, adopted by this research were very helpful in understanding the 
phenomena in question. The level of explored detail, describing a complex phenomenon, 
about which there was no previous knowledge, would not be possible without intensive 
interactions with social actors involved in the studied settings.
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The choice of a multiple case-study strategy was advantageous. The original objective of 
exploring similar and contrasting results (literal and theoretical replications) was fulfilled 
(Yin, 2003: 47; Hakim, 2000: 62; de Vaus, 2001: 240) (discussed in section 4.2). In 
addition, the strategy helped to extend my theoretical perception (Yin, 1981: 63; 
Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987: 369-370, 373) of new institutionalism, as the 
different ways of embedding social structures in different settings called attention to the 
role of agency, leading to the development of a theoretical contribution (presented in 
section 8.3).
There are two other aspects of this research design and execution, nonetheless, which 
deserve further critical evaluation. The first subsection summarizes the conceptualization 
of the studied communities in order to frame the context in which the findings may be 
understood. The second subsection discusses some contextual ambiguities present in the 
empirical evidence.
8.3.1. The conceptualization of the empirical object
It is necessary to clarify the limits of the present investigation in considering its empirical 
objects. The four studied Brazilian environmental-education Internet-mediated 
communities have characteristics which make them particular, although not unique:
a. These collectivities are conceptualized in this research as communities, following 
Graham’s definition (1999), as it is possible to define their boundaries, based on 
the presence of common interests, rules and voluntary participation (section 2.2). 
They are thus different to other virtual collectivities which do not have such clear 
boundaries.
b. These communities are informal associations and do not have legal existence. For 
this reason they receive financial and material support through organisational 
members, who assume the role of anchor organization leaders and who become 
legally accountable for contracts (when they exist).
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c. They have a particular level of embeddedness in the social tissue that is not 
necessarily the case in other virtual communities. Although members understand 
their communities as being independent social movements (networks), they have 
links with formal organizations, which support the community from the minimal 
level of providing a server for a website up to supporting face-to-face meetings at 
national level.
d. Membership is not anonymous in these communities. Although I could not 
confirm if this rule is always enforced, all interviewees in this investigation 
interact in these communities with their real names. Thus the role of each member 
in society is transparent for all, at least within the group.
e. These communities have decision-making processes to support online and offline 
activities which demand collective coordination. This would not be the case for 
virtual communities whose members do not engage in common activities.
f. The Internet-mediated tools, especially the discussion lists, are the main 
communication channel in these communities.
It is not possible to be certain which of these aspects are essential in a conceptualization 
of these communities, which would permit generalization from this study to other settings 
in relation to the observed process of restrict institutionalisation. Indeed, as discussed in 
subsection 4.4.3,1 agree that in qualitative research, the understanding of a phenomenon 
may only inform our knowledge about other settings, thus I avoid attempts at 
generalizing findings and analysis to other spheres.
Within this limit and with regard to the carriers that have been identified in this 
investigation on decision making, it appears that the level of interaction of these 
communities with, and dependence on, other organizations (government, universities and 
NGOs) is important in making them more susceptible to the influence of the observed
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institutional carriers. Also, that these communities are not anonymous and some members 
have strong social links outside the virtual environment may reinforce the role of the 
observed carriers. Finally, that the nature of their interaction involves collective action, 
and thus decision-making processes, may be related to the kind of observed phenomena, 
since interviewees identified cognitive difficulties in coordinating action without having 
segregated decision-making processes.
These are only suppositions derived from my interaction with the data. This research does 
not aim to compare these communities with other settings in order to try to offer a better 
understanding of which factors may interfere with a community’s greater or lesser 
readiness to diffuse institutions. Still, these reflections may inform future research that 
studies communities in other virtual settings and allow contrasts between these 
communities and others.
8.3.2. Contextual ambiguities
In spite of the complexity of the studied phenomenon, the level of ambiguities in this 
research is very low and does not compromise its results. Two facts have contributed to 
the good quality of the empirical evidence: the elaboration of a pilot study before the 
main investigation (as explained in subsection 1.2.1); and the number of interviewees (58 
members, without considering the interviews for the pilot study), which brought a 
diversity of viewpoints to this research.
Still, as discussed in chapter 7, there are a few situations in which differences between 
cases have been observed and where the empirical evidence does not permit an 
exploration of associations with the contextual elements, which would help to understand 
the phenomena. In a few other situations, the empirical evidence permits more than one 
interpretation about possible associations.
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For instance, tactic 5C-1, organize leadership peers to give support to each other on the 
general discussion list, has only been cited by Rebea and Remtea members. As discussed 
in subsection 7.1.5, it makes sense that Reasul members do not cite this practice, as its 
ordinary members do not participate in decision making. The contextual ambiguity 
remains with Repea. As argued in the cited subsection, there is no empirical evidence that 
the result is biased because of the selection of interviewees (issue discussed in subsection 
4.3.1). The available data, nonetheless, does not suggest any association between this 
omission in Repea and contextual factors.
A second example is related to tactic 4C-1D {undermine the legitimacy o f ordinary 
members as potential leaders). There are contextual factors which may indicate that 
Reasul leadership is less concerned with this practice: it could be either because ordinary 
members do not challenge Reasul leaders (recalling that they are clearly excluded from 
decision-making processes); or because management members ignore the complaints of 
ordinary members (recalling that Reasul’s general discussion list is moderated). These 
both interpretations are grounded in empirical data, open thus space to certain level of 
ambiguity (as discussed in subsection 7.1.4).
In relation to these ambiguities, firstly it is important to clarify that this research does not 
aim to explain causal mechanisms between context and social structures. Furthermore, 
the questions proposed to respondents were open (in depth, semi-structured interviews), 
permitting them to explore the relevant aspects of their governance structures in 
accordance with their interpretation (discussed in section 4.1, and subsection 4.3.4). I 
explored the details of the practices they related, without requiring them to describe their 
perception on practices they did not refer to spontaneously.
The differences between cases are pointed out, however, and some contrasts appear to be 
associated with contextual factors. These associations are though exploratory in nature. 
The qualitative approach adopted in this research does not aim at, or allow, the testing of 
such relations, or the drawing of conclusions about reasons and causes. It simply 
explores possibilities. Thus without affirming that an interpretation is the correct, this
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research contextualizes findings and reports ambiguities clearly, permitting deeper 
accountability of procedures and conclusions (Taylor, 2003: 182-184; King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994: 31-32).
Lastly, in spite of the general quality of this investigation, in hindsight I have reflected 
that dividing the data collection into two distinct periods would improve its empirical 
data, especially allowing for the exploration of the contextual factors in greater depth and 
clarifying specific doubts. However, it is necessary to add two caveats about conducting a 
second set of interviews. Firstly, new ambiguities are likely to emerge from new 
interviews; such a likelihood is inherent in qualitative research. Second, in a second 
round of interviews, the investigator might be more tempted to tilt the findings in the 
direction of her initial understandings.
Naturally, the researcher always has a level of influence on interviewees (Mason, 2002: 
64, 68; May, 2001: 127; Klein and Myers, 1999: 74; Walsham, 1993: 8). The point thus is 
not to avoid a second set of interviews in future research, but to be aware of the risks of 
constructing an inferior picture in spite of greater effort. Even bearing this in mind, it 
appears that a second round of data collection could contribute to reducing ambiguities.
8.4. Concluding remarks on contributions and future research
In a broad sense, this research contributes directly to the fields of Internet (new media) 
and organization studies, considering its empirical object (Internet-mediated 
communities) and its focus on governance structures. It also contributes to new 
institutionalism, in applying Scott’s (2001) framework to understand a virtual 
environment and in proposing the addition of elements of agency to the categories of 
carriers of social structures. Finally, this study contributes to the field of information 
systems, as it focuses on social structures that emerge from Internet-mediated interaction 
and also offers a broad discussion on the role of Internet tools as carriers of institutions in 
these environments.
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In more specific terms, this research makes other contributions. Firstly, this study 
responds to Wellman’s (2004: 127) suggestion to adopt a theory-driven approach to 
investigate an Internet phenomenon. Reviewing ten years of studies in this field, 
Wellman describes most research as descriptive or exploratory and that it is time to direct 
investigation through theory. This research is driven by new institutionalism, as the pilot 
study suggested that segregated decision-making social structures have diffused through 
Internet-mediated communities.
The theory-driven approach adopted helped the research design and operationalization, as 
the research question and the interview guide were clearly defined. Compared to my 
exploratory pilot study with these communities, having a framework permitted me to 
focus more deeply on the relevant evidence (Walsham, 1995a: 76; King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994: 29). Commencing from the concept that institutions are reproduced by 
agency in a specific context, I formulated questions to explore their governance structures 
in a given situation (Giddens, 1979: 69; 1984: 17; Scott, 2001: 67; Manicas, 1998: 318, 
320; Walsham, 1993: 53-55; Avgerou and Madon, 2004: 162; Sayer, 2000: 17).
Secondly, this research helps to address the gap in the academic literature on virtual 
communities and their related institutional influences in these settings, especially in 
relation to their governance structures, as discussed in chapter 2. The empirical evidence 
suggests that institutional carriers influence the diffusion of social structures through 
online environments, in spite of the many differences Internet-mediated interactions have 
in relation to those conducted face-to-face, at least in the studied settings. Furthermore, 
this study discusses how social structures and agency interact empirically to diffuse 
institutions.
Based on this empirical contribution, I suggest introducing agency (arguments and 
tactics) to Scott’s (2001) framework, associating them with institutional carriers. This 
amendment produced a better understanding of the diffusion of social structures. This 
association may help other researchers to understand the interplay of structures and 
agency within a single framework. To be sure, the literature on new institutionalism
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accounts for social structures and agency, as discussed in section 3.3. The argument here 
is that to link agency with specific carriers enables an understanding in practice of how 
social structures are reproduced (or changed) at the micro-level, by observing 
interpretations and actions directly related to specific carriers. To this end, the concept of 
carriers-in-practice is suggested, to differentiate clearly between the carried social 
structure and the observed enactment of similar or divergent patterned behaviour.
The suggested extended theoretical framework may be applied in any investigation of 
institutionalisation, being an analytical generalization from this study (Yin, 2003: 10, 32- 
33). Thus although this research starts from a theory driven approach, it has kept enough 
flexibility to expand its initial conceptual framework (Walsham 1993: 7; 1995a: 76, 79- 
80; Vaughan, 1995 [1992]: 195; May, 2001: 127; Fontana and Frey, 1994: 367; Rubin 
and Rubin, 2005: 32-37).
Thirdly, I suggest how to interpret artefacts as carriers of institutions in the studied virtual 
communities (subsections 5.2.10 and 8.1.4), utilizing the flexibility offered by Scott’s
(2001) framework. For example, the differentiation between artefact as its technical 
features (10A-1) and artefact as institutionalised customization (11A-1) is helpful in 
understanding how the same piece of technology embodies both these carriers as 
repositories of social structures. Still, the way people use this artefact is a second step 
that, in this study, appears in the discussion of tactics, which are the modes of 
appropriation of a social structure through agency in a given setting (which is closer to 
the idea of technology-in-use, proposed by Orlikowski, 2000). This conceptualization of 
artefacts may help other researchers to contextualize the framework on institutional 
carriers in computer-mediated settings.
Fourth, this research contributes to the debate on network versus hierarchical forms of 
organization in virtual communities, although it is not the objective of this research to 
explore this contrast. Still the pilot study and the main investigation both suggest that 
these communities struggle to accommodate two parallel models -  the ideal of a network 
organization versus the actual practice of vertical decision-making structures. Based on
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this empirical data, future research could explore this loose coupling of paradoxical 
structures, which could be related to the processes of legitimisation of these communities 
in society (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) (see further detail on this theme in subsection 8.4.1).
Lastly, this research indicates that there is an interaction between carriers, arguments and 
tactics, despite the diverse nature of these categories, that is worthy of continued study 
(8.1.3); it is important to understand carriers, arguments and tactics in their complex 
interaction rather than in isolation. Indeed, Scott (2003: 890-891) suggests the need to 
investigate how institutional carriers are combined in different contexts. The interactions 
presented in this dissertation point to the possibility of creating a more comprehensive 
approach to the diffusion of institutions through carriers. This study presents the evidence 
for going further in this direction.
• 8.4.1. Future research
Drawing upon this research, I would like to suggest other studies which may continue to 
expand on the themes presented here. This section thus is very modest and aims mainly to 
argue that this study may also be useful for the development of future research, furthering 
the present contribution to the existing scholarly literature.
Firstly, reflecting on the homogeneity of the studied communities (subsection 8.3.1), I 
suggest elaborating a comparative study between these collectivities and a contrasting set. 
Naturally this first study has been fundamental in establishing solid knowledge on the 
role of carriers and agency, in a virtual setting that reproduces institutionalised, 
segregated decision-making processes. Using these findings as a foundation, further 
research could explore the contrast between the studied communities and other virtual 
collectivities that are less dependent on formal organizations. Indeed, Indymedia16 would 
be an interesting contrasting case, as it is a setting known for its more democratic,
16 http://www.indvmedia.org
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network-like decision-making structures, but which is able to coordinate collective efforts 
on a global scale (Pickard, 2006; Polletta, 2002) (discussed in section 1.2).
Secondly, community members revealed the presence of a loose coupling process of 
having two parallel models, the ideal of a network organization in contrast with the 
enacted practice of reproducing instances of hierarchical models. This phenomenon 
resembles, at some level, the one described by Meyer and Rowan (1977), of 
organizations which keep both formal, rational structures, so as to gain legitimacy in their 
relational networks, and conversely informal, efficient ones to conduct day-to-day 
activities. The two models are kept together through loosening coupling strategies.
Indeed, the studied communities make a huge effort to sustain a discourse of having 
network governance structures, which are legitimate to social movements around the 
world (as discussed in chapter 1). Thus an interesting study, based in new 
institutionalism, would be to investigate the network model as an institution, similar to 
the rational model discussed by Meyer and Rowan. The empirical evidence suggests that 
these communities cultivate the ideal model as a way of legitimising themselves in their 
relational networks. It is necessary to develop, then, a further understanding of the 
institutions which diffuse such a network model as legitimate, in order to contrast this 
with the observed segregated decision-making models.
Thirdly, the findings suggest that the communities are subject to power systems, which 
possess instruments of enforcement (such as reward and punishment mechanisms), 
fostering the diffusion of social structures in these collectivities favourable to those 
external bodies exercising this power. This poses a question about what collective 
interests keep ordinary members and leaders together. From the interviews, it is not 
difficult to understand that members are rewarded and punished by power systems; what 
is not clear is why these communities, embedded as they are in broader social systems, 
are attractive to members.
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In other words, leaders and ordinary members perceive keeping these Internet-mediated 
structures in their current form as a worthy objective, but it could be otherwise. Given the 
prevalence of Internet channels in these communities, ordinary members could rebel at 
any time against the leaders by creating competing communities, but they do not do so. 
Again, new institutionalism may help to understand how these communities are located in 
broader institutional environments, in which being a member and conforming to rules 
makes sense. It would also be informative to research the phenomenon from the point of 
view of power structures. As conceptualized by Foucault (1980: 98), all individuals are 
nodes who actively articulate the circulation of power through social networks. Thus it is 
important to understand the benefits members gain from belonging to these communities 
as an exercise in power and resistance.
Finally, this investigation also calls attention to the role of artefacts in the elaboration of 
social structures. Reflecting on the many times respondents reproduce behaviours in 
order to comply with enforcement mechanisms, it would be enlightening to compare the 
environment created by the Internet tools with the idea of the panopticon17; extending 
Zuboff s (1988) description of a computer enabled panopticon in a single geographical
1 Rworkplace, as computers permit a greater level of control and surveillance , to a 
distributed community.
As proposed by Foucault (1991 [1977]: 187, 200; 1980: 148-155), the panopticon works 
as a mechanism of disciplinary power: people subjected to such a structure of permanent
17 The panopticon is an architectural model, created by Jeremy Bentham, which makes prisoners 
permanently visible to observers. As the prisoners are not able to know when they are being observed, they 
act as they are always being observed, to avoid punishment for misbehaviour. See Foucault (1991 [1977]: 
200; 1980: 147-155).
18 In chapter 9, Zuboff discusses how computers may increase surveillance capacity, also using the 
metaphor of the panopticon. The author, nonetheless, does not take it for granted that techniques of control 
and surveillance would be successful in any setting. She emphasises that computers also expose managers 
to the scrutiny of others, and that the enacted social structures, emerging from interaction in computer- 
mediated environments, depends on the prevalent power structures. In sum, Zuboff argues that it is 
necessary to analyse the empirical situation to conclude the impact of computers in organizations.
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surveillance internalise the rules and become their own overseer. In the discussion of 
power relations, it is important to investigate how these virtual communities are located 
in society as an instance which exposes part of the social interactions to the surveillance 
of the collective and how this affects members’ identities within and outside the virtual 
environment. In other words, the interaction through these virtual communities may have 
affected the power structures in society. Such an investigation will provide insights into 
current concerns about the influence of social networking communities on the fabric of 
society and the changing nature of inter-personal relationships in non-computer mediated 
environments.
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